

## **Chapter V**

### **Critique of Intentionality and Reflexivity of Consciousness**

## 5.1 Introduction

So far as we have discussed these two theories of intentionality and reflexivity in the context of phenomenology and Vedānta in the previous chapters it follows that the fundamental essence of consciousness has been mainly designated either by its self-luminous nature or by object-directedness. On the one hand, Husserlian tradition and some of the significant Indian schools like the Nyāya and the Viśiṣṭādvaita are rigid in their adherence to define consciousness in terms of ‘consciousness of’; on the other hand, there is Advaita philosophy that strongly challenges the intentional thesis by confirming to reflexivity as the essential nature.

It needs to be admitted that the polarity between these two notions is so severe that it is hard to get any preferable alternative to resolve the conflict. Though some measures have been taken by phenomenologists like Merleau-Ponty and Mohanty, and even implicitly by Rāmānuja, yet their final stand involves a sense of biasness. Intentionality and reflexivity, they hold, are not conflicting but compatible with each other, though ultimately it has also been noticed that they seek to derive reflexivity from intentionality by maintaining intentionality as the primary aspect of consciousness and consequently source of self-awareness. As a result Mohanty’s claim about the compatibility between intentionality and reflexivity in the true sense is questionable. Since from Advaitic standpoint, the conflict between these two is absolute and unending due to their opposed nature which does not leave any further scope for convergence. Advaita goes a step further and deeper and ascribes ‘object-directedness’ to the subtle internal organ that is indeed a product of matter and defines consciousness entirely in terms of reflexivity.

Thus argues Mohanty, an Advaitin does not only deny any such compatibility but also makes reflexivity fundamental.

Nevertheless, the aim of this chapter is not to revisit the above two theories nor to undertake any descriptive study rather to make a critique of the theories of intentionality and reflexivity in a rigorous way. The sole aim is to examine what would be the consequences if consciousness is taken to be absolutely intentional and what would be the consequences if consciousness is purely reflexive. In other words, this chapter seeks to explore the major limitations we find in the way to characterize consciousness absolutely through intentionality or reflexivity. The chapter intends to know, does absolute intentional consciousness rule out the possibility of reflexivity or co-extensive with reflexivity? Does Husserl really tend to reduce reflexivity into intentionality? Again, does reflexivity leave any room for intentional nature or preclude intentionality absolutely? Though, expecting any precise answer is beyond the limit of this study, for such an acute philosophical endeavor often seems to be an unending process. However, that does not make the present study redundant because the significance of any inquiry either positive or negative is that it turns out into a path for the successors which like a lamp lights up even the darkness and enhances the future research to go ahead. One may affirm the path or deny it but in whichever way he makes a path through the previous one.

Therefore, in this chapter an attempt has been carried out to make a critique of both the doctrines from antagonists' point of views in order to penetrate deep into the issue and to find out a reasonable approach for comprehending the problem.

## PART- I

### 5.2 Critique of Non-difference

According to Advaitins, the cognitive process which is undertaken by the internal organ to know the object brings modification in itself. This change in the constitution of internal organ results in forming the subject-object relation. Though, in reality, it is a mere contact between consciousness conditioned by the internal organ and consciousness conditioned by the object. However, according to Mohanty and other phenomenologists, this conditional nature of consciousness is the very essence of consciousness as consciousness in all states is seen to be ‘about an object’ or ‘conscious of an object’. By intentionality, Husserl and his followers do not mean any ‘intentional relation’ between two relata, such as, consciousness and object as Brentano has mistakenly assumed, for intentionality persists even in all cases where conscious state is just an act of imagination or hallucination, that is, when consciousness is not conscious of any real existing object. In other words, consciousness is not intentional for being related to any real object but since it possesses an objective content. Consciousness is always aware of something and thus reveals its own presence in terms of this nature of ‘awareness of an object’. It follows that the being of consciousness for phenomenologists is equivalent to its being ‘conscious of an object<sup>1</sup>’ for according to their view, there is no such state where consciousness is found to be non-intentional or without an objective content. That is to say the revelation of consciousness is determined by the revelation of an object. Thereby, it can be stated without any difficulty that for Husserl and other phenomenologists, there is no legitimate distinction between seeing and seen, for seeing is found to be manifested only through the manifestation of seen. In other words, like Rāmānuja, the

phenomenologists<sup>2</sup> attribute consciousness with an objective-content in all cases of its manifestation. And thus, it can be stated that phenomenologists implicitly affirm the non-difference between seeing and seen.

This being the claim of phenomenologists, it opposes the Advaitic principle of seeing-seen polarity. The entire tradition of Advaita retains a firm belief in the absolute difference between seeing (*dṛk*) and seen (*dṛśya*). Since for Śaṅkara, those which are opposed to each other like light and darkness cannot be by any means taken to be non-different. It is due to its intrinsic nature the seeing is claimed to be distinct and prior than known. While the manifestation of the seeing is pervasive, the seen is subject to mutation. Hence, seen cannot be manifested along with the manifestation of the seeing.

Vimuktātman, a later Advaitin, by analyzing the nature of seeing and seen in his famous work *Iṣṭa-siddhi* has argued for an ambiguous sort of relation between the two that permits neither difference nor non-difference nor both difference and non-difference. Though the difference between perceiving and perceived is firmly established and admitted by all, yet dialectical reasoning fails to prove this. Our experience of phenomenal world reveals that knowledge of difference is achieved only in case of two entities those are perceived while the reverse is not possible. That is, if one of the two entities is not seen, the difference logically cannot be proved. Accordingly, the difference between the seeing and seen cannot be realized for the seeing is not seen. If the seeing is seen then there would be no more seeing and if there is no seeing then seen cannot be known. Thus, it is concluded through dialectical reasoning that there is no difference between the seeing and seen. For, there is no other way to prove the difference. Here, it can be countered against this view that even if seeing is not seen that does not

substantiate the non-existence of seeing, for it is a mere illogical claim. At least to confirm the being of the seen the existence of seeing is considered to be prior and essential than any other entity. This consequently marks the difference between the two.

However, the denial of difference does not presuppose non-difference between them. Because what this latter Advaitin seeks to mean is not the denial of difference between seeing and seen rather is the absence of dialectical proof in empirical usage to prove the difference. However, it must be stated that there is no logical ground as well for establishing the non-difference or any identity between the two. It is interesting to note that the argument put forth by Vimuktātman for establishing absence of non-difference between seeing and seen is more sound and convincing.

The first argument that is proposed to prove the illegitimacy of non-difference between seeing and seen is that if there were no difference between them the seeing would be the holder of all finite characteristics and limitations<sup>3</sup> attributed to the seen. The seeing would be non-eternal like seen and thus there will be series of fragmented cognitions and finally it will cause all types of epistemic and psychological problems for the cognizing self. Again, if the seeing is manifested only with the seen as meant by Husserl, then the seeing would be an inert object like a 'pot' etc. and being unconscious it can neither reveal itself nor can it reveal the known.

Further, the opponent may argue that the identity is evident by the act of consciousness where both the seeing and seen are apprehended simultaneously. Seeing and seen are manifested together for neither the seen can manifest itself without the seeing nor the seeing manifests itself alone without a seen (this is also argued by the Vijñāna-vādin like

phenomenologists). Hence, it follows that the seeing and seen are identical<sup>4</sup>. However, it is countered by Vimuktātman that the very expression that the seeing and the seen are manifested together or simultaneously is the proof for their difference. For, the term ‘together’ implies either two or many and not one. Consequently, when two are realized their difference is also evident. T.M.P Mahadevan writes, “we do not say that the seer is manifest along with the seer; nor do we maintain that the seen is manifest along with the seen.”<sup>5</sup>

Moreover, the identity between seeing and seen is inappropriate because the very nature of seeing is diametrically opposed to the nature of seen. Firstly, while the ‘seen’ is cognized through seeing the reverse is totally impossible. Even ordinary experience states whereas the ‘book’ is cognized by me, the book in turn can neither cognize me nor can its own being. Secondly, while seeing is self-luminous at all times, the seen is not. Thirdly, while the ‘seen’ is dependent for revelation on the seeing, seeing is self-evident. And, lastly, seeing is essentially one, but seen is many. In fact, the differences in various acts of cognition is caused by the extraneous objects superficially attributed to seeing; just as whiteness and blackness are attributed to cow. Hence, they cannot be the content of one and the same awareness, which is necessary for any assertion of identity<sup>6</sup>. Moreover, to claim seeing and seen are contents of one awareness implies that they both are cognized by a different cognitive act and thus, leads to an infinite regress. In brief, says S.N. Dasgupta, the perceiver is never a cognized object, and the perceived is never self-luminous.<sup>7</sup> As commenting on *Brahma-sūtra*, Śaṅkara says,

“it has to be admitted that the regularity in the simultaneous appearance of the cognition and its object is owing to the relation of causality between them and not owing to their identity.”<sup>8</sup>

According to Śāṅkara, the difference between ‘cognition of a pot’ and ‘cognition of a cloth’ is due to the different qualifying parts, that is, pot and cloth. Though, the substantive part of knowledge is beyond any such differentiation. Just as the way, between ‘a white cow’ and ‘a black cow’ the difference is the mere quality, like ‘black’ and ‘white’, yet the cowhood remains same. Confirming the essential differences between consciousness and object in phenomenal cognition, William Indich writes,

“the limitations (*upādhi*) of Atman-Brahman which create the duality between the subject and the object are still in effect during the identification of the knower and the known in perceptual experience. The non-difference of waking thus fails to transcend the basic duality between the subject and object that characterizes this level of consciousness, although perception comes closer to transcending this duality than any other empirical means of knowledge.”<sup>9</sup>

Moreover, both Husserl and Sartre hold that it is the self-transcending nature of consciousness that certifies its opposed nature from the object. For the very aspiration to go beyond emerges from the realization of something which is external and beyond. Likewise, the very phrase that consciousness is ‘about something’ states that consciousness is directed towards something which is distinct and external to conscious experience and thus known by it. It is quite surprising to note while phenomenologists have established intentionality as the very essence of consciousness by means of the dissimilarity between consciousness and object and ultimately ends in associating the two



by means of 'about-ness'; Advaita in terms of this very difference between the two repudiates any correlation between consciousness and object. And thereby, argues for the non-intentional essence of consciousness.

Hence, even the phenomenal state denies any identity between the seeing and seen, for there cannot be any seeing of seeing. An object existing outside is known through a cognition that is different from the object. To put it differently, the seen is pervaded by the seeing in all cases of perception, though the 'seeing' is not bound to associate with the 'seen'. When a particular object for instance, 'table' is cognized, one may not cognize the 'chair' placed in a distant corner of the room at the same time. Similarly, when the 'chair' is known, the 'table' may not be known simultaneously. Yet, this fact does not prevent consciousness from being luminous. The object either is revealed or not, the seeing is self-luminous always. Therefore, consciousness cannot be regarded as being associated with an objective content at all times. The inevitable conflict between the seeing and seen is sufficient in itself to repudiate the non-difference between them. To be more precise, neither seeing is an object of perception nor is the object co-present with the seeing. Thus, states S. N. Dasgupta,

“...so no consciousness can be regarded as being always qualified by a particular objective content; for, had it been so, that particular content would always have stood self-revealed.”<sup>10</sup>

It is obvious therefore, that contention of phenomenologists' to attribute consciousness or seeing with an objective content is not far-reaching. For dialectical reasoning and the very nature of experience point to the being of consciousness that is free and

unassociated. It seems that Advaita is not less radical in their approach to prove the non-intentional nature of consciousness.

Moreover, it is to be noted that the method of experiment adopted by the western phenomenologists to determine the authenticity of intentionality is not exclusive. Since, Advaita by the application of the same phenomenological method, indeed, by extending the very range of this method has proved the being of one eternal, non-intentional, self-luminous consciousness. Advaita has not only challenged the identity between seeing and seen, rather also argues for the absolute being of self-luminous consciousness.

### **5.3 Analysis of Three States of Experience and Establishment of Non-intentional Consciousness**

Though not as popular as that of Husserlian phenomenological method in the western world, yet the phenomenological study conducted by Advaita is more methodical in its application than the former. While Husserlian phenomenology prefers to pursue their study only in the waking state of experience, Advaita along with the support of revealed texts conducts the same transcending the edge of ordinary waking experience. Besides the waking state, Advaita comprehends both the dream and deep sleep experiences. It seems while Husserlian phenomenology stops prior to dream and sleep states and thereby, it is incomplete in its approach and consequence, Advaita provides us with a detailed account of consciousness including dream and sleep experiences and thereby, it is complete in its application and result.

Experience is the base of all existence for there is no such being that can sustain without consciousness. Perhaps for this reason Advaita defines the highest reality in terms of

absolute existence that is identical with consciousness. Ordinarily we limit the range of conscious experience within the waking state avoiding the import of dream and deep sleep states. Though, modern neuroscientists and psychologists admit that the periphery of consciousness is even more wide and deep than what it reveals to waking experience. Just as Sigmund Freud claims about the existence of widespread sub-conscious and unconscious states behind this perceptible state, even for Advaita, the waking state is just one outer expression of consciousness and as a result any inquiry into the nature of consciousness would be inadequate if we do not take into account the deep sleep state and dream state. In brief, the examination of three states of consciousness is the most important method by the application which Advaita aims to establish their unique position.

### **5.3.1 Analysis of Waking Experience**

Among the three states of consciousness, the waking state is known for its actuality and efficiency. While in case of other states, the empirical individual fails to react and perform according to one's own will, in waking state the will of the individual prevails at his utmost level. To all ordinary human beings, it is the waking state that appears real while dream state seems quite unreal for being less durable in compare to the former as well as for the vagueness and disorderliness we see in dream events. Even the state of deep sleep though important and necessary for the existence of being, yet in ordinary life it does not appear equally important like the waking state. The waking state alone seems primary for it is the only means to actualize all our needs and aspirations. It alone provides us the base for the performance of all deliberate activities. This is one crucial reason why psychological study is mainly concerned about our waking experience.

Indeed, according to the phenomenologists, the reason for considering waking experience alone to undertake phenomenological study is indubitably same. Among several reasons, according to Śāṅkara, one major point that shows the priority of the waking experience over dream state is the contradictory nature of the latter. While the threat of a wild elephant in our dream gets disrupted when we wake up, the elephant of the waking experience is real and can cause real threat unlike dream. In brief, while the dream experience is sublated by the waking experience, the latter is not.

The importance of waking experience lies in its being connected with the physical world. So far as the reality or the very being of this physical world is concerned it is known only if we are awake.<sup>11</sup> For instance, an object may exist in the world but if it is not known it is as equal as nonbeing, the value of which is not acknowledged. The phenomenal world in this way is known to exist through its perception in the waking state but neither the dream experience nor the state of sleep supports the being of any external world. As long as, one is in dream, he continues to admit the dream state as the only reality which is proved from his corresponding response and feeling in dream. In the same way, when one is in deep sleep state, he remains completely unaware about the activities which are taking place in the world outside. Therefore, the only state that makes us acquainted with this vast physical world operating outside is the waking experience. Consequently, the maximum application of this physical body and its different organs is seen in this waking state, where one not only receives the impression through the five different organs of knowledge but also communicates with the world incessantly through the different organs of action.<sup>12</sup> It is in this state we venture into several worldly affairs by means of our will or volition. We enjoy and suffer the results of our activities and thus the process

continues. There is thereby no such moment in waking state where we are not related with anything; either physically or mentally we communicate with the world at all the time. Even if we withdraw ourselves from all worldly activities, there is basically no such state where one finds oneself as dissociated or unattached from other. As Brentano claims that in desire something is desired, in judgment something is judged, in presentation something is presented; in brief, there is no such state where our conscious states and perception are not aware of something or related to an object<sup>13</sup>. Either we affirm or deny, love or hate, claim or refute, we are always in association with an object in terms of our mental states. While in case of external perception or act we are in contact with an external object, in case of internal perception viz., pleasure etc. we are in direct contact with the states of mind and indirectly with the objects of outside. For, the states of pleasure, pain, anger, love etc. are the immediate objects of perception to the witness.<sup>14</sup> While in case of external perception, the involvement of the organs of our knowledge or senses is required, internal perception is free from the activities of the former and requires only the participation of the internal organ. The objects of internal perception are thereby not outside but inside, these are different states of mind, immediately apprehended by consciousness. In brief, the waking experience is not just a dim representation by the mind like dream rather it needs the entire gross body to move simultaneously, at least the senses and the internal organ. The objects of waking state being real phenomena, there is a real effort in the part of the individual to cognize them which seems absent in case of dream.

It follows that any analysis into the waking state of consciousness is analogous with the examination of perception. For, perceptual process yields a complete account of our

waking experience as we go through in ordinary life. Though, other means of cognition are also necessary in different knowledge situations besides perception, yet in empirical order all other *pramāṇas* are logically dependent on perception which ultimately ensures the supremacy of perception in the process of cognition. Indeed, this is not the only reason for ensuring priority to perception rather for Advaita the significance of perception lies in its sole authority to reveal the nature of Pure Consciousness.<sup>15</sup> Since, the highest knowledge as the Śruti asserts is a result of immediate and intuitive perception.<sup>16</sup>

Like Husserl, Advaita does argue that perceptual cognition by means of its very mechanism in the phenomenal world is object-directed to formulate any piece of knowledge. Advaitins of course did never propose formally any theory of intentionality, yet they do affirm this object-directed character as well as the subject-object correlation as necessary aspects for any phenomenal knowledge. However, there is a methodological difference between their perspectives. An object says Advaita, is manifest only through the participation of knowing being and thus, duly depends on the act of perception. As a result the knowing-consciousness although is distinct, seems to be correlated to the object-consciousness by means of the necessary instrumentation of the internal organ. Since, any act either physical or mental is accomplished by the participation of the agent. It is for this reason internal organ is considered essential to cognize the object as consciousness by its inherent nature is devoid of any agency and thus, seeks the intervention of internal organ to act. Indeed, what comprehends the object is the modification of internal organ, viz, the *vṛtti* which by means of its unique composition gets associated with object and thus bridges the gap between the subject and the object.

Agency in phenomenal cognition thus belongs to the internal organ which is always pervaded by the conscious experience to operate.

There are two views stated by the Advaitins regarding the operation of mind in the act of cognition. First, the mind being very dynamic always goes out towards the object of its cognition. And, secondly, being extremely flexible the mind assumes the form of the object bringing a transformation in itself. It is important here to mention that object-directedness for Advaita is conditioned by these two stages of mind. For neither pure consciousness in Advaita is suffered by any desire to meet an object, for it is self-contained nor it can logically coincide with the object that it excludes. Again, individual consciousness though essentially pure, is incapable to reveal and to cognize the object as it is concealed by *avidyā*. Hence, there is the need of the mind to coordinate. Though this function of the mind that incorporates these two consecutive steps sounds fictional to many western philosophers, yet Advaita provides a strong rationale behind their adherence which needs to be clarified.

The existence of mind in empirical order is affirmed by Śaṅkara in his *bhāṣya*, for all activity of the senses.<sup>17</sup> Since the limitation of senses in cognitive act can be compensated by the mobility of the mind that not only goes to the object by means of the senses but also helps in revealing the object. Different popular theories of west tend to define this perceptual process as an act performed duly by the senses that accumulate raw information for the mind to analyze and synthesize them in a proper order. The work of the mind is thereby confined in arranging the given data to produce knowledge. However, the Advaitic view contradicts this popular western view that is often admitted as an authentic standpoint. First of all, to Advaita mind is not a 'white sheet' where experience

writes its impression nor it is simply the data organizing tool in the act of perception. The mind indeed is not the blind supporter of the senses rather it is finer and more pervasive in nature than the gross senses. Being extremely active, it co-operates the senses to hold the object but not by staying inside rather it goes out to posit the object. Here, it would be sheer nonsensical to argue that mind regulates a particular perception only if it is intended with will. Since association of mind is necessary for all cases of productive cognition. Or else, differences between two or more similar objects cannot be noticed by mere senses. For example, when I am attentively writing a paper to develop a particular notion where my mind is extremely involved in bringing out the content, I am also aware of the movement of the hand holding the pen and thereby the hand pauses the moment I need to rethink on a particular point. To be precise, all valid cognitions as well as activities need the mind to cooperate the senses.

According to D.M. Datta, if it is assumed that the sense organ receives the external stimuli from object that brings physiological changes and which consequently leads to cognition, where the mind aids the senses attentively to grasp the object without going out; the theory apparently implies that the very reason for knowledge is not the cognition of the object existing outside but the physiological changes that take place due to it. This theory seems implausible because there will be no uniform knowledge even regarding the same object between two different percipients due to the different physiological changes occurred in them. Further, the only logical conclusion of such theory of perception says D.M. Datta, is representationism<sup>18</sup>. However, perception necessitates a direct contact with the external world without which we could hardly have even an inferential knowledge about it from its supposed physiological effects.<sup>19</sup> We cannot imagine to have



our own internal percepts that coincidentally found to be identical with real external objects in all cases of perception. Thus, in this context the Advaitic view that mind goes out to meet its object in perception is not at all fictitious rather supported by common sense as well as philosophical speculation<sup>20</sup>. This point, however, would be more evident once we examine the second function of mind in the case of perception.

The immediate function of the internal organ after reaching to the object through the channels of the senses is to posit the object that produces the modification of the internal organ or *vṛtti* into the form of the object. At the time of perception there is the illumination of this modification of mind that is identified with the object and thus, we have the cognition of the object. Though in case of imagination or remembrance of the object, we only have the image in the form of the modification or *vṛtti* apart from the object, yet the *vṛtti* refers to the real object. To Advaita, this formation of *vṛtti* is necessary for any act of cognition which gets recorded mechanically. Since, if the form of the object is not immediately recorded after the act of perception there will be no more stored memory and we will fail to recognize our past perceived object in all subsequent cases of perception.

In brief, the mind is the mediating principle through which the subject knows the object by the light of consciousness.<sup>21</sup> For perception occurs says *Vedānta-paribhāṣā*, only when consciousness limited by the object is tinged with the consciousness limited by the subject through the consciousness limited by the means of knowledge<sup>22</sup>. Expressing the role of *vṛtti* in his essay *The Six ways of Knowing*, D. M. Datta writes:

“....the *antaḥkāraṇa* functions not only in perception and memory, but also in all other forms of mental dealing with objects, such as judging, inferring, imagining, forming ideas

on the basis of words heard, and so on. In every one of these cases, there is an objective mode of the mind (*antaḥkāraṇa-vṛtti*). The only thing which is self-manifest, and does not need a mental mode, but on the contrary, illumines even the mode, is consciousness (*cit*) itself.”<sup>23</sup>

In Advaita, therefore, the mind does not lead a perception only when it is a purposive act or follows from some intention rather participation of mind is necessary for any cognitive act to correlate with the object. Nevertheless, it seems that Advaitic account of *vṛtti* or mental mode as the form of the intentional object possesses keen similarity with Husserlian account of ‘*noema*’ or meaning. Like *vṛtti*, the *noema* of an act of perception is definitely not the object of perception nor it is the one towards which the act is directing. It is rather emerges in each case of our cognitive perception and endures even when the object does not exist. Indeed, it persists even when there is no corresponding real object of it like in case of our act of imagination, hallucination and erroneous cognition. Here, the only difference one may notice is that for Husserl it is this *noema* that in the true sense makes a conscious act intentional whereas for Advaita the *vṛtti* cannot bring any change into the nature of pure consciousness for that goes against the basic tenet of Advaita. However, it must be emphasized whereas Advaita has a justification to explain the constitution of *vṛtti*, we don’t find any proper ground to explain the formation of *noema* in phenomenology.

It is thereby, can be stated that even though Advaita is not formulating any systematic account of intentionality like Husserl, Advaita is far-reaching in providing us a detailed account of cognitive process that is intentional throughout. Since for Advaita the core interest is not just to explain empirical knowledge rather the realm of transcendental

knowledge, which is possibly the reason for which we don't find any formal account of intentionality as the way it is developed in Husserlian phenomenology. To put it differently, it is the metaphysical presupposition of Advaitins that does not allow them to ascribe any quality either internal or external into transcendental consciousness. Intentional character or object-directedness to view from Advaitic standpoint is not intrinsic to consciousness rather predominates only the waking and the dreaming states and thus, does not contaminate the purity of consciousness. So, an analysis of Advaitic account of dream state follows.

### **5.3.2 Analysis of Dream Experience**

Dream, for Advaita, is not a mere unconscious or subconscious region as conceived by many western scholars rather a state of consciousness, in fact it would not be wrong if we characterize it a passing state of consciousness like waking and sleep states. It is for this reason Advaita has never overlooked the necessity of conducting the phenomenological study even in our dream state. Dream peculiarly shares the quality of waking state, sleep, memory and erroneous cognition, yet dream is neither the waking state nor the sleep nor is the memory nor can it be regarded an erroneous cognition. It is a paradox where perception takes place within the state of sleep. Besides being an important state for psychoanalysis, dream is one necessary plot for phenomenological study as it needs the base of conscious experience to persist. The merit of analyzing the dream state of consciousness lies in its being an important proof to demonstrate the agent-ship of mind as well as the object-directedness of the mental process apart from the senses. It is says Śaṅkara, an intermediate stage of existence where consciousness never lapse rather continues to manifest only the subtle body and neither the gross body nor the external

world outside. Thus, dream being the intervening stage or *sandhya-sthāna* occurs between the waking and sleeping states.<sup>24</sup>

The Upaniṣad describes dream as a state of inner world - *antahprajñah*<sup>25</sup> where one stops receiving the inputs of gross body and external light and lives through the subtle mind. As it is the mind that creates all objects and it is the same mind that strives for those objects. In dream, we are merged in the world where we see people, objects and animals—all mentally<sup>26</sup>. So, the activity one does in dream is all mental. In dream, the mind perceives the snake that is its own creation, it is the impression of the real snake imprinted in the mind at waking state though it terrifies the dreamer. In dream, mind is the agent, mind is the knower, mind is the object and mind is the destination. It is a state when all the external means of perception stop working and mind is the only internal organ that is spontaneously active. Mind thus being the only active agency enjoys and suffers the past impressions it has received through the senses at the waking state and keeps on creating a dream world inside. In dream, the modification of the mind or *vṛtti* takes the place of objects that is revealed by consciousness<sup>27</sup>. However, unlike the waking experience, in dream the *vṛtti* is not associated with the external object, for there is no channel for mind to go to the external world, which accordingly results in producing the vague forms of the objects perceived by the mind. Indeed, Advaitic account does not permit any modification of mind or formation of *vṛtti* in dream for there is no real object for the mind to assume nor the mind is joined with the senses. It is interesting to note that describing the role of mind, like Locke, Śāṅkara compares it with a piece of cloth on which pictures are being painted<sup>28</sup>. However, along with rationalists he again has characterized mind with agency that works independently in dream stage by reproducing

the impressions or pictures made on it through the sense-perception.<sup>29</sup> Even, on close examination it follows that along with psychologists namely, Freud and Jung, Advaita again defines dream contents as unconscious, which have been repressed, ignored in waking life<sup>30</sup> for these are the products of subtle mind; which is by nature an insentient matter though it appears conscious because of the reflection of consciousness. Of course, like them, Advaita does not consider dream as mere unconscious state for it will discard the persistent being of consciousness. For, if consciousness is conceived to be absent during sleep and dream states and assumes to be present on waking alone then there is a possibility of reviving or reawakening even of a death body. All external or internal activity therefore, as Advaita holds including the function of mind presupposes the foundational being of consciousness.

Dream according to Advaita, needs to be distinguished from erroneous cognition which is based on the sense-object contact. Moreover, while an erroneous cognition continues as long as the right object is not known, the dream object is sublated even within dream by the impression of other objects.<sup>31</sup> Dreaming again cannot be regarded as an act of recollection for it is an act of perception like the one occurs in waking state. Of course, Śāṅkara does recognize that perception in dream is occurred due to the memory of past impression (*samskāra*), and not through valid means of knowledge.<sup>32</sup>

It follows thereby, that even after having similarity with waking state, erroneous cognition and memory; dream state is unique and distinct from any other acts particularly for being a perception in and through the mental state which results from its material cause of sleep. It is rather to be noted that the necessary cause of dream is not the primal Nescience rather the mental ignorance. If dream is the result of primal Nescience then we

could have attained freedom immediately after waking up when dream reality is sublated. Opposed to this, we though get relief from the suffering we feel at dream stage immediately on wakening, yet we don't get rid of the bondage of this phenomenal world. An account of *Paribhāṣā Prakāśikā* states, sleep which is only a derivative of primal Nescience, is the material cause of the dream objects, and ignorance, which is a derivative of primal Nescience, is the material cause of the shell-silver'.<sup>33</sup> Dream objects, according to *Anantakṛṣṇa Śāstrī*, are the transfigurations of the consciousness conditioned by the mind and not the transformations of pure consciousness. Like illusory objects, the objects appear in dream due to the defective sleep and therefore, they too are considered to be illusory in nature. But, undeniably dream experience contains the dream objects known through dream perception and therefore, it cannot be categorized as an erroneous cognition which occurs at waking state. Moreover, unlike the object of waking state, the dream object being a mental creation has no objective existence rather solely subjective. It appears by the appearance of dream and again destroys by the end of the dream and so, it has less durability than phenomenal object. Dream being unable to confirm the law of nature and the dream objects for not being endowed by the law of causality, space and time get contradicted even in dream and also on waking up. Thus, like many contemporary philosophers namely, Metzinger, Advaita argues that dreams are more dynamic than waking state since the representational content of dream changes quicker than visual experience.<sup>34</sup> However, drawing the structural similarity between these two states Śāṅkara disproved them and categorized them as the mere superimposition on consciousness.

It is found that in dream like waking, our consciousness is particularized through the impressions and desires of mind. While the difference is that in waking along with mind we have sense experience and real external object corresponding to our desire and perception. However, in spite of this difference in both these two cases cognition is provoked by an agent or mind and not absent. Dream in this sense is not an unconscious state, for the agency of mind in all states needs to be illuminated by the presence of consciousness. Otherwise mind being material though subtle could not have known its reflected images. So, there must be some ground, some base<sup>35</sup>, on which these changing states occur and obliterate subsequently. This ground is the persisting consciousness which stands through all changes and loses, yet remains unaffected and distinct from all. It would be sheer mistake to assume that consciousness is passing through different states of experience. Since, if consciousness is flowing from waking state to sleep through dream state, there would be a possibility of being unconscious in waking and dream state and conscious only in sleep.

In other words, the functions of the three states are dependent on the being of one pervasive consciousness. Just as the way the river is supported by the ground to flow, similarly consciousness supports the stream of different mental states to manifest. As the water of the river appears muddy due to its association with the muddy ground, likewise the mental states appear to be conscious because of the presence of consciousness though not intrinsically conscious. So, while mental states are being approved by Śāṅkara as unconscious, consciousness is established as distinct to them without which no state can exist. However, unlike the waking experience, the state of dream provides us with

stronger evidence to conceive the being of an undifferentiated consciousness. Making this point more evident Professor V. H. Date writes,

“In one way, however, the dream affords us more room to assert that there can be consciousness without any reference to the actual objects of the world and the operations of the senses and the body. It is not in the waking life so much as in the dream that we get the evidence for the belief in the self-effulgent nature of the Ātman.”<sup>36</sup>

Here, a glance into the Contemporary Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness is imperative, as it resembles with the Advaitic view of dream. Reputed philosophers and cognitive neuroscientist as well as psychologists Antti Revonsuo and Thomas Metzinger have suggested a new perspective in analyzing dream experience breaking the traditional stereotyped notion where dream is considered a mere unconscious state. In the mode of Advaita, Revonsuo claims that dream being a complete internal state is isolated from external world though bears a similarity with sensory awareness as it is a special episode of consciousness and therefore, an important model to be studied. In fact, dream might reveal the essence of consciousness more explicitly for it is the consciousness that underlies as the condition to occur dream and therefore, an analysis of dream state is justified. According to Revonsuo, dream consciousness being devoid of external stimuli is pure in essence. It is even interesting that like Advaita, Revonsuo claims that dream experience is continuously revealing the subjectivity of consciousness creating a ‘*world-for-me*’ which is organized in its activity and selective too. It is a conscious state where the subjective agency keeps on performing its activity even if no external input is received, though some occasions it is found to promote some unusual external behavior. In brief, the content of dream is basically a proof that consciousness is compressed within



brain. To quote Revonsuo from his article *The Reinterpretation of Dreams: An Evolutionary Hypothesis of the Function of Dreaming*

“Dream phenomenology, therefore, is likely to be the consequence of an active and organized process rather than a passive by-product of disorganized activation.....The momentary phenomenal content of dream consciousness is comprehensible and conforms to the kinds of multimodal perceptual experiences that we have during waking perception.”<sup>37</sup>

However, this view has provoked many philosophers like Denial Dennett, Malcom and Windt, who have not only challenged the conscious nature of dream but even refuted to admit any identity between dream and waking experiences. Nevertheless, it has been noticed that how their perspectives bear similarity with Advaitic understanding of dream experience. Of course, Advaita still is distinct in its position to hold that purity of consciousness does not consist in its being devoid of only external input rather requires total suspension of both subtle and the gross body.

However, a very significant and marked similarity between these two states that has drawn our attention is the relational nature of waking and dream experiences. Advaita initiated the nexus between waking and dream experience on the basis of this intentional nature. Besides challenging the ontological being of both these states Advaitins’ intention to extend the phenomenological analysis beyond the waking state to dream is to expose that cognition occurred in both these two states have one joint cause. Perception, either in waking or in dream state is dependent on the trinity of knower, known and the process of knowing, which not only apparently splits the experience rather also makes it conditional. Advaita admits that waking state has higher degree of reality than dream, yet both are

bound to be directed towards some object. Just as in waking our perception either external or internal is intentional, similarly our perception in dream too is intentional in character. In waking our experience turns to be intentional by means of *vṛtti* which works through the channels of senses and consciousness is found to be identified with the mind-body complex. Whereas dream is attributed by the absence of the sense-operation and thus becomes intentional due to the operation of the subtle mind which perceives the object that it itself reproduces from the imprinted memory. In dream, the dreamer is aware of the dream objects in terms of his different acts of perception. The dreamer either he is enjoying something or scared of something or willing something, he is always conscious of the object of his perception. As a consequence, Advaita's strong conviction here is that both waking and dream experiences become intentional because of the involvement of mind. Nevertheless, this assertion of Advaita would be more evident only after an examination of deep sleep state. As a result an examination of sleep state after Advaita necessarily follows.

### **5.3.3 Analysis of Sleep Experience**

It is quite surprising that we devote one third of our lives in sleep which inherently sustains our existence and thereby, sleep experience is always an essential sphere of human study. Besides providing an important platform for scientific and psychological inquiry, sleep state offers a scope for phenomenological study of consciousness. Though unfortunately this prospect has not been appreciated by Husserlian phenomenology, it is widely acknowledged and emphasized in Upaniṣad and Śāṅkara Advaita. Sleep for Advaitins is also a passing state along with waking and dream and never absolute while grounded in one undifferentiated consciousness that is not particularized<sup>38</sup>. Going against

the conventional understanding, Śaṅkara characterizes the state of *susupti* not as an unconscious state or mere absence of consciousness rather a state that represents the essence of consciousness more explicitly than waking and dream states. Deep sleep, according to Upaniṣad, signifies a sense of oneness, where there is nothing but a homogeneous mass of consciousness – *susuptasthāna ekībhūtaḥ prajñānaghana*.<sup>39</sup> As writes T.M.P. Mahadevan, “It is experience which is not split up into experience, experienced object, and experiencing.”<sup>40</sup> It seems that Śaṅkara’s phenomenological pursuit of consciousness is far-reaching than Husserlian approach, as Śaṅkara continues to examine the manifestation of conscious experience as seen not only in waking but even in dream and deep sleep states too.

The state of deep sleep as shown in *Śaṅkara Bhāṣya* is not superficial rather coheres to our rational standpoint. Deep sleep is ordinarily viewed as a stage of complete cessation in the sense that both sense organs and internal organ call for a temporary withdrawal of their activities. Our consciousness seems to be aware of nothing as we are neither directed towards any external object nor to any internal entity. What is being realized in the state of deep sleep is the sheer emptiness. As the sense organs and internal organ shut the door towards phenomenal world the empirical being also merges in the midst of darkness. According to Śaṅkara, the study of sleep experience is relevant in showing here that the gradual withdrawal from objectivity leads us in apprehending the one solitary observer passively witnessing all movements in dream, waking and even silently persists in sleep. It thus enables us to clear away all fake assumptions we fortuitously hold about the nature of consciousness. It endorses not the absence of consciousness but all those are manifested through consciousness in other two states of experience.

Following the path of Upaniṣad, Śāṅkara rationalizes that sleep like waking state does not allow any direct intervention of the experiencer. If the individual is able to reflect on sleep experience while sleeping like waking state, one could not have slept at all. However, even if not at the time of sleeping, the latter analysis of sleep experience as we do in case of dream too exposes distinctive nature of consciousness which does not seem obvious in the prior two cases. Since, object, sense organs, mental organ that attribute other two states by modifying the function and guise of consciousness superficially are lacking solely at the third stage. As a result, consciousness though found as ‘conscious of something’ in waking and dream states, is not so in the third state of experience. In sleep, consciousness being free from any objective content is totally non-intentional. Thus, highlighting the same idea *Kārikā* states “when there is only consciousness but not consciousness of anything, that is your third state known as *prāñña*.”<sup>41</sup>

What is so startling about Advaitic approach is that it points to the limits of empirical perception by systematic reasoning and the possible ways to transcend the limited empirical insight. For Śāṅkara, analysis of the post-sleep judgments as ‘I slept very peacefully’, ‘I was not aware of anything’ – does not imply the absence of knowledge but the absence of the objects of knowledge. The ‘unawareness of anything’ or the ‘emptiness’ we come across in the third state highlights the non-intentional nature of sleep experience, which results from the absence of both the means of cognition and object of cognition. In sleep, the sleeper is neither aware of any external gross object nor any internal object as the means of cognition are abstained from any activity. The emptiness of sleep therefore, is not due to the absence of consciousness *as such* but due to the absence of *upadhīs* – that is the object-consciousness and ego-consciousness and

thus, one confronts ‘only with general non-particularized Nescience, not with any of its special modification.’<sup>42</sup> Moreover, if consciousness were absent in deep sleep, the so-called emptiness or general ignorance would not have been known. Śaṅkara thereby affirms the being of consciousness that ‘is independent of the three states’ – *sthāna-traya-vyātiriktam*. The particular state may exist or not but the universal consciousness as the foundational ground endures behind all states. As writes, R. Balasubramanian,

“If consciousness were also absent at that time, recollection to the effect, ‘I was not conscious of anything then’ would be impossible. The point is that consciousness reveals objects if they are present; and when there are no objects to be revealed, consciousness remains alone.”<sup>43</sup>

However, the person after waking up from third state apart from the emptiness of sleep also acknowledges the pleasing experience he had during that time. The report for a pleasing experience presupposes the very being of one that is blissful and that cannot be anything apart from the undifferentiated consciousness that abides even if none of its object does. It cannot be the ego or I-consciousness for the ego along with its object is resolved in the general ignorance. Indeed, if the ego were present in sleep, the dream state would have continued even in sound sleep.

However, a question aptly arises here: how can one report for the pleasing experience and the absence of pain in the absence of ‘I’ or subject-consciousness in sleep; for, mere consciousness cannot do so. Here, the verdict of the latter Advaitins like Viḍyāraṇya along with Śaṅkara is also noteworthy. As for Viḍyāraṇya, it is by the application of *arthāpatti* or postulation and recollection that one verbalizes the state of sleep. While one

remembers the bliss and positive Nescience one realizes in sleep, ‘the absence of pain and of cognition in the state of deep sleep is, on the other hand, known by presumptive reasoning.’<sup>44</sup> As a person cannot appreciate the bliss and peace of deep sleep unless his cognition is suspended and the ego, the generator of pain gets dissolved in general Nescience, which of course reemerges at the time of waking. In other words, if the ego or the phenomenal identity persists even in the third state one could not have experienced the painless state of sleep. Accordingly we would not have considered *suṣupti* as a state distinct from *jāgrat* and *svapna* but a mere continuation of them. However, the Advaitins though refute to admit any ego or internal organ in the third state, they are firm in their point to justify the post-sleep statement like ‘I slept peacefully or well’ which one consciously passes on waking.

“In deep sleep”, says Advaitin, “the organ of egoity was resolved in general Nescience; at the moment of waking it again forms itself; what at that time is reflected upon really is the Self; but the Ego then is thought and spoken of as implying the Self, to the end of rendering empirical thought and speech more definite; this indeed being the only end of the *ahankāra*. As a matter of fact, the Self is never viewed as represented by any other modification of the internal organ (but by the *ahankāra* modification).”<sup>45</sup>

In short, analysis of deep sleep accounts for an undifferentiated consciousness that is explicit strikingly though not entirely since it is still associated with general ignorance but not with any of its modifications as found in the prior two states. Of course, being free from the modified forms of ignorance i.e. internal organ and sense organs, consciousness of the third state is not conditioned either by the apparent subject or apparent object and so non-intentional. This does not mean that consciousness was

lacking or not manifesting at the time of sleep, for consciousness continues to manifest itself and its objects at all passing states. What makes it unique is that while in other two states we perceive the objects manifested by consciousness, in sound sleep we cannot, for the organs of perception and objects themselves are at rest. Consequently, consciousness continues to manifest the so-called general ignorance which is proved when we reflect back on this state on waking and assert 'I was conscious of nothing'. In sleep, the sleeper is not conscious of himself too i.e. there is no consciousness of the knowing subject as the way there is no consciousness of the object, the knower and known being the mere fictitious characters disappear from this third state. Had there been any real subject it should have been present in sleep too like consciousness. Phenomenological inquiry shows that unlike the prior two states, deep sleep is characterized by the non-existence of subject or knower but not by the non-existence of consciousness. In other words, sleep may be described as a state of ego-abstention, though it is not a state of suspension or retirement of consciousness.

Explaining the nature of intentional act Prof. R. Balasubramanian argues that any occurrence of perceptual process either in waking or in dream is composed of trinity (*tripuṭī*)<sup>46</sup> of cognizer, cognition and object of cognition. All our cognitions become intentional due to the involvement of this trinity, where the internal organ or ego encounters either a dream object or an empirical object of phenomenal world. It thus produces intentional or relational knowledge (*viśiṣṭa-jñāna*). It is evident that in deep sleep, the sleeper does not develop any such relational knowledge the way he does in waking and dream states. The sleeper never says 'I am conscious of the pleasant sleep' or 'I am conscious of the non-existence of anything' as he says in waking 'I am conscious of

the bird'. It follows that the trinity of epistemic knowledge does not prevail in deep sleep rather it is collapsed in positive ignorance and what remains thereby is one isolated consciousness revealing the ignorance alone.

“The paradox,” writes R. Balasubramanian, “is that deep sleep is what it is only because of the absence of triputi therein, and the experience wherein there is triputi is not deep sleep.”<sup>47</sup>

It is equally unconvincing to claim that one is not conscious of the trinity even though it is present in the third state, for the epistemic trinity of any perceptual process emerges only when it is experienced. It thereby, follows that mere intentionality of waking and dream cognition cannot prove the inherent intentional nature of consciousness for the phenomenological inquiry of the state of deep sleep profoundly testifies the sole existence of consciousness. It is thus, conclusive to hold that intentionality is not essential but adventitious to consciousness. Since, what is called essential cannot be present in some cases and absent in the rest.

Here, a recent study by one reputed scholar Nicolas de Warren in the field of Husserlian phenomenology draws our attention. Nicolas in his long essay *The Inner Night: Towards a Phenomenology of (Dreamless) Sleep* argues insistently for the necessity of extending phenomenological inquiry up to dreamless sleep along with waking state. Nicolas profoundly upholds that Husserl's phenomenology of time-consciousness would be incomplete without an adequate consideration of 'sleep-consciousness' i.e. dreamless sleep. This approach definitely points to an important transformation of Husserlian phenomenology in the field of consciousness studies. Indeed, in the course of his



discussion Nicolas has noted Husserl's own attempt to deal with the state of dreamless sleep specifically in his manuscript D-14 which Husserl could not formulate explicitly. And thus, Nicolas recommends for conducting a phenomenological study of sleep state in the widening context to comprehend Husserl's notion of time-consciousness.<sup>48</sup>

It is to be noted here that even if latter Husserl and some recent phenomenologists support the study of sleep state, there is a fundamental difference in their way of apprehending the state of sleep from that of Advaita. Sleep, for phenomenologists, is a fragmented period in the stream of consciousness like wakefulness which contrasts Advaitic understanding of one universal consciousness. To Advaitins, consciousness does not comprise of the episodes of sleep and wakefulness rather these are the fleeting states which are sustained through consciousness.

Thus, the analysis of dreamless sleep establishes two points. Firstly, the phenomenological study of sleep does not just reveal the non-intentional nature but the self-manifesting being of consciousness that keeps on revealing both general and particular modifications of nescience. Secondly, self-consciousness or reflexivity is not derived from the object-directedness nor it is a circular process where consciousness holds back its being in the way of its activity. Rather, it is an essential nature that cannot be reduced to anything opposed to consciousness. To put in different way, self-revelation of consciousness neither is a result of the activity of the knowing subject nor does it emerge because of the influence of the object on consciousness. Since both mental mode and object being adventitious in nature are manifested by consciousness. What is to be noted here is that in the absence of any particular subject and object consciousness abstains from illuminating them but it does not abstain from its own being and thus, what

reveals there is the sheer darkness. It is the light flashing in circumambient gloom, revealing nothing but the gloom.<sup>49</sup> Thus, by examining the states of experience, it can be ascertained that the self-luminous consciousness is uniformly present in all states, yet the objects of consciousness are transforming in each succeeding state. Identifying the state of *susupti* with the fourth state of consciousness K. C. Bhattacharyya argues that in both these two states duality lapses and consciousness endures as an undifferentiated bliss; while the difference lies in the fact that in the former state the isolated consciousness still exists in its object-knowing attitude and also possesses the potentiality to be demarcated by the subject-object duality on waking up, while, in the latter state, consciousness enjoys ultimate freedom from any such duality.

Indeed, the very attitude of attributing the transcendental consciousness by means of subject or object is to mistake the very essence of transcendental consciousness. The duality of subject-object does not represent the nature of consciousness rather gets survived through consciousness that unites them both but goes transcending them entirely. The Advaitic philosophy stresses this transcendental consciousness as ultimate and absolute which is the presupposition<sup>50</sup> of all epistemic, psychological as well as scientific knowledge yet on account of its association with objects it becomes relative and multifarious. Consciousness therefore, does not come to exist only by the manifestation of the object but persists endlessly.

The paradox is that both Advaita and Husserl argue for the being of the transcendental consciousness that is self-constituting and conferring sense to other, yet for Husserl, this transcendental consciousness constitutes itself by means of constituting and revealing the objects in terms of its intentional act but in contrast, for Advaita, consciousness being

transcendental cannot be delimited by anything that gets revealed by consciousness and thus, free from any intentional character. Thus writes Mohanty,

“The transcendental consciousness in Advaita Vedānta, on the other hand, is non-temporal, contentless and over-individual; in Husserl it is temporal flux, full of content, still individualized though not locatable in spatio-temporal dimensions...”<sup>51</sup>

Again, says Zahavi by stating transcendental nature of consciousness,

“It is worth emphasizing that on this account, although being no part of the world, transcendental subjectivity is not worldless. After all, as the subject of intentionality, it cannot be described without reference to the world; it is nothing in isolation from the world.”<sup>52</sup>

It could be claimed while subjectivity in phenomenology becomes transcendental in course of being relative and conditional; the Advaitic transcendental consciousness is transcendental throughout. As a result, the empirical demarcation between subject and object even if confines the Husserlian transcendental consciousness it is merely fictitious in Advaita philosophy. To put in different way, the binary between the knowing subject and the object where Husserlian consciousness is enslaved even in its transcendental phase fails to lock the pure consciousness of Advaita. As from the examination of the deep sleep it is evident that consciousness as an invariable existence transcends all gulf between subject and object.

The Advaitic inquiry however, does not stop with the analysis of waking, dreaming and dreamless sleep rather encompasses the fourth state, i.e., *turīya*, the highest state of revelation which is beyond all these three states, yet is the foundation of all. While in

waking, dream and deep sleep, consciousness is contaminated in gross object, subtle object and general ignorance respectively, in its fourth state consciousness is free, indivisible and pure. It is the state where phenomenal world is negated not due to sleep but by the manifestation of pure knowledge. Though, it is true that any philosophical inquiry either phenomenological or epistemological does not affirm the fourth state of consciousness. For, any experience beyond the framework of this empirical world that logical principles and dialectics cannot rationalize is not approved by philosophy but may satisfy the soul of a mystic. However, even if philosophy prohibits us to comprise this fourth state within the course of our analysis, yet the inquiry into these three empirical states are sufficient to infer the non-dual and non-intentional nature of consciousness. Sleep experience inevitably endorses that any attempt to define consciousness in terms of intentionality or to reduce reflexivity into intentionality is to mistake the essential nature of consciousness.

Now, in the second half of this chapter, it is obligatory to pay a critical reflection on the Advaitic position from antagonists' standpoint. Since, any full-fledged research must have a provision to consider the study from the perspectives of the opponent, which does not only allow us to see the other part of our standpoint that we often inattentively overlook but also enhances the profoundness of our own viewpoint. In brief, the aim is to evaluate critically the positions of both the counterparts. Hence, in the second part of this chapter, we will examine the Advaitic view from the perspective of Rāmānuja, who adheres to the notion of intentionality like phenomenologists.

## PART- II

Definitely, the effort throughout the chapter is to make a critique of the notions of reflexivity and intentionality from antagonists' perspectives in order to reach a comprehensive and rational end. In the first part of this chapter a critique of intentionality thesis has been developed from the Advaitic perspective that challenges the primacy and validity of intentionality and lays emphasis on reflexivity as the fundamental nature of consciousness. In this second half, however, the chapter intends to develop a critique of the Advaitic concept of non-intentional consciousness. In other words, it is an effort to examine whether sleep experience confirms the being of an undifferentiated consciousness as proclaimed by Advaita. Here, the aim is to measure Advaitic position from Rāmānuja's standpoint, who mainly represents the position of phenomenologists.

It would not be wrong if I concede that there is hardly anyone who can be a better critic of Śaṅkara's Advaita than Rāmānuja either in east or west. Hence, to start with Rāmānuja is always crucial. Here, I would like to make it clear that a detailed exposition of Rāmānuja's position has been presented in the chapter two of this thesis. Hence, the aim is not to make any further study on Rāmānuja but to make a critical appraisal of Śaṅkara's notion of consciousness from Rāmānuja's perspective, particularly, the deep sleep argument that Śaṅkara has proposed to ascertain the non-intentional nature of consciousness.

### **5.4 Critique of Sleep Experience**

The examination of three states affirms not only the non-intentional nature of consciousness but also points to the incomplete application of Husserlian

phenomenological approach that undertakes only the waking experience disregarding the wide implication of dream and deep sleep states in consciousness studies. It has been proved that the apparent intentionality that influences our waking and dream consciousness is lacking solely in sleep experience, which is adequate for inferring that intentionality is superficial rather necessary to mental state and is not fundamental to consciousness.

At this point Rāmānuja is prompt to counter the view of Śaṅkara. Rāmānuja is not simply rigorous in criticizing the notion of non-intentional consciousness rather he has renounced the very existence of consciousness in sleep in the absence of its corresponding object. Here, Rāmānuja's contention is based on his notion of consciousness which is not identical with self rather is just a quality of self, which again is qualified by intentionality. From the very assertion on waking up one makes it is apparent that he was not aware of anything but had a sound sleep. That very statement logically implies not just the absence of the object but also the absence of consciousness that cannot exist in the absence of the former. As consciousness if exists would reveal his presence only by the revelation of its object<sup>53</sup>, otherwise cannot. Rāmānuja contends that the very non-existence of 'I' and the object does not establish the existence of any undifferentiated consciousness rather the very non-existence of consciousness. Consciousness being the *dharmabhūta-jñāna* is connected with the 'I' and the object in all its existence and thus, cannot be experienced without them. And as the 'I' and the object as the Advaitins argue do not exist in sleep then logically consciousness also cannot exist in deep sleep<sup>54</sup>. Indeed, for Rāmānuja, the 'I', which is the self-conscious substance, persists in deep sleep though not very vividly<sup>55</sup> but not the consciousness

which is the attribute of self and proceeds through contraction and expansion. To put it explicitly, for Rāmānuja, sleep is a mere unconscious state where the conscious ‘I’ exists dimly, which can neither experience nor can cognize anything as its attributive-consciousness is not accompanying it. It seems Rāmānuja is very clear in his view to deny the existence of consciousness in sleep. However, a brief analysis of some of the arguments, which are proposed by Rāmānuja, is sufficient to show the inconsistency of his position.

Being an advocate of substantialist notion of self, Rāmānuja denies any independent existence of consciousness by characterizing it a mere quality of the self that provides its access to the world. Consciousness is considered to be not identical with self but the attribute of the knowing self which being a self-conscious subject can reveal its existence, yet cannot know its objects without its attributive consciousness that reveals them to it. However, following Śruti, Rāmānuja does agree that consciousness is a permanent attribute<sup>56</sup>. Unlike the attribute of ‘whiteness’ of ‘pot’ that may disappear, self is said to be characterized by an attribute which is eternal and unlimited.<sup>57</sup> Nevertheless, it is not obvious here that how this eternal and permanent attribute of the self gets detached from it at deep sleep state. If the self is admitted to be present during deep sleep, then consciousness too must be present. Hence, the question is: why consciousness being the permanent attribute of self is claimed to be absent. Being an eternal and permanent quality consciousness cannot be absent at any state either waking or sleep where the self is claimed to be present. Indeed, what seems more absurd is the very distinction maintained by Rāmānuja between self and consciousness where the self is not devoid of consciousness rather it is essentially self-conscious

Needless to say, Rāmānuja’s contention openly results in causing two sorts of paradox. First of all, it is contradictory to argue here that though self is incessantly present in deep sleep but consciousness is not, for there is no essential distinction between the two. Therefore, if the existence of self is admitted in sleep that logically implies the being of consciousness that is non-intentional.

Secondly, the notion of attributive-consciousness that Rāmānuja has put forth to explain the ‘object-directedness’ of consciousness is solely untenable and inconsistent with the very notion of self. The formulation of attributive-consciousness does not account for the ‘awareness of object’ or conditional nature of consciousness rather splits the one universal consciousness into two unusual parts. The bifurcation of the same consciousness into one substance and other quality while there is no essential variation in their nature is redundant. Indeed, the attributive consciousness is not a mere quality of self but also claimed to be a substratum of the qualities of contraction and expansion. Here, it is totally unintelligible that how one substance can possess another substance as a quality. The reason that attributive consciousness is a quality in terms of its relation with self and a substance in terms of its qualities of contraction and expansion is beyond apprehension. For the same consciousness cannot be classified into two categories. Rāmānuja rather can justify his view by claiming that while one is primary quality i.e. attributive-consciousness, another one is secondary, i.e., contraction and expansion. But the very attempt to define consciousness as a quality is wrong when it is the very essence of self. Since, self is called self because it is self-conscious or self-luminous, it cannot be called a substratum of consciousness nor consciousness can be regarded as a quality or attribute if in its being absent, self is unable to maintain its very essence. Therefore, the



very distinction between self and consciousness on the basis of substance and attributive seems to be based on mere misinterpretation and therefore, is not applicable.

The dilemma Rāmānuja faces here is that in the absence of attributive consciousness he fails to explain the empirical conscious state which is always found to be directed towards an object. Which indeed, Śāṅkara explains more rationally in terms of *vṛtti-jñāna* or empirical consciousness that is rather a mental state or the inner organ that appears to be conscious but not essentially conscious. It is a fiction that results from the operation of the mind that is illuminated by the presence of consciousness, which is an object of the latter. Śāṅkara never mistakes *vṛtti-jñāna* as consciousness or any permanent quality of self for it is changeable. Like Rāmānuja, Śāṅkara characterizes our empirical experience as ‘object-directed’ but does not mistake it as a permanent quality for its absence is evident in sleep state nor does he call it an eternal substance for it is a mere fiction that undergoes continuous transformation.

It is thus, found that Rāmānuja’s attempt to establish the non-existence of consciousness in sleep proves the non-existence of *vṛtti-jñāna* which is not a permanent quality of self and thus, cannot be called attributive consciousness; on the other hand, his claim for the existence of self proves the existence of consciousness that is transcendental. It is to be noted that the bifurcation he made between two substances and then inclined to attribute one into other indicates the weakness of his position. According to R. Balasubramanian, if attributive-consciousness even after being a substance needs another substance to inhere then the second must require a third one and that third needs a fourth and thus, makes an infinite regress. If to avoid this, Rāmānuja confirms that even if the attributive-consciousness inheres in another substance but the latter does not then it logically

approves the being of consciousness without any locus or *nirāśraya*, which in other way pervades all.

In brief, the arguments Rāmānuja has offered to prove the non-existence of attributive-consciousness in sleep instead of proving the non-being of consciousness, ultimately ensures the absence of intentionality or ‘object-directedness’ of consciousness. This is an evidence to claim that intentionality is not essential to consciousness, for it is found to be absent while self-luminous consciousness is surviving in sleep. Though, in other states of cognition intentionality is associated with empirical consciousness which Rāmānuja wrongly characterizes as attributive or *dharmabhūtajñāna* rather than *vṛtti-jñāna*. If empirical consciousness is contingent on the function of the mind, intentionality being the attribute of it is also subject to mental state. In sum, the counter-argument put forwarded by Rāmānuja to endorse the non-existence of consciousness in sleep is inept, indeed it is inconsistent with his own standpoint. If *dharmabhūta-jñāna* is claimed to be absent in sleep, intentionality or object-directedness being the nature of it cannot be claimed to be present. It follows thereby that Rāmānuja’s criticism of sleep argument is quite irrelevant to what Śaṅkara is actually intending to establish. The objection he has thrown hardly touches the reasoning of Śaṅkara.

### **5.5. Critique of Deriving Reflexivity from Intentionality**

It has been observed that an inclination to derive reflexivity from ‘object-directedness’ or intentionality is explicit in Rāmānuja. In course of discussion, Mohanty reports that the similar attempt is found even in the work of Husserl. He writes,

“For Husserl, consciousness is of course intentional, but it is also reflexive in the sense that it may double back upon itself, may become the object of another intentional act. Thus we find in him the tendency to reduce reflexivity of consciousness to its intentional which in that case becomes more basic in his system.”<sup>58</sup>

Needless to say, even Mohanty adopts the same attitude in his essay *The concept of intentionality*, when he seeks to derive reflexivity from the other, which M. K. Bhadra has countered strongly. It seems that Mohanty’s adherence to this position follows from his commitment to Husserl. However, according to Mohanty, this kind of attempt to reduce one into another is not seen in Sartre’s account of consciousness<sup>59</sup>. Sartre indeed, tried to keep both the dimensions of consciousness uniformly. The self-consciousness, for Sartre, is not a new mode of consciousness but ‘as the only mode of existence which is possible for a consciousness of something’<sup>60</sup>.

But then the questions would be, is reduction necessary to justify the foundational role of intentionality? Again, more importantly, does Husserl really support any such reduction? Of course, Mohanty’s answer is affirmative in this regard. Intentionality being wider in extension is necessary for any mental state that is transparent. However, at this stage, Dan Zahavi’s position is quite unique and essential to be noted. Specially, in his treatise titled *Self-Awareness and Alterity*, Zahavi by examining the theory of self-awareness as developed within Husserlian phenomenology has revealed to us a new aspect of this problem. As he firmly declares that Husserl’s own phenomenological study of the doctrine of ‘self-awareness’ is more concrete and substantial than usually what is assumed by many of his contemporaries and followers. Zahavi argues that the possibility of transcendental phenomenology depends on self-manifestation of the transcendental

subjectivity which ultimately permeates the ground for the phenomenological analysis of the transcendental subject, a fact which Husserl accepts firmly. Moreover, any satisfactory theory on self-awareness needs to maintain that there is a radical difference between object-manifestation and what we call self-manifestation of consciousness. Husserl has admitted that the way object gets manifested to the subjectivity, the latter is not manifested to itself. Subjectivity is the condition of its own manifestation unlike the object, but also makes possible the being of the object. For, consciousness is not given to itself as an object is given. Self-awareness, thereby does not occur only 'when the act is apprehended by a further act' as it leads to an unending regress. Self-awareness does not result even from introspection or a reflection, as it is a type of object-manifestation only. Nor it can be stated after Frank that the notion of self-awareness is based on Husserl's 'tacit assumption that consciousness is conscious of something different from itself.'<sup>61</sup>

It must be mentioned, according to Frank, Husserl's formulation of self-awareness is construed by the subject-object dichotomy and therefore, fails to come with a satisfactory theory of self-awareness. Noticeably, Mohanty also has the same impression about Husserl. As for Mohanty, Husserl like Rāmānuja has the tendency to reduce reflexivity in to intentionality. Though, Mohanty never accused Husserl for this attempt as Frank, Henrich and Tugendhat did. Rather, he too in the latter stage made the similar kind of effort to derive reflexivity from intentionality. It is extremely important here to assert that Husserl in *Logical Investigations*, made himself very clear by denying to attribute psychical phenomena solely by intentionality. While granting intentionality as the feature of consciousness he has also acknowledged the fact that there are experiences which are lacking intentionality. Hence, for Zahavi, it would be inappropriate to argue that Husserl

theory of self-awareness is based ultimately on his notion of intentionality. There is no attempt to reduce one into other or to derive one from the other. As it is explicit from his words,

‘Every experience is “consciousness,” and consciousness is consciousness of....But every experience is itself experienced and to that extent also “conscious”.’<sup>62</sup>

Self-awareness, in this way Husserl defines as inner or immanent perception. However, this ‘inner perception’ is not an experience that is again internally perceived by a second act for it may lead to an infinite regress. It is also not a process to grasp consciousness as its own object. This internal perception as indicated by Husserl is not itself internally perceived. According to Zahavi, by self-awareness, Husserl rather means nothing but the very being of consciousness. Equating self-awareness with innermost perception, Husserl argues that this inner perception does not mean here an active self-apprehension but self-appearance.<sup>63</sup> In different context, Husserl also describes self-awareness as an inner consciousness. It is the revelation of consciousness to itself. It is not an act of appearing to something distinct, as object does appear to something which is different from it. Rather, here that which appears and to whom it appears must be one and the same since self-awareness does not seem to allow any distinction or separation between the dative and genitive of manifestation<sup>64</sup>. Thus, expounding Husserl’s account of self-awareness more distinctly and comprehensively Zahavi writes,

“Self-awareness is not merely something that comes about the moment we direct our attention at our conscious life. In its most basic form, it is not the result of a relational, mediated, conceptual, or objectifying process; rather, it is an immediate, internal, and pervasive feature of consciousness. To phrase it differently, an analysis of self-awareness

is not merely an analysis of an exclusive problem about how we manage to pay attention to ourselves, or about how we are able to discriminate between ourselves, the world, and other subjects. It is rather an analysis of what it means to be conscious. To be conscious is to be immediately and noninferentially aware of whatever experience one is undergoing, and to be aware of that is to be acquainted not simply with transcendent objects, but with one's own subjectivity.<sup>65</sup>

Undoubtedly, this Husserlian account of self-awareness as espoused by Zahavi carries marked similarity with Advaitic account of self-luminosity. Since, Advaita too emphatically opines that consciousness being self-luminous is immediately known without being the object of any cognition. It is non-cognizable, universal being of consciousness that presupposes nothing in order to exist except its own being. It follows thereby that this specific interpretation of self-consciousness leaves no room for any further polarity between Śāṅkara and Husserl. As, by self-awareness both of them confirm the very being of consciousness. However, the incongruity starts at the moment Husserl relates this self-luminous experience with the self-transcending nature of consciousness. Though, there is no attempt to reduce this self-awareness into self-transcending character of consciousness, yet he agrees that it is this self-transcending consciousness that is self-aware. As the essential nature of subjectivity according to phenomenologists, is embedded in its being open towards something which it is not and it is in this process of 'openness' consciousness reveals itself to itself.<sup>66</sup> However, this does not imply that consciousness of objects is mediated by self-awareness or that the self-awareness is mediated by consciousness of objects.<sup>67</sup> Self-manifestation and object-manifestation says Zahavi, are strictly interdependent, inseparable and co-original. They are two different dimensions of one and the same consciousness.<sup>68</sup>

As viewed by Zahavi, Husserl's inclination towards this self-transcending character of consciousness results from his conviction that this lived body is indispensable for sense experience and thereby, it is necessary for any other types of experience. Hence, for Husserl, there is no state of pure self-awareness. This so called purity to him is just absurd. Self-awareness is neither pure self-coinciding nor undifferentiated experience rather it is what presupposes hyletic content, a lived body. Self-awareness is neither a form of object-manifestation nor simply can be reduced to bodily awareness but certainly it occurs not in separation from the hetero-manifestation, it is the self-transcending subjectivity that is self-aware.<sup>69</sup>

Hence, it must be claimed following Zahavi that though Husserl does not support any 'derivation' but affirms an inescapable correlation between the two. Thus the compatibility between self-luminosity and intentionality does not seem to result from any derivation or reductionism but because of the interdependent and inseparable relation between the two. Indeed, it can be stated that polarity between Śāṅkara and Husserl ultimately arises because of these two different interpretations of the notion of 'subjectivity'. While for Husserl 'subjectivity' is the consciousness not in isolation from the lived body which can also be called as body-subject following Merleau-Ponty; for Śāṅkara the notion of subjectivity fails to articulate the true nature of consciousness as long as it is bound in physical apparatus. For Śāṅkara, subjectivity in its transcendental realm is pure and free from all associations.

## 5.6 Some Observations

I close the chapter with the following remarks. The initial analysis of the three states of consciousness as well as the denial of the non-difference between seeing and seen indeed, has prepared the edifice upon which the Advaitic contention for non-intentional consciousness is established. These are indeed, the major points of argumentation that Advaita has extended for showing inadequacy of intentionality thesis. In brief, according to Advaita, the consequence of describing consciousness solely through intentionality is to misapprehend the very transcendental nature of consciousness and to get bound within the purview of ephemeral nature of empirical consciousness. Śaṅkara's analysis of the three states of phenomenal experience following Śruti, ascertains that along with the waking and the dream states even the state of sleep cannot be accounted for without the self-luminosity of consciousness. On the other hand, the consequence of defining reflexivity as the very essence of consciousness is to confirm the appearance of intentionality. Whereas, the basic difficulty in categorizing consciousness as non-intentional lies in explaining the phenomenal perception that is out and out object-directed and does not virtually give scope to affirm any experience that is existing without any objective reference. Yet, the analysis of sleep states gives a reason to admit that one transcendental non-intentional consciousness is the logical presupposition of these conscious states which are transient and always directed towards the objects. The disparity arises because Husserl delimits the nature of consciousness up to psycho-physical being and tries to portray the nature of consciousness as it is reflected in the psycho-physical operation of the being.



Finally, the chapter has thrown light into some new dimensions of Husserlian thought. The analysis of self-awareness theory as delineated by Dan Zahavi has made us free from many prevalent misunderstandings. It has been shown that neither there is any attempt by Husserl to reduce reflexivity into intentionality nor he seeks to derive reflexivity from the latter rather he affirms the co-presence of both as the inevitable aspects of consciousness. Indeed, what is noticeable here is that even after being a strong advocate of intentionality he too accepts the existence of experiences which are non-intentional.

The analysis of three states ensures that Śāṅkara does not absolutely repudiate intentionality rather limits it only up to the waking and dream experiences. As sleep does not permit any mental or sensual activity but the presence of one undifferentiated consciousness that manifests only gross ignorance. Thus, Śāṅkara's interpretation though not absolutely but partly seems to admit the compatibility between reflexivity and intentionality in the waking and the dream experiences. It can be said that though there is an explicit attempt to deny intentionality, yet there is no intention to renounce it completely from ordinary experiences. At the end, it can be argued from the forgoing analysis that in the strict sense reflexivity does not leave any room for intentionality though not vice versa; since to be conscious is to be reflexive. Thus, a reappraisal of the states of consciousness by means of the gradual suspension of the objective associations leads us in appropriating the being of consciousness that is free, isolated and non-objective.

## *Notes and References*

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<sup>1</sup> The term 'object' does not mean here any physical object rather the content or the meaning in Husserlian sense that every conscious act possesses.

<sup>2</sup> Here, by phenomenologists, I mainly refer to Husserl and Mohanty, because Sartre does not accept any such content within consciousness apart from its self-transcending nature. Whereas, for both Husserl and Mohanty consciousness is never contentless awareness, it is always associated with some objective content.

<sup>3</sup> Dasgupta, S.N., (1991), *A History of Indian Philosophy*, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers Pvt. Ltd., Vol. III., p. 200

<sup>4</sup> Mahadevan, T.M.P., (2011), *The Philosophy of Advaita*, Delhi: Bharatiya Kala Prakashan, p.129

<sup>5</sup> Ibid, p. 129

<sup>6</sup> Potter, Karl H. (2013), *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies*, Vol. XI, Delhi: Motilal Banarasidass Publishers Pvt. Ltd., p.79

<sup>7</sup> Dasgupta, S.N., (1991), *A History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. III., Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers Pvt. Ltd., p. 201

<sup>8</sup> Śāṅkara, (2011), *Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya*, (Translated by Swami Gambhirananda), Kolkata: Advaita Ashram, II. ii. 28

<sup>9</sup> Indich N. William, (2000), *Consciousness in Advaita Vedānta*, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers Pvt. Ltd., p. 70

<sup>10</sup> Dasgupta, S.N., (1991), *A History of Indian Philosophy*, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers Pvt. Ltd., Vol. III., 201

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<sup>11</sup> Swami Lokeshwarananda ed.,(2012), *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*, (Translated and with notes based on Śaṅkara's commentary), Kolkata: Ramkrishna Mission Institute of Culture, p.15

<sup>12</sup> Ibid., p. 11

<sup>13</sup> Brentano, F. (2009), *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, EBook, (Translated by Antos C. Rancurello), D. B. Terrell & Linda L. McAlister, Taylor & Francis e-Library, p. 68

<sup>14</sup> Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra, (2015), *Vedānta-paribhāṣā*, (Translated and annotated by Swami Madhavananda), Kolkata: Advaita Ashram, p.29

<sup>15</sup> Ibid., p.8

<sup>16</sup> Madhavananda, Swami, (tr.) (1934), *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, (With the commentary of Śaṅkara), Kolkata: Advaita Ashram, III. iv. 1

<sup>17</sup> As already discussed elaborately in the preceding chapter.

<sup>18</sup> Datta, D.M. (1997), *The Six Ways of Knowing*, Calcutta: University of Calcutta, p. 56

<sup>19</sup> Ibid., p. 56

<sup>20</sup> Ibid. , p. 56

<sup>21</sup> Ibid., p. 60- 61

<sup>22</sup> Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra, (2015), *Vedānta-paribhāṣā*, (Translated and annotated by Swami Madhavananda), Kolkata: Advaita Ashram, p.14

<sup>23</sup> Datta, D.M. (1997), *The Six Ways of Knowing*, Calcutta: University of Calcutta, p. 61

<sup>24</sup> Śaṅkara, (2011), *Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya*, (Translated by Swami Gambhirananda), Kolkata: Advaita Ashram, III. ii. 2

<sup>25</sup> Lokeshwarananda Swami, (Ed.),(2012), *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*, (With the commentary of Śaṅkara), Kolkata: Ramkrishna Mission Institute of Culture, p. 25

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<sup>26</sup> Ibid., p. 19

<sup>27</sup> Madhavananda, Swami, (tr.) (1934), *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, (With the commentary of Śaṅkara), Kolkata: Advaita Ashram, IV. Iii. 9

<sup>28</sup> Lokeswarananda Swami,(ed.),(2012), *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*, (Translated and with notes based on Śaṅkara's commentary), Kolkata: Ramkrishna Mission Institute of Culture, p. 17

<sup>29</sup> Ibid., p.17

<sup>30</sup> <http://www.iep.utm.edu/dreaming/>

<sup>31</sup> Madhavananda, Swami, (tr.) (1934), *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, (With the commentary of Śaṅkara), Kolkata: Advaita Ashram, IV.

<sup>32</sup> Śaṅkara, (2011), *Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya*, (Translated by Swami Gambhirananda), Kolkata: Advaita Ashram, II.ii.29

<sup>33</sup> Gupta, Bina,(1995), *Perceiving in Advaita Vedānta: Epistemological Analysis and Interpretation*, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers Pvt. Ltd., p. 280

<sup>34</sup> <http://www.iep.utm.edu/dreaming/>

<sup>35</sup> Lokeswarananda, Swami, (Ed.),(2012), *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*, (With the commentary of Śaṅkara), Kolkata: Ramkrishna Mission Institute of Culture, p. 33. (Gauḍapāda's Kārikā, I.6)

<sup>36</sup> V. H. Date, (1973), *Vedanta Explained*, vol. II, New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, , p. 477

<sup>37</sup> . Pace-Schott, E. Solms, M., Blagrove, M. and Harnad, S. (Ed.)(2003), *Sleep and Dreaming: Scientific advances and reconsiderations*, UK: Cambridge University press, p.

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<sup>38</sup> Swami Lokeshwarananda (Ed.),(2012), *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*, (With the commentary of Śaṅkara), Kolkata: Ramkrishna Mission Institute of Culture, p.19

<sup>39</sup> Ibid., p. 4-5

<sup>40</sup> Mahadevan, T.M.P. (1975), *Gauḍapāda: A Study in Early Advaita*, 4<sup>th</sup> edition, Madras: University of Madras, p. 83

<sup>41</sup> Lokeshwarananda Swami, (Ed.),(2012), *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*, (With the commentary of Śaṅkara), Kolkata: Ramkrishna Mission Institute of Culture, p. 25 (Gauḍpāda's Kārikā, I.1)

<sup>42</sup> Viḍyāranya, (1994), *The Vivaraṇapramēyasaṅgraha*, (Translated by G. Thibaut), Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications, p.121

<sup>43</sup> Chattopadhyaya, D.P., Embree Lester & Mohanty, J.N. (1992), *Phenomenology and Indian Philosophy*, New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research in association with Motilal Banarsidass Publishers Pvt. Ltd., p.83

<sup>44</sup> Viḍyāranya, (1994), *The Vivaraṇapramēyasaṅgraha*, (Translated by G. Thibaut), Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications, p.125

<sup>45</sup> Ibid., p.125

<sup>46</sup> Balasubramanian, R. (1978), *Some Problems in the Epistemology and Metaphysics of Rāmānuja*, Madras: University of Madras, p. 49

<sup>47</sup> Ibid., p. 50

<sup>48</sup> Lohmar, Dieter & Yamaguchi, Ichiro,(Ed), (2010), *On Time - New Contributions to the Husserlian Phenomenology of Time*, EBook, Natherland: Springer, P.286

<sup>49</sup> Bhattacharyya, Krishnachandra, (1983), *Studies in Philosophy*, Vols. I & II, Ed. by Gopinath Bhattacharyya, Delhi: Motilal Banarasidass Publishers Pvt. Ltd., p. 26

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- <sup>54</sup> Ibid., p. 31
- <sup>55</sup> Ibid., p. 42
- <sup>56</sup> Ibid., p. 36
- <sup>57</sup> Ibid., p. 38
- <sup>58</sup> Mohanty, J.N.(1993), *Essays On Indian Philosophy*, (Ed. with an introduction by Purushottama Bilimoria), New Delhi: Oxford University Press, p. 285-286
- <sup>59</sup> Ibid. p., 286
- <sup>60</sup> Sartre, J.P. (1957). *Being and Nothingness: An essay on Phenomenological Ontology*. (Translated with an introduction by H. E. Barnes), London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., p. liv
- <sup>61</sup> Zahavi, Dan, (1999), *Self-awareness and Alterity*, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, p.53
- <sup>62</sup> Ibid., p. 54
- <sup>63</sup> Ibid., p. 55
- <sup>64</sup> Ibid., p. 50
- <sup>65</sup> Ibid., p. 198

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<sup>66</sup> Ibid., p. 124

<sup>67</sup> Ibid., p. 124

<sup>68</sup> Ibid., p. 124

<sup>69</sup> Ibid., p. 200