Chapter- 3

The Critique of Reason and the Ethical Domain:
Jüergen Habermas' Critical Theory

3.1. Introduction

The present chapter discusses the contemporary engagement with the critique of reason and its ethics. This chapter as the third segment of the ethics of critique of reason opens a path to align the previous ethics of critique of reasons with a clearer purpose. In this chapter the study discusses Habermas' critique of reason and his theory of discourse ethics. Habermas' discourse and the critique of reason grows through the critique of Frankfurt School and its major text 'the dialectic of enlightenment'[1].

3.2. Jüergen Habermas: A Brief Biographical Sketch

Jüergen Habermas is the well known representative of the Frankfurt school and critical theory. He belongs to the second generation critical theorists. As an engaging interlocutor, he makes the claim to renew and refresh the socio political life more 'democratizingly emancipatory' through a reconstruction of the intersubjective and dialogical basis of human engagements. Habermas's theoretical presence is situated around the dictates of a rationally critiqued and reclaimed humane society. Thus, Habermas fixes the axis of his critical philosophy quite emphatically on the need to overcome anti-dialogical, regressive-fundamentalist orientations and the anti-rational. His Major works are: Knowledge and Human Interests, Theory of Communicative Action Vol. 1 and 11, The Philosophical

Discourse of Modernity, Between Facts and Norms, The Inclusion of the Other, The Post-national Constellation etc.

3.3. Habermas' critical theory: the route to critique of reason

The key-words of the nature and purpose of the critique of reason, for Habermas, from a critical reappraisal of the nature of critiques from his post-Kantian predecessors, that has somehow obscured the role of a reflective consciousness, as Fichte puts it like the purpose of reason to know itself - if only reason can justify its purposive autonomy in a Kantian line of its moral purposive theoriography of the life-world, would be a retreat of consciousness to the lifeworld in a self-curative manner that would come up in social theoriography's redefining of modernity. The following lines perhaps best justifies Habermas's concern of the reason's critique of itself that tries to re-establish its moral purposiveness in theory:

> "Moral-practical questions of the form What ought I to do? are considered not amenable to rational debate unless they can be answered in terms of purposive rationality. This pathology of modern consciousness calls for an explanation in terms of *social theory*. Since philosophical ethics is unable to provide such explanation, it has to proceed in a therapeutic manner, invoking the self-curative powers of reflection to oppose the obscuring of basic moral phenomena[2]."

The problem that has been the starting point of the post-Kantian modern philosophies in the West has been the presuppositions of the unifying principle of 'knowledge' and its theoretical justification as the locus of freedom and the moral consensus to the evolving world. Thus the critique of reason as a regulative principle of both knowledge and morality has been a matter of philosophical concern that ended up in re-defining the active principles of the reflective

consciousness and the rational structure of the evolutionary principle of history that expresses itself in theoriographies of modern life-world.

Hence a critique of the reflective consciousness or the consciousness of the dialectical rationality methodologically presupposes any theoretic structure which intends to rationalize and re-define modernity and categorizes the possibility of a discursive/communicative structure of modern lifeworld. The obscurity that belongs to the critique of reason in Kant and post-Kantian moral philosophers and knowledge theorists depended on the abstraction of a formalistic domain of theoretic paradigm. The 'knowledge claim' as a disenchantment propounded by the Enlightenment philosophers seems to have sneaked down all over again as the spirit of speculative force of a hypothetical judgment into the *forces* of cognitivist and non-cognitivist critical reappraisals of the forces of the nature that have been influencing and registering the historical evolve of pure and practical reason. A challenge to such an *a priori* non-discursive knowledge domain has been technically and purposively (under the influence of practical rationality) put forward in India by Nāgārjuna few centuries back. A critique of the theoretic domain of *pramāṇa* theorists or the cognitivists of Indian systematic origin revolves around the criticism of the hypostatization of the premises drawn as conclusions by an integrated and exaggerated deductive principle of argumentation. So far as the cognitivistic approaches of the classical theories of the metaphysical re-apprehension of the nature of the universe goes to exert a direct influence on the normative universalization of moral judgment, the purpose and objective of the Mahayana critique of knowledge aims at the nullification or deconstruction of the existential issues as knowledge domains based on speculative metaphysics, and

thus stands obstructing liberation from the pre-existent domain of knowledge. The speculative inductive principle generalization stands *a priori* in the consciousness as knowledge domain that influences the reason to formulate theoretic framework on moral judgments.

3.3.1. Critical Theory and the Frankfurt School

Frankfurt School brought into being in the first years of Weimar Republic and historically understood as both critical and constructive response to Marxian philosophy, which later created its own genealogy of theoretical engagements, gained its recognition under the directorship of Max Horkheimer with its other prominent first generation members Theodor Adorno, Walter Benjamin, Erich Fromm, Otto Kirchheimer, Leo Löwenthal, Herbert Marcuse, Franz Neumann, and Friedrich Pollock. Frankfurt School's main agenda was formulating a critical theory of society, culture and politics with its varied multi dimensional frameworks radically different from the traditional theory. It was complemented by related work in the aesthetics of experience (Benjamin and Adorno) and work in political theory and political economy (Neuman and Kirchheimer). But the guiding concern of the original Frankfurt School was with emancipation through reflective social science, focused on the experience of the working class in particular. 'Frankfurt School' came to stand for a social-theoretic approach employing methods of qualitative social science to expose the ideology responsible for various societal pathologies. With it's the most discussed second generation critical theorist Juergen Habermas, Frankfurt School's theoretical ambience attaches with itself yet another dimension of reconstructive, deep hermeneutical theory of rationality,

communication and normativity. The third generation members of Frankfurt School are SeylaBenhabib, Axel Honneth and Hans Joas, to name the most notable few.

As we discuss the Frankfurt School, let us start with the Marxian core that inspired the Frankfurt School's critical theory in the following section so as to conceptually and historically ground the Frankfurt School and the critique of reason that it generated.

3.3.2. Marxism-Classical Theory

Marxism, as propounded by Karl Marx, Frederich Engels and later Ilyanovich Lenin, is the political philosophy of the working class. It is a theory of social change which asks why social changes take place and how do these changes come into effect. The answer given by Marxism is that the social changes take place because of the material factors and they can be known through a method called 'dialectical materialistic' method[3].

Dialectical materialism and historical materialism are the theoretical/ philosophical basis of Marxism. Dialectical materialism is the sum-total of the general principles which explain as to why and how social changes take place. The social changes take place because of the material factors and through the dialectical materialistic method. The dialectical materialistic method is a triple method. According to Marx, Relations of Productions constitute the basis of the society at any given point of time. What are called the social relations among the people are, for the Marxists, the relations of production. Productive Forces constitute those

elements which originate from the relations of production, but which, though opposite to the latter, promise more production through newer methods/devices.

In very simple words, the Marxian theory states that all development takes place through struggle between opposites and because of factors which are economic. New Mode of Production is the result of the struggle between the relations of production and productive forces at a matured stage of their development. The new mode of production has the merits of both the relations of production and productive forces; hence a higher stage of economic development.

Historical Materialism is also called the economic/materialistic/ deterministic interpretation of history. The Marxian explanation of history is that it is a record of the self-development of productive forces; that the society keeps marching on its path of economic/ material development; that each stage of development indicates the level of development attained; that history is the history of numerous socio- economic formations: primitive communistic, slave-owning, feudal, capitalist and thereafter the transitional socialist followed by the communist society; that each succeeding society is an improvement over the preceding one; that the socialist society, after the abolition of the capitalist society would be a classless society but with a state in the form of the dictatorship of the proletariat; the communist society, which follows the socialists society, would be both classless society and stateless society[4].

Marxism, as a critical theory, advocates that the socialist society that follows the capitalist society after its abolition is a classless society where each gets according to one's ability and the mode of sharing of wealth will be on the basis of

the ideal that 'from each according to his abilities to each according to his work'. The communist society which follows the socialist society, will be both classless and stateless society. Marxism understands that the state, being the result of a class society, is a class institution. It is neither impartial nor just; it is a class institution. It is a partisan, oppressive and exploitative institution; it exists to serve the dominant class of which it is an instrument. In the capitalist society, the capitalist state protects and promotes the interests of the capitalists while in the socialist society, it protects and promotes the interests of the working class. By the time the socialist society becomes fully communistic, the state would, by then, have withered away. Withering away of the state, according to the Marxists, means disappearing of the state, i.e., slowly and gradually the state apparatus would wither away.

3.3.3. Marx's Meta-critique of Hegel

Habermas, in his work Knowledge and Human Interest discusses Marx's metacritique of Hegegl in details. For Habermas, the problem of Marx with Hegel is: "Marx follows the strategy of detaching the exposition of consciousness in its manifestation from the framework of the philosophy of identity[5]." Marx criticizes Hegel's standard of idealistic consideration of both subjective and objective nature, as the mind he considers as the pure presupposition of nature and the "mind emerges as the Idea existing for itself: both *the object and the subject* of the Idea is *the notion* (concept, Begriff)[6]." The reason being that: "Nature cannot be conceived as the other of a mind that is at the same time in its own element (beisich) in its other. For if nature was mind in its complex externalization, then as congealed

mind it would have its essence and life not in itself but outside itself[7]." "Here the mind presupposes nature, but in the sense of a natural process that, for within itself, gives rise likewise to the natural being man and the nature that surrounds him – and not in the idealist sense of a mind that, as idea existing for itself, posits a natural world as its own self-created presupposition[8]."

Habermas writes:

> "Objective idealism attempts to render the being-in-itself of nature comprehensible as a presupposition of absolute mind that has not been discerned as such by subjective mind. What Marx opposes to this is not coarse materialism…Marx certainly emphasizes, beside the bodily attributes of an organism dependent on its environment (sensuous receptivity, need, emotionality, vulnerability), the adaptive mode of behaviour and active expression of life of "an active natural being."but as long as he attributes to "objective activity" the still unspecific meaning that man, like every organism, "can only express his life through real, sensuous objects," Marx remains caught in the realm of naturalistic ideas[9]."

Again, therefore,

> "The subject of the world constitution is not transcendental consciousness in general, but the concrete human species which reproduces its life under natural conditions. That this "process of material exchange"…takes the form of process of social labor derives from the physical condition of this natural being and some constants of its natural environment[10]."

For Marx, human being expresses himself in and through nature by his physical activity that, Marx calls labour, and that which mediates the material exchange between man and nature. "The nature that surrounds us constitutes itself as objective nature for us only in being mediated by subjective nature of man through processes of social labour[11]."

3.3.4. Frankfurt School's Critique of Marx (and Marxism)

The foundation stone of a critical reaction against a purely discursive method of the deliverance of knowledge enhanced by the dogmatic tendencies and the wayfarers of the enlightenment theoriography was already been laid by the empiricist and faith philosophers who claimed that discursive understanding can never penetrate the layers of reality which they claimed can only be felt in the heart[12]; what perhaps can be predicted by this is that it might be reflecting its voice towards the critique of pure theoretic understanding. In spite of being a form of the origin of a critical force, the theories of faith-philosophers were no less dogmatic in the autonomy of the mystical visions over the subjective freedom and particularity of experiences. It is needless to say that the scientism and dry skepticism that belonged to the very core of pure intellectual understanding and deliverance of knowledge, in the language used by Thilly - "mocked humanity's deepest yearnings and rendered fictitious its most precious values[13]." As has been told earlier, the critical spirit or the inevitable critical tendency of the intellect, that has constantly been relocating its origin in human freedom, disposes and determines its historical existence in the form of a dialectical consciousness.

The origin and importance of Critical Theory lies in a critically reflective orientation of the theory of knowledge and recover a dialectical self-consciousness and methodology, that though originally emerged with an attempt to selvage Marxism from the degeneration into "mechanical materialism"[14] and "directed its effort against the determinism and objectivism of a Marxism in danger of destroying the validity of the dialectic"[15], also incidentally brings within its critical

purview the socio-political development contextualizing itself from the critique of political economy and praxis to the critique of the system of human experience concerning culture and philosophy[16].

> "The fundamental importance of Marxism was seen to lie in its development of a dialectical theory of knowledge and a critical method for analyzing and changing society, not in its development of a deterministic and metaphysical cosmology. Therefore the recovery of a dialectical-critical epistemology and method was not perceived by the critical theorists as a radical "revision" of Marxism; rather, it was understood as the recovery and development of the dialectical, core elements of Marxism, which has become "residual" through its positivization[17]."

Its objective is then a return to the centrality of the dialectical Marxism which refers back to Kantian and Hegelian roots of dialectical theory[18].

> "Essential to Critical Theory is the reflective reconstruction and reestablishment of the Kantian and, especially, Hegelian epistemological origins of Marxism. Through such a reconstruction, a critically self-reflective Marxism can refound itself philosophically and dialectically[19]."

The origin and development of Critical Theory in Frankfurt School, according to Scott Warren, had both philosophical as well as political turns and to relocate socio-political structures and their developments in the line of problematic that echoes a critical emancipatory turn: the attempt to unite phenomenology with Marxism directed the theory of the origin of the Critical Theory towards both philosophical and political concern respectively. Scott W says: "…the Frankfurt School came into being as a response within the Marxist tradition to particular important political and historical transformations taking place in the early part of the twentieth century."[20] The development of a "socialist orthodoxy" as a result of the "eastward shift of the centre of gravity of socialist thought", after the World War I and the Russian Revolution initiates an immediate intellectual reaction in the

form of a critical and meta-critical reappraisal of the development in socialist self-consciousness and in the emancipatory theoretic unfolding, particularly the developments that would redirect itself towards the emergence of an anti-democratic socio-political theoretic structure[21].

> "The political development of a bureaucratic and oppressive Communist orthodoxy presented substantial problems for the self-understanding of marxism as a movement of emancipation and critical enlightenment[22]."

The emergence of the historical development in the form of the post-liberalist structure of the Capitalism adopting the monopoly frame and growing government intervention in the economy also had been a cause of theoretic consciousness when the proponents of Frankfurt School felt themselves responsible to the current stage of socio-political structural development, which it seemed to have been a difficult task for the orthodox Marxism. The need to emancipate Marxism from its dogmatic slumber and making it suitable to the reconstructions of the modern socio-political accommodations becomes the initial theoretic purpose for the critical theorists. Thus, not only witnessing the structure and functioning of the developments in the socio-political life since early 1920s, Frankfurt School also becomes firm footed in re-examination of the nature of marxism itself.

Scott Warren tells us that perhaps the Critical Theorists of Frankfurt School also finds them in the midst of an ongoing struggle of one more powerful historical force that controlled the socio-economic and political structure of thought, simultaneously with that of orthodox and dogmatic Marxism. The most important social and political inspiration that makes Frankfurt School consistent in reconstructing a critical theory was "the perceived need to deal with the historical

structure and importance of the emergence of the advanced industrial-technological society."[23] The rapid development of technological society in its integration of the socio-political system exerted a new form of transformation even in the structure of capitalism.

> "The various conditions and problems involved with the rise of technological-industrial society were seen by the original Critical Theorists to transcend those of classical liberal capitalism. Marx's original starting point in the critique of political economy had to be broadened to the more comprehensive framework of the critique of technical civilization. In this light, the major problem to be confronted by a critical theory of society was the rise of technical rationality and "instrumental reason."[24]"

The main point of philosophical concern behind the socio-political critique of technical rationality for Critical Theory is not only its involvement in the qualitative transformation of capitalist economy and society but also concerned with (i) the growing integration and intimacy between the positivist and technological *mode of thought* which would result in (ii) an *ideological defense* and maintenance of the 'neocapitalist' status quo[25].

The founders of Critical Theory thus, were faced with two currents of positivistic trends as two extremes, one contradicting the other: the major historical and political development in the structure of capitalist society in the one hand and the emergence of a bureaucratic Communist orthodoxy on the other[26].

As Scott Warren has shared with us the philosophical origin of Frankfurt School and the emergence of Critical Theory, was intimate and inherent critical reaction to the classical Marxism. He says, "…the Frankfurt School theory was an endeavor to recover a dialectical Marxism…[27]"

As a critical reflective reaction towards the dialectical crisis of Marxism, and restore it to the Kantian-Hegelian roots of critical dialectics, the members of Frankfurt School found themselves standing on the same line with the Leftist-Hegelian (including Marx) as not only a recovery of the 'dialectics' in Marxism but also concerning the development of Hegelian dialectical method through a practical critique and transformation of society. But the only difference that can be accounted for the Critical Theorist members of Frankfurt School that they "…were separated philosophically from Kant and Hegel by the work of such figures as Nietzsche, Bergson, Dilthey, Weber, and Husserl and they had to confront the reality of a systematized, positivistic Marxism[28]" Hence, it would be worth, as Scott Warren thinks, to say that their reply to the crisis in dialectical Marxism and the theory of knowledge in the context of political economy is two-fold: "…first they attempted to deal with and integrate the work of Nietzschean and Bergsonian *Lebensphilosophie* (philosophy of life), Dilthey's hermeneutical historicism, Weber's sociology, Husserl's phenomenology, and especially Freudian psychoanalysis; and second, they attempted to overcome the positivism and objectivism which has invaded Marxist theory itself[29]."

While started talking about the reconstruction of the development of Dialectical Theories entailing meta-critical and meta-ethical structures of enquiry in his work, "The Emergence of Dialectical Theory", Scott Warren mentions why he thinks that the contribution of Frankfurt School should be worth mentioning. There are two reasons he says:

> "First, although the Frankfurt School founded by Max
> Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno emerged from the same

Kantian, Hegelian, and Marxian roots as dialectical Marxism and existential phenomenology, it developed in its own distinctive direction, particularly, it developed toward an analysis of philosophy and culture and away from an analysis of political economy, and it also developed in conscious opposition to the movement of Husserlian phenomenology. Second, as a movement which self-consciously called itself "the critical theory of society", the Frankfurt School enjoyed an institutional base and continuity as the *Institute fur Sozialforschung* for almost half a century. Thus as a movement in the development of dialectical theory, it possessed a particularly strong sense of identity in a field of many other similar movements and developments[30]."

The critique of reason in Frankfurt School accounts for a subscription of historical re-formulations of critical tendencies throughout generations and thus continues to present critique in its newer forms of categorical competencies, while maintaining the common objective of the critique of instrumental reason tooling the 'top down' ideological domination of man over the entire phenomena of understanding nature. The Frankfurt School through the four generations of Critical tendencies (Horkheimer, Adorno, Marcus and Habermas) thus continues to critically re-apprehend man's capacity of understanding nature and the ways of "emancipation" from its domination. A critique of the role of reason justified and fashioned by the Enlightenment is the rock bottom of all the critical tendencies belonging to generations and from which the actual initiation takes place as what is thus technically called "critique of reason." Nonetheless, a study of the historical account of the preconditions and pre-considerations of critique is important including the founder thinker - Horkheimer's definition of "criticism" that actually rationally guides the entire critical tradition.

The contribution of Frankfurt School into the theoretic re-appraisal of the dogmatic degeneration of Marxism and the critique of the dialectic of science and

society can also be apprehended from the arguments put forward by Scott Warren in support of the philosophical origin of Frankfurt School and the emergence of Critical Theory.

The "vitiation of the theoretical and practical impact of critical theory"[31] by the rise and dominance a positivistic theoriography in critical Marxism resulting in the development of Communist orthodoxy directed the founders of Frankfurt School to re-read or re-establish the links between theory and practice.

> "...the genesis of critical theory is grounded in a concern for praxis, understood not as an external determinism or the instrumental-technical application of theory, but as a self-creating and self-generating free human action."

Again,

> "The desire for a union of theory and praxis revitalized inquiry into the nature of their dialectic in terms of "critique," or dialectical thought, and into the relationship between the liberation of critical consciousness and the real emancipation of human being from various forms and forces of domination[32]."

Science involves a crisis: the crisis left out by the positivistic tendency of objectification of knowledge that supported the class-dominant civilization of technological-industrial society that nurchars value free neutrality of politics and social theoriography. "The knowledge produced within such a system was capable of mediating and controlling "objective" conflict."[33] Critical Theory accomplished what was, as Scott shows, left over by Husserl as the gap between theory and practice left untouched by him. The concern of Critical Theory has been the emancipation from the pure *theoria* of a positivistic objectivism of science and the value free neutrality. What was needed at the face of such "positivistic self-

image"[34] of politics and social sciences is a "critical theory of society with a practical intent[35]."

> "Husserl's response to the crisis by way of phenomenology and pure *theoria* left the gap between theory and practice untouched and hence did nothing to overcome the importance of theory in the face of countervailing practice. What was needed was a critical theory in which the theorist was not confined to the realm of pure theory and political detachment. What was needed to combat the crisis in the role of science, and the real social and political crisis it reflected, was a critical theory of society with a practical intent[36]."

The ideological move of a positivistic science is pure socio-psychological and thus natural. The conclusion of such a proposition is not reached, again, by a positivistic approach towards the objective nature of positivism and the fundamentals of socio-psychology, but by the instances from pure praxis. Ideologies are natural outcome of the domination of an objective approach towards knowledge: the autonomy of objective knowledge over subjective values. Therefore:

> "The response of Critical Theory,…had to be seen as a battle against positivistic objectivism which had become ideology. The critique of positivism, and hence of ideology, was viewed by the Critical Theorists as a form of the unity of theory and praxis, which could only be validated by more fundamental revolutionary praxis[37]."

3.3.5. Horkheimer and the Dialectical Theory of Knowledge

Horkheimer obtains a dialectical theory of knowledge and having been a Marxist critique of Hegel, rejects the "Hegelian phenomenological dialectic insofar as it presupposed the philosophy of identity and absolute knowledge." The social theory that is based on Horkheimer's dialectical theory of knowledge thus seems opposed to "the pursuit of absolutes in classical idealism and "identity theory," as

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well as to the empiricist-posiivist position, which entails a rejection of everything beyond observable experience[38]." The 'Philosophy of Life'[39] that influenced his thought was not only a protest against the "degeneration of reason into a rigid, abstract rationalism and therefore attempted to recover the spiritual and vital dimensions of human thought and life." but also a rescue of individual from various forms of conformism and the irrationality of existing society[40]. But being critical to the 'Philosophy of Life' as such, what was left for Horkheimer and Critical Theory was that which required the rescue of materialism from reductionism: "For Critical Theory, the rescue of materialism from reductionism takes the form of an attack on economic determinism, a critique of "materialist theory of knowledge," and a recovery of the sense of social reality as a dialectical mediated totality[41]."

3.4. Frankfurt School and Critical Theory: The Characteristics of Criticism

The characteristics of Critical Theory consists in all about a critical reappraisal of reasons competence of its own theoretic endeavor into categorizing a regulative principle of action that has its foundation in moral principles in reasons practical accommodation to socio-rational demands and are not inherent in the reason's instrumental purpose of regulating social principles under some pure constructive law, or considering reason as a non-communicative special faculty coining universal social principles. The critical theorists of the first generation of Frankfurt school are thus very much conscious about reasons performance about a practical law-giver, or a productive principle in disguise. Thus Critical Theory

"…does not make a fetish of "pure-knowledge" as distinct from and superior to action. Neither does Critical Theory conceive the relation between theory and

practice as an instrumental one in which theory is technically "applied" to practice, particularly in order to regulate a given and accepted social structure. Furthermore, a critical theory of society refuses to accept unconditionally the political-evaluative categories which evolve in a particular society[42]."

Similarly, as"Horheimer introduces and defines,

We must go on to add that there is a human activity which has society itself for its object. The aim of this activity is not simply to eliminate one or other abuse, for it regards such abuses as necessarily connected with the way in which the social structure is organized. Although it itself emerges from the social structure, its purpose is not, either in its conscious intention or in its objective significance, the better functioning of any element in the structure. On the contrary, it is suspicious of the very categories of better, useful, appropriate, productive and valuable, as these are understood in the present order, and refuses to take them as nonscientific presuppositions about which one can do nothing[43]."

Similarly the Critical Theorists saw the need for their theory to become more radical (hence to return to the "root" questions of man-nature relations) the attempt to reestablish the relationship between critical theory and revolutionary praxis by seeing the class conflict in a new dimension. They would say that "We find that the centrality of class conflict in the philosophy of history of traditional Marxism is replaced by the centrality of the conflict between man and nature[44]." And again, "The degeneration of reason into a narrow and technical rationality has from the beginning of modern history been related to the domination of nature, and reason has been understood as a tool for the control of nature and, ultimately, for the domination of man[45]."

According to the critical theorists, the view of nature as something to be subjugated and controlled for the purposes of human "emancipation," and the concomitant view that this would take place through a process of the "rationalization" of the world contained at least two major faults. First, it involved

a non-dialectical separation of man and nature. Second, since it superficially equated the technical and formalistic rationalization of the world with any broader and deeper view of reason and rationality, it allowed for the concealment of more radical forms of irrationality. This kind of argument moved the critical theorists even further way from orthodox Marxism, especially in so far as they began to place Marx more strongly within the Enlightenment tradition. Thus they argued that Marx placed too much emphasis on an objectivistic, instrumental concept of labour and that his view of a theory-praxis relationship presupposed the domination and control of nature[46]."

3.4.1. Dialectic of Enlightenment: A Brief Historical Introduction

Dialektik der Aufklärung or Dialectic of Enlightenment by Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno explores the socio-psychological status quo that had been responsible for what the Frankfurt school considered the failure of the age of enlightenment. The work is an outcome of certain pessimistic reaction towards the ambivalence in the structure and function of the socio-political domination and human freedom/emancipation. These issues and the crisis that they face were a deeply rooted historical problem which were perhaps felt difficult to be addressed within the terms of traditional critical theories. The history of human societies, as well as that of the formation of individual ego or self, is re-evaluated from the standpoint of what Horkheimer and Adorno perceived at the time as the ultimate outcome of this history: the collapse or "regression" of reason, with the rise of National Socialism, into something resembling the very forms of superstition and myth out of which reason had supposedly emerged as a result of historical progress or development. The authors coined the term *culture industry,* arguing that in a

capitalist society mass culture is akin to a factory producing standardized cultural goods — films, radio programmes, magazines, etc. These homogenized cultural products are used to manipulate mass society into docility and passivity. The introduction of the radio, a mass medium, no longer permits its listener any mechanism of reply, as was the case with the telephone. Instead, listeners are not subjects anymore but passive receptacles exposed "in authoritarian fashion to the same programs put out by different stations."

Horkheimer and Adorno makes the key observation in the Dialectic of Enlightenment that Productive Rationality is that form of rationality that tends to *produce* knowledge that *serves as a means* to manipulate subjects. Therefore it encodes thatKnowledge was more a systematic method of disciplinary purposive approaches as masters of nature as if it is meant to be something very useful to manipulate nature. Instead of presenting the conceptual knowledge what, according to Bacon, knowledge still holds back in its stock are also mere instruments. "What human beings seek to learn from nature is how to use it to dominate wholly both it and human being[47]."

The major theoretical endeavor of dialectica enlighten was to make a critique of reason imbibed by Enlightenment as enlightenment rationality. Adorno and Hork says: "Enlightenment, understood in the widest sense as the advance of thought, has always aimed at liberating human beings from fear and installing them as master...Enlightenment's program was the disenchantment of the world. It wanted to dispel myths, to overcome fantasy with knowledge[48]."

This rationality directed reason towards 'knowledge' that could be argumentatively assigned and employed to master the nature. Enlightenment had to be the power of knowledge, according to Backon, that disenchanted man of the power of nature and made him its master.

The critique of reason and the critique of enlightenment, thus says Hork and Adorno, appears to be patriarchal in nature: "the mind, conquering superstition, is to rule over disenchanted nature."[49] Therefore, they tells further that:"Knowledge, which is power, knows no limits, either in the enslavement of creation or in its defence to worldly masters. Just as it serves all the purpose of the bourgeois economy both in factories and in battlefield, it is at this disposal of entrepreneurs regardless of their origins[50]."

It makes another important observation as part of its critique of reason that, technology becomes as democratic as the economic system with which it evolved. It became a secular tool for not only merchants and the bourgeois but also an inevitable part and parcel of the origin of knowledge and its systematicity in constructing human understanding of the nature. It further adds: "Technology is the essence of this knowledge. It aims to produce neither concept nor images, not the joy of understanding, but method, exploitation of the labour of others, capital[51]."

The Dialctic of Enlightenment makes the key observation in this context that, "Its concern is not "satisfaction, which men call truth," but "operation," the effective procedure. The "true end, scope or office of knowledge" does not consist in "any possible, dialectable, reverend or admired discourse, or any satisfactory arguments, but in effecting and working, and in discovery of particulars not

revealed before, for the better endowment and help of man's life." There shall be neither mystery nor any desire to reveal mystery[52]."

Knowledge becomes a means and reason becomes an instrument of producing knowledge. 'Knowledge' becomes a mere tool, a product, a means by which subjects can be manipulated. The force that proved its domination is the autonomy of Productive Rationality.

Through a number of analogical incidents of the treatment of knowledge situation Hork and Adorno tries to show how Enlightenment, with a rather positivistic sense of intellection judges knowledge and its inner meaning. With this positivistic attitude, human beings have also discarded 'meaning' on their way towards modern science. "On their way towards modern science human beings have discarded meaning. The concept is replaced by formula, the cause by rules and probability[53]." Scientific criticism, which they called "the latest secular form of creative principles," where by creative they most probably means creation (or production) of knowledge, has the theory of causality the last principle left to be criticized by it that alone belongs to the old ideas and still stood in the way to such criticism[54]." The concept of life and death were interwoven in myths. The entire natural and super-natural phenomena and the mythical figures could be reduced to a common denominator, and that is the subject. The projection of human personality over these phenomenon who allow themselves to be frightened by those phenomenon is to bring the phenomenal capacity of the unknown and the unknowable within the human rational intellection. Anthropomorphism has thus been a tool for the Enlightenment for its unitary purpose of rational intellection[55].

"For enlightenment, everything which does not conform to the standard of calculability and utility must be viewed with suspicion[56]." The scope of empiricism is clubbed with rational constitutive and progressive engagement when it comes to the question of the status of an intelligible unity of existent or event. Only that can be encompassed by reason as an existent even that followed a unitary method of intellectual calculability[57]. The use of Formal Logic as a tool of unification offered the Enlightenment thinkers a "schema for making the world calculable[58]." The unifying attitude of the enlightenment temper is also reflected in the concept of justice which equates itself with the principle of mathematics[59]. The authors are of the opinion that the intellectual system of equivalence actually complimented the socio-economic contingencies of the Bourgeois society and used to run on them. The intellectual system of unifying various particular propositions and dissimilar things into one generalized unitary consideration actually became a tool and medium of flourish of the Bourgeois. The authors say: "Bourgeois society is ruled by equivalence. It makes the dissimilar things comparable by reducing them to abstract qualities. For the Enlightenment, anything which cannot be resolved into numbers, and ultimately into one, is illusion; modern positivism consigns it to poetry[60]."

Talking about myths, the authors says that the "myths which fell victim to the Enlightenment were themselves its products[61]." Myths actually recorded the origin of scientific approaches and their origins but thus also to narrate, record and explain. Resulting from depending upon myths for the record and collection of the data, myths soon dominated the theoretic realm of science and the scientific explanation of the rituals, the prerequisite of the elucidation of processes. The

unitary principle obtained by the Enlightenment intellection brought every scope of mythical explanation under the generalization of scientific explanation: the local spirits is replaced by the hierarchy of heavens, magic by the carefully graduated sacrifice, and the labour of enslaved man mediated by command. Man's resemblance to God, his attempt of mastery of nature and the command of intellection under the spell of the rationalized presupposition of the principle of unification brought under its scope not only every aspects of human social and cultural inculcation including religion and scientific enquiries but also the human and divine existential: "In the face of unity of such reason the distinction between God and man is reduced to an irrelevance, as reason has steadfastly indicated since the earliest critique of Homer[62]."

Enlightenment ruled the domain of reason. Reason has been the master of nature of things where reason is clubbed into its empirical counterpart to form ideological set of propositions as axioms, knowledge, of any kind, had to be fitted to which to be called knowledge proper. The range of knowledge was assumed to the core of production and manipulation. Enlightenment rationality in its estrangement from its object, the nature assumes the form of its master, the way the director assumes its relation with the humans[63]. The knowledge of the nature becomes the commodity, the possession that actually belongs to the one who masters it: "The man of science knows things to the extent that he can make them[64]." Enlightenment is the space where magic and science stood together in the same platform as a claim to conceive the knowledge of the world, the former as sometimes being expressed in the later in a more discursive and demonstrative format.

Enlightenment is the space where magic and science stood on the same platform as a claim to conceive the knowledge of the world. It has been a period where science and religion, magic and superstition, logic and morality were made identical and stood for by a discursive logic. The animal for the sacrifice had qualities of its own and became unsubstitutable like the rabbit in the science lab persisted to be the only specimen in exemplification. Tough science puts an end to representationism, but both science and rituals show radical rigidity and discursivity in both theory and practice. "The manifold affinities between existing things are supplanted by the single relationship between the subject who confers meaning and the meaningless object, between the rational significance and its accidental bearer[65]." The reason attributed by scientific and speculative powers categorized and given "meaning" to the nature that he mastered. "The "unshakable confidence in the possibility of controlling the world" which Freud anachronistically attributes to magic applies only to the more realistic form of world domination achieved by the greater astuteness of science. The autonomy of thought in relation to objects, as manifested in the reality-adequacy of the Ego, was a prerequisite for the replacement of the localized practices of the medicine man by all-embracing industrial technology[66]."

Mythology, now added up with the power of science replaced the traditional myths and thus sets in motion the endless process of enlightenment by which every definite theoretical view "is subjected to annihilating criticism that it is only a belief, until even the concept of mind , truth, and, indeed, enlightenment itself has been reduced to animistic magic."[67] Enlightenment by its cogent systematic necessity of rational cognitions and systematic evolution of rational

institutions dissolved each and every classical mythological contents to the formal logical conclusion. Reason with its formal logical cogent succession presides over the succession of systems originating from the hierarchy of gods. "The principle of fated necessity which caused the downfall of the mythical hero, and finally evolved as the logical conclusion from the oracular utterance, not only predominates, refined to the cogency of formal logic, in every rationalistic system of Western philosophy but also presides over the succession of systems which begins with the hierarchy of the gods and, in a permanent twilight of the idols, hands down a single identical content: wrath against those of insufficient righteousness[68]." Enlightenment was now being accused of entangled to mythology more deeply receiving all its subject matter from myths only to destroy them.

The moral death of enlightenment along with its scientific spirit is construed from the fact that like myths it adhered to representative formats of scientific knowledge and explanations of the world that it always puts against the mythical imaginations. "The principle of immanence, the explanation of every event as representation, which enlightenment upholds against mythical imagination, is that of myth itself[69]." The "critical" boundaries set for all possible experiences was narrowed down to the sameness of whatever might appear as different.

The symbolic structure of the teachings of priests in which signs and images coincide, appeared to the core, the functionality of the repetition of Nature. Symbolic representation of nature characterized endless repetition and regressive renewals. Even the gods were not speared from the symbolic representations. The

essence of gods is not exhausted by individuality. The scorn of the ancient left the anthropomorphism or too-humanness of gods untouched. They still had about them the qualities of *mana*. Hey symbolized powers of nature as universal power. "With their preanimistic traits they intrude into the enlightenment."[70] The symbolism ultimately brought with it the scientism of the explanation of the universe that extended itself in language. "For science the world is first of all a sign; it is then distributed among the various arts as sound, image, or word power, but its unity can never be restored by the addition of these arts, by synaesthesia or total art[71]." As a result of language's resignation to be a system of calculable framework to know and explain the Nature, science, in its neo-positivist interpretation resulted in being identical with the system of symbols which was not willing to transcend the systematic framework resembling mathematics.

The symbolic representation of the universe that overlooks the philosophical fallacy demonstrated by the separation between intuition and concept had its effect on the demise of the social knowledge. "The making of images was proscribed by Plato as it was by Jews[72]." Language in its resignation to be a symbolic representation of the universe had to do away with the spiritual representationism of nature in magic. Reason and the autonomy of intellectual symbolism in artifacts and religion in their fight for the supremacy in the explanation of the universe outlawed the consistency of magic: "Nature is no longer to be influenced by its likeness but measured through work[73]." But the irony is the common thing that art shared with magic: "Art has in common with magic the postulation of a special, self-contained sphere removed from the context of profane existence. Within it special law prevail. Just as the scorner begins the

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ceremony by marking out from all its surroundings the lace in which the sacred forces are to come into play, each work of art is closed off from reality by its own circumstance. The very renunciation of external effects by which art is distinguished from magical sympathy binds art only more deeply to the heritage of magic[74]."Art shares with magical tradition the representationism of the universe of nature its spiritual duplication, the universal into a particular form of manifestation sometimes that consists the influence of *mana*: "as an expression of totality, art claims the dignity of the absolute[75]."

The elevation of *mana*consciousness went to construct a norm following from the nomadic period to that of intellectual symbols. The subjection to *mana* assigned to different classes of humanity: "power to one side, obedience to the other".[76]. The spirit seers extended their esoteric knowledge and their particularities along with the spirit-world relationship to powers of manipulating society that had presented itself as an outcome of the influence of symbolic supernaturalism: "The symbols take on the expression of fetish. The representation of nature which they signify always manifests itself in later times as the permanence of social compulsion, which the symbols represent. The dread objectified in the fixed image becomes a sign of the consolidated power of the privileged[77]." And "The division of labor, through which power manifests itself socially, serves the self-preservation of the dominated whole[78]."

3.4.2. Habermas' Critique of Dialectic of Enlightenment

The problem of the tenability of the scope of speculative metaphysics in the contingent form of a positivistic re-apprehension of science as absolute value-free

is basically a problem pertaining to the *epistemology* or the interest of cognitive intervention into the world of *knowledge*. It thus problematizes a normative foundation that knowledge chooses to associate with the practical disposition, the theory-praxis relation. The choice, of the individual actor as a knower, according to Fichte, presupposes the foundation of critical philosophy problematizing the practical foundation of knowledge. Horkheimer and Adorno saw the positivistic foundation of knowledge embedded in the scientific research and in traditional theories as a reproductive agency of capitalism and therefore, conflicting the role of social interest. But they fail to detect the practical interest that scientific research postulates in the traditional theoretic understanding that forms the basis of critical theory as promulgating the normative structure of *theoria*.

Positivism does not see the subtleties of deep-seated anthropological demands of reason in technical and practical interest in cognition recognized by Habermasin the appraisal of science and degrade it to the form of sheer ideology. The theoretic format of criticism that belongs to Horkheimer's and Adorno's foundation of theoretical re-apprehension models it back to the foundational format of positivistic thinking as they develop the value of negative function and the radicalizatioin of the withering critical foundation since they overlook the practical interest involved in science and traditional theory that actually provides sociology with a normative basis. For Habermas, the traditional theoriography suggests, in disguise, the normative claim that is overlooked by his predecessors and that which as the ground of human being's practical interest to the practical disposition of knowledge as it follows the line of Kant's teleological intervention into the critique of reason in practical presuppositions.

The purpose of critical theory is to reestablish the connection between knowledge and human interests by means of the concept of knowledge-constitutive or cognitive interests so that theory retains its emancipatory interest. Against positivism, for Habermas, theory must regain a practical interest in transforming the world through collective human action towards human emancipation. It is this conception of the relation between reason and praxis that for Horkheimer and Critical Theorists escapes the efforts and understandings of *Lebensphilosophie*, positivism and even of Husserl.

The goal of traditional theory is purely objective and universal recognition of the practical world as devoid of 'action' and other particular and individuated contingencies of social life. Scott points out the following essential characteristics of Critical Theory that stands as a drawback of the Critical Theory as followed by a suppression of Critical theory by Traditional *theoria*:

> "…critical theory is radical and foundational. In its attempt to distinguish the apparent from the essential through its inquiry into the nature of reality, critical theory returns to the classical origins of *theoria*. In this sense, for Critical Theory the very notion of *critical* theory is somewhat redundant, since criticism is essentially *theoria*.[79]"

Again,

> "Because of the increasing problematical position of two working class as a revolutionary force, and because, for Horkheimer and the Critical Theorists, the classical concept of a radical critique of political economy seemed increasingly inadequate, the Frankfurt school began to turn their attention to an analysis of the vanishing of negative and critical forces in society. Thus, rather than developing and revising the classical Marxist concepts in the critical of political economy, they began to focus more and more on the cultural and ideological "super-structure" of society negated by Marxism[80]."

Scott W writes:

"His (Habermas) undertaking is, in a sense, to complete the basis for a critical theory of society by going beyond the work of Horkheimer, Adorno, and Marcuse to demonstrate the epistemological foundations and problems of "transcendental theory" which not only justify but necessitate the tradition to critical theory[81]." He demonstrates: "…theory and practice are capable of a profound and radical unification *epistemologically*[82]."Thereby, "His reformulation of the relationship between theory and practice in these terms, grounded in the notion of "cognitive interest," is perhaps the most important and innovative contribution Habermas offers to the evolution of dialectical theory and contemporary political inquiry.

Scott thus starts with Habermas's critique of Marx:

> "Habermas's work stands in a critical relation to Marx, a relation not of absolute negation but of dialectical *Aufheben*. Hence he is interested in developing in marx what is rightfully important and relevant for a critical theory of society, given the historical transformations of advanced industrial society, and critically rejecting what seems to have lost its validity in the development of Marxism, as it is rooted in the Marx's thought itself[83]."

Habermas's problem was with the Marx's theoriography is that of a submerging character of the dialectic into traditional philosophy and positivistic materializations.

> "At the most fundamental level, perhaps, this means recovering the epistemological dialectic from the instrumental and positivistic tendencies in Marx's thought which have prevailed in the development of the dominant self-understanding of Marxism. Since Marx never explicitly reflected on the nature of "critique," his self-proclaimed mode of inquiry, he failed to distinguish it sufficiently from both traditional philosophy and "positive science" and hence allowed the dissolution of the dialectic

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into positivism." Thereby: the "reduction of the process of reflection to instrumental action that disturbs Habermas, since it is Marx's emphasis on the instrumental nature of knowledge that permits the degeneration of his dialectic into pragmatism and the pretense of natural sciences[84]."

The dissolution of Kantian conception of critique of knowledge took place beginning with Hegel and Marx but soon was compelled to devoid after the emergence of positivism. As a result of such methodological trajectory in thought and the emergence of a positivistic and objective attitude towards the method of philosophy rather the importance of minorities of cognitive aspects philosophy resulted into a pure form of "positive science" rather than a critical apprehension of the foundations of knowledge and the knowables. The reaction of Critical Theory against the traditional form of knowledge and positivization of categorical theorization is based on the intrinsic purity of knowledge and the alienated relation between theory and praxis in sociology and political action. The only unity between theory and practice would be expressed in the range of instrumental rationality. The meaning of the term "critique" as Horkheimer would signify is not the critique of pure reason, instead he relates it to the sense it has in the "dialectical critique of political economy[85]."But on the contrary, Horkheimer places his critique within the Marxian line of criticism.

Habermas conceives 'the need to recover the Kantian notion of an "interest of reason"' "to combat the dissolution of epistemology into methodology'. According to Habermas, in Kant we find the notion that reason has an inherent interest in emancipation in so far as it either arises from or awakens a need to be fulfilled. This interest is "cognitive" since it is part of the process of reflection

itself. The interest of reason in emancipation and fulfillment is frustrated, however, by the Kantian distinction between theoretical and practical reasoning[86]."“The unity of interest and reason rejects the traditional concept of theory reformulated in positivism[87]."In a knowledge-constitutive interest, the interested self-reflection projects the interest embedded in reason becomes constitutive for both knowing and acting. “Hence the self-formative process of human species, in which reason's interest in emancipation is invested, aims at realizing conditions of “instrumental action” (conditions of the “material exchange” of man with nature) and of “symbolic interaction” (conditions of interaction of man with man). What Habermas wants to do is to reinterpret the concept of the “interest of reason” (a cognitive interest) materialistically so that the emancipatory interest is contingent upon and embedded in the development of the life processes of interaction and work. All of this is intended to demonstrate the necessity of recovering the dimension of self-reflection in which reason grasps itself as interested[88]."The fact that as Habermas belongs to Frankfurt School and the aim of critical theorists is to conceive and stalk the emancipation through a process of self-reflection, and as the search of critical consciousness methodologically presupposes understanding the preceding levels of consciousness which poses legitimation of certain unreflective social-political conditions: “…Habermas's aim is to recover the movement of the liberating self-reflection which Hegel had grasped, and, as one interpreter has is, “to show how the dynamics of self-reflection are relevant for a critical understanding of contemporary social and political reality[89]."

Therefore, “Habermas is aware that simply liberating ourselves from various mystifications (as in Hegel's notion of self-reflection), by way of a critical

examination of the legitimatization of a positivistic self-understanding of knowledge and science, is not sufficient for a radical praxis directed towards human emancipation. Nonetheless, he believes it is necessary for such a praxis. This involves nothing less than a fundamental rethinking of the nature of science and knowledge. We need to recover the interests that guide various modes of inquiry, which means reconceptualizing theory itself as active and constructive. In other words, we must develop a new view of the relation of theory and practice in terms of the interests of cognition. For Habermas, this view cannot be developed by positivistic Marxism or by the positivistic orthodoxy in contemporary liberal society. It can only be developed by a critical theory of knowledge and human interest[90]."

"Indeed positivistic science retains two elemental assumptions of classical theory: the methodological assumption of disinterested, natural observation as the mode of inquiry and the ontological assumption of an objectively structured cosmos. Yet it destroys in its process of inquiry the classical claim of *theoria*: that knowledge inherently provides cultivation of the individual which liberates him from the bonds of conventional wisdom…It abandons the connection of knowledge and human interest, theory and practice, as intrinsic to the process of inquiry." Thereby, "…subsequent separation of knowledge and interest serves as an ideological legitimation of existing conditions.

3.5. Habermas's Idea of Critical Theory

Habermas, therefore, argues that "Theory has an interest in the practical transformation of the world, an interest in the improvement of the human

condition, which does not take place apart from the development and liberation of the self-consciousness of individuals actively concerned with and determining their own destiny. It is in this sense that critical theory must focus on the "critique of ideology" and the assault on "false consciousness" in order to assist in the growth of a critical self-awareness in the subjects of radical change[91]."

For Habermas, "…critical theory is radical and foundational…In its attempt to distinguish the apparent from the essential through its inquiry into the nature of reality, critical theory returns to the classical origins of *theoria*…Thus critical theory involves an attempt to recover the "negative function" of theory which has been suppressed by traditional theory. The result of this suppression is the inability of traditional theory to offer a rational basis for the criticism of accepted, given reality[92]."

3.5.1. Habermas's Reconstruction of Reason

One of the major stances of Habermas critical theory is that "Reason has split into three moments – modern science, positive law and post-traditional ethics, and autonomous art and institutionalized art criticism – but philosophy had precious little to do with this disjunction. Since the turn to autonomy, art has striven mightily to mirror one basic aesthetic experience, the increasing de-centration of subjectivity. It occurs as the subject leaves the spatio-temporal structures of everyday life behind, freeing itself from the conventions of everyday perception, of purposive behavior, and the imperatives of work and utility[93]." He would therefore, further add that, "Everyday life, however, is a more promising medium for regaining the lost unity of reason than are today's expert cultures or yester year's classical philosophy of reason[94]."

3.5.2. Habermas's Justification of the Need of a Critique of Modernity

Modernity, for Habermas, is reflected in the cognitive foundation of the cultural reconstruction based on universal models or ideas of rational arguments[95]. Habermas would argue further that, "…what happens when it surrenders the role of judge in matters of science as well as culture? Does this mean philosophy's relation to the totality is severed? Does this mean it can no longer be the guardian of rationality?

The situation of culture as a whole is no different from the situation of science as a whole. As totalities, neither needs to be grounded or justified or given a place by philosophy. Since the dawn of modernity in the eighteenth century, culture has generated those structures of rationality that Max Weber and Emil Durkheim conceptualized as cultural value spheres. Their existence calls for description and analysis, not philosophical justification[96]." Therefore, reason as knowledge and systematic thinking registers a different sense of role to play. He says, "…it makes sense to suggest that philosophy, instead of just dropping the usher role and being left with nothing, ought to exchange it for the part of stand-in (*Platzhalter*). Whose seat would philosophy be keeping; what would it be standing in for? Empirical theories with strong universalistic claims. As I have indicated, there have surfaced and will continue to surface in non-philosophical disciplines fertile minds who will give such theorists a try. The chance for their emergence is greatest in the reconstructive sciences. Starting primarily from the intuitive knowledge of competent subjects…secondarily from systematic knowledge handed down by culture, the reconstructive sciences explain the presumably universal

bases of rational experience and judgment, as well as of action and linguistic communication[97]."

3.5.3. Critique of Instrumental Reason

The distinction Habermas makes between communicative rationality that is aimed at reaching mutual agreement, from instrumental rationality, the arbitrary decision by a subject, and from any form of contextualism, is quite emphatic and clear. As he goes further, by way of elaborating the notion of communicative action Habermas aims to show the universality and unavoidability of communicative action. With our first utterance, he argues, we put forward the implicit claim that we could, if necessary, vindicate the validity claims implied in our speech act before a universal communication community. The dictum, therefore, from the very outset is that social action is intersubjective. To this extent, Habermas proposes a The Theory of Communicative Action.

The utmost intent of the 'Theory of Communicative Action', as declared by Habermas, was to derive a universalistic (and, therefore, non-relativistic) theory of rationality that is not transcendentally grounded, but grounded socially/ in society. With such an ideal aimed, Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. I and II, becomes an ambitious and huge project, which engages in an eclectic encounter to appropriate the major currents of twentieth century western philosophy and social theory, such as, the speech-act theory and analytic philosophy, classical social theory, hermeneutics, phenomenology, developmental psychology, and (Parsonsian) systems theory. Habermas says his theory intertwines three topic complexes: a concept of rationalitythat is free from the subjectivistic and individualistic premises of contemporary Western philosophy and social theory; a

two-level concept of society that connects the life-world and system paradigms; and a theory of modernity that explains the social pathologies and paradoxes of modernity.

The rational presuppositions of ethical questions are stranded on the questions of 'justification of norms as moral or immoral. To what extent normative justification is dependent on reason and standards of rational objectivist approaches is the principal question being dealt with by Habermas in his critique of reason as a qualifier of moral standards. Morality, as which is initially subjectively being approached in the form of a feeling should be made the ground of inquiry in terms of its question of normative justification. As Habermas in his 'Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action' shows, the feeling, (as moral feeling) is hardly vulnerable to any "*external* 'rational' justification." In fact it is in a form of a web of feelings which has innumerable scopes open to modification and criticism which are necessarily internal to its nature. Therefore, it, "…questions of justification are internal to the structure or relate to modifications internal to it. The existence of the general framework of attitudes itself is something we are given with the fact of human society. As a whole, it neither calls for, nor permits, an *external* 'rational' justification[98]." Again,"…the world of moral phenomena can be grasped only in the performative attitude of participants in interaction, that resentment and personal emotional responses in general point to suprapersonal standards for justifying norms and commands, and that the moral practical justification of mode of action aims at an aspect *different* from the feeling-neutral assessment of means-ends relations, even when such assessment is made from the point of view of the general welfare[99]."

Interestingly, therefore, as one of the recent studies says, 'The tripartite structure of the lifeworld recognized by Habermas, such as, culture (knowledge), society(legitimate order) and person(Individual identity), adding one more dimension to the intersubjective notion of de-centering understanding, elaborates it with rationalization of the life-word, which is identified as the liberative process that could 'potentiate the possibility of a dialogical negotiation of our own ways of life' different from the un-free and undifferentiated centralization of life in the traditions or societies dominated by instrumental reason'[100].

3.5.4. Habermas' 'Communicative Reason/Rationality' Model

The concept of communicative action conceived by Habermas as the action for reaching understanding, which is intended to map and explore how language can function as a medium of unhindered understanding, speaks of a decentred concept of reason. As David Ingram opined, 'The contrast between closed and open world views provides the key to Habermas's defense of the superior rationality of the modern view'[101], since modern understanding is de-centered or the modern de-centered understanding of the world is characteristically closer to a standardizable mode of rationality compared with the mythic world view, because 'it makes possible the most extensive and progressive form of learning'.

Transferring this idea to elaborate the action bereft of the communicative action, Habermas argues that it is socially strategic and non socially instrumental. Habermas has the following schema[102] to explain it:

Action orientation Action situation	Oriented to success	Oriented to reaching understanding
Non-Social	Instrumental action	-----------
Social	Strategic action	Communicative action

This pattern, Habermas attains in the counterfactual ideal of a an ethical domain, which is informed by a communicative ethics and decentred rationality and reason. As Habermas says:

> On the field of analytical action theory … there are debates concerning the relation of the mind and the body (idealism versus materialism), concerning reasons and causes (free will versus determinism), concerning behaviour and action (objectivistic versus non objectivistic descriptions of action), concerning the logical status of explanations of action, concerning causality, intentionality and so on. …Analytical action theory treats the problems of pre-Kantian philosophy of consciousness in a new perspective, and without pushing through to the basic questions of a sociological theory of action[103].

3.5.5. Communicative Reason and Action

Habermas' theoretical engagement with critiquing reason starts with the idea of communication has been formulated it further with the task of Universal Pragmatics', which according to Habermas, ' is to identify and reconstruct universal conditions of possible understanding'[104]. Every communicatively competent speaker must possess pragmatic or dialogue constitutive universals to

'produce grammatically well formed' sentences. Theses Universals are, intersubjective , a priori elements which enable the speaker in producing speech act and to produce the general structures of the speech situation.

Johnson B. Thompson summarizes the chief arguments of the notion of Universal Pragmatics as follows: ' 1. The utterance of a speech act implicitly raises four validity claims, 2. that communicatively competent speakers have at their disposal a series of pragmatic universals , 3. that an idea speech situation, which can be constructed in terms of pragmatic universals, is presupposed in every speech, and, 4. truth is a validity claim that can be rationally redeemed in a discourse having the structure of an ideal speech situation'[105].

Therefore, universal presupposition of argumentation relates itself to the principle of universalization / universalizability. Habermas defines it as follows: 'The consequences and side effects which would foreseeably result from the universal subscription to a disputed norm, and as they would affect the satisfaction of the interest of each single individual could be accepted by all without constraints'[106]. With this he argues that the 'categorical imperative' is reformulated, which is made to understand, 'Rather than ascribing as valid to all others any maxim that I can will to be a universal law, I must submit my maxim to all others for purposes of discursively testing its claims to universality. The emphasis shifts from what each can will without contradiction to be a general law, to what all can will in agreement to be a universal norm'. This reformulation is justifiably defended by Habermas as he installs the transcendental-pragmatic or quasi-transcendental argument in its core. Habermas argues that the

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communicative rational necessity here is that no communicatively competent actor can take up a normative argumentation without presupposing the validity principle of universalization. If a communicatively competent actor rejects the principle of universalizabilty, he/she is falling into a performative contradiction. Habermas's argument here is based on the communicative rationality/action's two assumptions that how argumentation is immanently obligatory in speech and the presuppositions of participation real. Habermas lays out two rules determining/defining pure communicative action. They are, 1. No actors can take up a discourse with hidden intentions or motives and thus prevent the true expressions of the attitudes, feelings and needs of somebody else. Reciprocal openness of actors that ensures equal chances and fair self expressions is to be maintained. 2. Any theoretical or practical validity claim can be called into question, since discourse assures equal distribution of opportunities.

3.5.6. The Project of Discourse Ethics

Discourse ethics, as the decentred rational base of ethical and moral commitment, is inspired, as pointed out by, "To suppose that all the questions of the good life dealt with under the rubric of classical ethics – questions of happiness and virtue, character and ethos, community and tradition – could be answered once and for all, and by philosophers, is no longer plausible[107]." Hence, it is further pointed out that "Like Kant, Habermas understands his type of practical reasoning as universal in import: It is graded to what everyone could rationally will to be a norm binding on everyone alike. His "discourse ethics" however, replaces Kant's categorical imperative with a procedure of moral argumentation: normative

justification is tied to reasoned agreement among those subject to the norm in question[108]."

A hint of the need of a critical reappraisal of reason can be sensed from the following observation Habermas makes on the relation that has been established by the philosophical overtone between Kant's formalist foundationalist theory and the philosophical characteristics of modernity that is thus implied. So, "Implied by Kant's conception of formal, differentiated reason is a theory of modernity. Modernity is characterized by a rejection of the substantive rationality typical of religious and metaphysical worldviews and by a belief in procedural rationality and its ability to give credence to our views in the three areas of objective knowledge, moral practical insight, and aesthetic judgment. What I am asking myself is this: Is it true that this (or a similar) concept of modernity becomes untenable when you dismiss the claims of a foundationalist theory of knowledge?"

3.5.7. Discourse Ethics as the Critique of Kantian Ethics

Discourse ethics takes shape through a radical critique of Kantian deontological ethics. Habermas says that Kantian Moral Philosophy has all the following attributes: "it is deontological, cognitivist, formalist, and universalist. Wanting to limit himself strictly to the class of justifiable normative judgments, Kant was forced to choose a narrow concept of morality.". However, "Kant deals only with problems of right or just action. To him, moral judgment serves to explain how conflicts of action can be settled on the basis of rationally motivated argument. Broadly, they serve to justify actions in terms of valid norms and to justify the validity of norms and to justify the validity of norms in terms of principles worthy of recognition. In short the basic phenomenon that moral

philosophy must explain is the normative validity…of commands and norms of action. That is what is meant by saying that a moral philosophy is *deontological*. Habermas says, "A deontological ethics conceives the rightness of norms and commands on analogy with the truth of an assertoric statement." "As for myself, I hold the view that normative rightness must be regarded as a claim to validity that is analogous to a truth claim. This notion is captured by the term "*cognitivist* ethics". And "A cognitivist ethics must answer the question of how to justify normative statements[109]."

Here Habermas would further point out that, "…his (Kant's) categorical imperative in fact plays that part of a principle of justification that discriminates between valid and invalid norms in terms of their universalizability: what every rational being must be able to will is justified in a moral sense. This is what one means when one speaks of an ethics as being *formalist*. Discourse ethics replaces the Kantian categorical imperative by a procedure of moral argumentation[110]." And the principle that is postulated by discourse ethics is: "Only those norms may claim to be valid that could meet with the consent of all affected in their role as participants in a practical discourse. While retaining the categorical imperative after a fashion, discourse ethics scales it down to a principle of universalization (U). in practical discourse (U) plays the part of a rule of argumentation: (U) For a norm to be valid, the consequence and side effects of its general observance for the satisfaction of each person's particular interests must be acceptable to all[111]."

Therefore, it becomes an interesting imperative in Habermas that "…the thesis that discourse ethics puts forth on this subject is that anyone who seriously

undertakes to participate in argumentation implicitly accepts by that very undertaking general pragmatic presuppositions that have a normative content. The moral principle can then be derived from the content of these presuppositions of argumentation if one knows at least what it means to justify a norm of action. These, then, are the deontological cognitivist, formalist and universalist assumptions that all moral philosophies of the Kantian type have in common. Let me make one more remark concerning the procedure I call practical discourse'.

In contrary to the standard or moral principles adopted as the only suitable format of the validity claims to normative statements or actions, as founded by Kant or maintained in a variant modified formats by post-Kantians, the distinctive principle of normative validity claims in moral argumentation adopted by Habermas contains an idea of discourse ethics. Habermas thus propounds a universal principle of moral argumentation that involves a cooperative or discursive process of argumentation that brings within its normative jurisdiction the particular cases of all those effected in their respective aptitude as actors or at least participants in a practical discourse. He thus advocates:

> "Only those norms can claim to be valid that meet (or could meet) with the approval of all affected in their capacity *as participants in practical discourse*[112]."

This process of judgments of normative validity claim also has a scope of justifying someone's choice of a norm[113]. The crux of the contribution of Habermas pertaining to the critique of Kant's 'ought' characteristics may be summarized or re-theorized by referring to his post-Kantian critical standard of informal-logical principle of generalizing of maxim or the normative communicative principle. The generalizing or universalizability of principles of moral argumentation is qualified

by discursive framework of communicative action which is dialogical and not monological in character as substantive to the 'ought' characteristics of normative judgments.

The generalization of moral principle is a cognitive principle of moral consensus, qualified by discursive participation of moral communicative action. The question that centers on the problem regarding the criterion of normative judgment is pertaining to the flexibility and rigidity of the formative adoption of principles for normative validity claims. The coordinative principle of speech or action is not qualified by static principles of normative generalization. The normative validity claim that presupposes a communicative practice of everyday life refers to a participatory regulative principle which is dialogical in nature as preclusion of a monological one and that which accepts all the diverse perspective of participatory capacities of actors and participants in the discourse. The normative validity claim has a coordinative possibility of action of everyday life that is realizable only through the flexibility of judgmental principles adopted in discursive-cognitive context[114].

3.5.8. Discourse Ethics: Rules of Communicating Reason/ Communicating Rationally

The modern concept of argumentation is necessarily connected with the 'competent members of modern societies'. Their intuitive knowledge is reconstructed as valid argument and its propositional contents are explicatively represented as 'unavoidable pragmatic presuppositions of argumentation'. According to Habermas, the 'rules of discourse' or argumentation describe the

participants' intuition about conflicts that are likely to emerge in a speech situation and the 'force of the better argument' that resolves them. The notion of the 'ideal speech situation' gets activated here promoting the concept of rationally motivated agreement or consensus. The normative core of such an argument is, as observed by Stephen K. White, 'the notion of reciprocal recognition by each participant of the other as an autonomous source of both claims which have equal initial plausibility and demand for justification which must be addressed'. The rules of the discourse[115] that presuppose an ideal speech situation is as follows:

1. *(3.1). Every subject with the competence to speak and act is allowed to take part in the discourse.*

2. *(3.2). a) Everyone is allowed to question any assertion whatever.*

3. *b) Everyone is allowed to introduce any assertion whatever into the discourse.*

4. *c) Everyone is allowed to express his attitudes, desires and needs.*

5. *(3.3). No speaker may be prevented by internal or external coercion, from exercising his rights laid down in (3.1) and(3.2).*

6. *When the first two rules are about the fair argumentation, the third one assures and implies further rules for avoiding the effects of deception, power and ideology. The principle of universalization, hence, asserts as follows:*

7. *A). Whoever engages in argumentation must presuppose the validity of the discourse rules and B) that when that argumentation concerns normative claims – that is, ones about alternative orderings for the satisfaction of interests – the participants must, 'on pain of performative contradiction '*

admit that universalization is the only rule under which norms will be taken by each to be legitimate'.

3.5.9. Discourse Ethics as Communicative Ethics Reprimanding Centric Reason

As Pius V Thomas observes, 'Discourse Ethics appears at the end of Habermas's reflective – reconstructive engagement, as the pinnacle of the above programme to overcome hermeneutics'[116], which he achieves through his post metaphysical critique of Reason. He continues,

> 'Habermas's post-metaphysical stance makes a critique of the western metaphysical tradition and its over-rated conception of reason by de-mystifying the metaphysical traps that shape its concepts of reason. The postmetaphysical intent situates understanding and its grounding as the second larger framework that presumes that understanding of meaning is attained within the bounds of deliberative-democratic and societal dialogical reason. Such a stance, for Habermas, highlights autonomy- otherness, intersubjectivity-agency and the situated critic and rationality, in a new light of 'intersubjective procedural rationality'. In other words, the intersubjective critique that is triggered off in the postmeaphysical intent here enables various intersubjective 'idealizations' or 'counter-factual ideals' (in the Kantian sense of installing regulative ideals, which are unattainable actually or factually) to function as critical reference points of procedural rationality against the philosophy of consciousness[117].

Habermas is careful here not fall into 'anti-reason' oriented rejection of the very possibility of metaphysics, since such moves may 'undercut the possibility of rational critique itself'. The study thinks that it would be right to understand that the Postmetaphysical critique consciousness makes a Postmetaphysical critique of Reason, which moulds discourse/communicative ethics to house decentred reason and rationality.

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3.6. Conclusion

The chapter was an effort to discuss the critique of reason and its ethical foreground in Jurgan Habermas's theory. Though it was dome in a nominal way, the study in this chapter attempted to track down the route to Habermas' critical theory and his critique of reason. The chapter highlighted the Marxian and a Marxist ambience of critical theory, its later transference into the critical theory of Frankfurt School. The chapter also highlighted in such a way so as to discuss the critical theory of Frankfurt School through discussing the major text of ff school, i.e., the Dialectic of Enlightenment, and its critique by Habermas.

The chapter entered into the discussion on Habermas by briefly highlighting the dynamics of Habermas' critical theory, its ideas of universal pragmatics, discourse ethics/communicative ethics. The chapter ends with the observation that Habermas' Critique of Reason foregrounds a communicative ethics which houses decentered reason as communicative reason in its discourse theory of ethics and the post-metaphysical critique of Reason.

Notes and References:

[1]The book is by Horkhmair and adorno which is supposed to be the major text in the first generation FF theorists. Horkheimer; Max and Adorno, Theodor; 2002; **Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments**; Etd. GunzelinSchmidNoerr; Trans. Edmund Jephcott; Standford University Press.

[2]See p. 45 Habermas, Jürgan; 1992; **Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action**, Trans. Christian Lenhardt and Shierry Weber Nicholson; London, Polity.

[3]The basic postulates of Marxism are:1) Nothing happens in the world on its own; there is always a cause -effect relationship in what we see around. The relations of production (i.e., material relations among the people), as the basis of society, provide the cause while the productive forces constitute the effect. 2) The real development is always the material development (i.e., the economic development). The progressive development of productive forces indicates the progressive level of development.3) The material (i.e. economic) factor is the dominant factor in both individual life and social life.4) Human being is born at a particular stage of social / material development, i.e., born in a social setting which exists independent of him. But being an active being, human being makes his own social setting. Marx had said, human beings are born in history, but they make history. 5) Social classes, especially the opposing classes, through their struggle and following the process of revolution, move in the forward direction. That is why the Marxists say that every subsequent society is better than the preceding society. 6) Revolutions mean total and wholesome changes; they are not a negative force, but are what Marx had called, the locomotives of history. When launched and successful, revolutions take the society to a higher stage of development.

[4]Theory of Surplus Value is another characteristic of Marxism. Marx says that it is the worker who creates value in the commodity when he produces it. But he does not get what he produces, he gets only the wages: over and above the wages is what goes to the employer. That is the surplus value. The surplus value is the difference between what the value a labourer produces and what he gets in the form of wages. In simple words, the labourer gets the wages; the employer, the profit. This surplus value makes the rich, richer and the poor, poorer. It is through surplus value that capitalists thrive. Theory of Class Struggle is another tenet of Marxism. In the Marxian view, all hitherto history has been the history of class struggle between opposing classes. Class struggle is the characteristic of class societies. In the classless societies, there is no class struggle because there are, in such societies, no opposing/ antagonistic classes. Class struggle, in class societies, (i.e., in slave-owning society, the feudal society, the capitalist society) is of mainly three types: economic, ideological and political.Marxism advocates revolution. Revolutions, the Marxists say, are locomotives of history. Revolutions occur when the relations of production come into conflict with the productive forces, leading, thus, to a new mode of production. They bring about a complete transformation of society, without violence if possible, and with it, if necessary. Revolutions, indicate changes: wholesome changes, changes in the very character of a given society. They signify the coming up of a higher stage of social development. Accordingly, the Marxists regard revolution as a positive phenomenon.

Dictatorship of the proletariat means the rule of the working class. It is a state of the workers in the socialist society which follows the capitalist society. It is the dictatorship of the workers in the socialist society in the sense there is the dictatorship of the capitalists in the capitalist society. There capitalists rule the way they want; now the workers' rule in the socialist society the way the workers want. Nevertheless, Marx makes it clear that the dictatorship of the proletariat, i.e., the workers' state, is an interim or a transitional arrangement which functions between the capitalist society and the communist society.Once the socialist society is completely established, the workers state will not be needed, i.e., it will wither away (disappear slowly). Lenin insists that the dictatorship of the proletariat is better than the bourgeois state, both quantitatively and qualitatively (at it looks after the interests and welfare of the whole multitude of the workers rather than handful of capitalists).

[5]Habermas, J; 1971; **Knowledge and Human Interest**; Bacon press, Boston; p. 25

[6]Ibid.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Ibid.; p. 26;

[9] Ibid.

[10] Ibid.p. 27;

[11] ; ibid.28

[12] "According to them (the empiricists and the faith-philosophers), the discursive understanding can never pierce the covering of reality; truth has its source in feeling, faith, or mystical vision of some sort; the deepest realities cannot be conceived by reason, but only felt by the heart."; Thilly, Frank, Thilly, Frank, 2001, **A History of Philosophy**, Central Publishing House, Allahabad; p. 413

[13] Ibid.; p. 413;

[14] From p. 146; Warren, Scott, 1984, **Emergence of Dialectical Theory: Philosophy and political Inquiry**, University of Chicago Press.

[15] Ibid.

[16] "The attempt to restore the critically reflective and dialectical dimension of marxism, understood as a critical theory of society, was predicted explicitly on Marx's epistemology and methodology." Ibid.;p. 147.

[17] Iibid.

[18] "In a sense, in returning to the Hegelian origin of marxist thought, the founders of Critical Theory found themselves in a position similar to that of the Left Hegelians (including Marx) in the 1840s, with many of the same concerns of developing the Hegelian dialectical method and directing it "materialistically" toward a practical critique and transformation of society."; ibid; p. 147

[19] Ibid

[20] Ibid.; p. 145

[21] "Certain important structural changes began to occur in the social and political world which seemed to defy the comprehension of a reified, dogmatic Marxist theory. One such development was the emergence of an antidemocratic political system in the country of the first socialist revolution." Ibid.; p. 145;

[22] Ibid.

[23] Ibid.; p. 146.

[24] ; Ibid.

[25] Ibid..

[26] "The major historical and political developments in the structure of capitalist society, as well as the emergence of a bureaucratic Communist orthodoxy, engendered the founders of Critical Theory two basic needs: first, the need to develop a new dialectical and critical theory of society (still within the framework of marxist theory) which could deal with the changes in industrial-technological, postliberal capitalist society; and second, the need to recover the philosophical dimension of marxism which had suffered an economic-materialistic reduction at the hands of a new Marxist orthodoxy. In a sense, the return to a philosophical critique was as much a reaction to the political establishment of a Communist orthodoxy as it was an interest in pure theory." Ibid.

[27] Ibid; p. 147

[28] Ibid; p. 147

[29] Ibid.

[30] Ibid; p. 144

[31] Ibid; p. 148

[32] Ibid; p. 148 to 149

[33] Ibid; p. 149

[34] Ibid; p. 149

[35] Ibid.

[36] Ibid; p. 149

[37] ibid.

[38] "...Horkheimer turned to a dialectical theory of knowledge. However, taking his cue from Marx's critique, he rejected the Hegelian phenomenological dialectic insofar as it presupposed the philosophy of identity and absolute knowledge. We find Horkheimer embracing a dialectical theory of knowledge and arguing for a dialectical social science, which is opposed to the pursuit of absolutes in classical idealism and "identity theory," as well as to the empiricist-posiivist position, which entails a rejection of everything beyond observable experience." Warren, Scott, 1984, **Emergence of Dialectical Theory: Philosophy and political Inquiry**, University of Chicago Press; p. 150;

[39] The "philosophy of life" tradition, rooted in the thought of Nietzsche, Dilthey, and Bergson..." Ibid.; p. 150.

[40] Ibid.; p. 150

[41] "For Critical Theory, the rescue of materialism from reductionism takes the form of an attack on economic determinism, a critique of "materialist theory of knowledge," and a recovery of the sense of social reality as a dialectical, mediated totality." Ibid.;p. 151

[42] Ibid.; p. 153

[43] Ibid.; p. 154

[44] Ibid.

[45] Ibid.; p.158;

[46] Warren, Scott, 1984, **Emergence of Dialectical Theory: Philosophy and political Inquiry**, University of Chicago Press.; p. 158

[47] Horkheimer; Max and Adorno; Theodor; (2002); **Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments**; Etd. GunzelinSchmidNoerr; Trns. Edmund Jephcott; Standford University Press; p. 2

[48] Ibid; P.1

[49] Ibid; p. 2;

[50] Ibid; p. 2

[51] Ibid.

[52] Ibid.

[53] Ibid; p. 3

[54] "To define substance and quality, activity and suffering, being and existence in terms appropriate to the time has been a concern of philosophy since Bacon; but science could manage without such categories. They were left behind as *idola theatric* of the old metaphysics and even in their time were monuments to entities and powers from prehistory."; ibid; p. 3

[55] "For the Enlightenment, only what can be encompassed by unity has the status of an existent or an event; its ideal is the system from which everything and anything follows."; ibid; p. 4

[56] Ibid; p. 3

[57] "Although the various schools may have interpreted its axioms differently, the structure of unitary science has always been the same. Despite the pluralism of that different fields of research, Bacon's postulate of *unascientiauniversalis*is as hostile to anything which cannot be connected as Leibniz's *mathesisuniversalis*is to discontinuity."; ibid; p. 4

[58]Ibid.

[59] "…[If you add like to unlike you will always end up with unlike] an axiom of justice as well as of mathematics…" ibid.;p. 4

[60] Ibid; p. 4-5

[61] Ibid; p. 5

[62]Ibid; p. 6

[63] "Enlightenment stands in the same relationship to things as as the director to human beings. He knows them to the extent that he can manipulate them. Their "in-itself becomes "for him".";ibid; p. 6

[64] Ibid; p. 6

[65] Ibid; p. 7;

[66]Ibid.

[67]Ibid.

[68]Horkheimer; Max and Adorno; Theodor; (2002); **Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments**; Etd. GunzelinSchmidNoerr; Trns. Edmund Jephcott; Standford University Press; p. 8

[69]Ibid.

[70] Ibid; p. 12

[71]Ibid; p. 13

[72]Ibid.

[73]Ibid.

[74] Ibid; p. 13-14

[75] Ibid; p. 14

[76]Ibid; p.15

[77]Ibid; p.16

[78]Ibid.

[79]Warren, Scott, 1984, **Emergence of Dialectical Theory: Philosophy and political Inquiry**, University of Chicago Press; p. 155

[80]Ibid; p. 156

[81] Ibid; p. 160

[82] Ibid.

[83]Ibid.

[84]Ibid.

[85] Ibid; p. 154

[86] Ibid; p.164

[87]Ibid.

[88]Ibid.

[89]Ibid; p. 166

[90]Ibid.

[91] Ibid; p.154

[92] Ibid; p. 155

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[93]Habermas, Jürgan; (1992); **Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action**, Trans. Christian Lenhardt and ShierryWeber Nicholson; London, Polity; p. 17

[94]Ibid; p. 18

[95]"…what (Richard) Rorty says, I have trouble accepting his conclusion, which is that if philosophy forswears these two roles (the role of usher and judge), it must also surrender the function of being the "guardian of rationality". If I understand Rorty, he is saying that the new modesty of philosophy involves the abandonment of any claim to reason – the very claim that has marked philosophical thought since its inception."; ibid; p. 3

[96]Ibid; p. 17

[97]Ibid; p. 15-16

[98]Ibid.

[99] ibid

[100] Pius V Thomas, 2013; "Between Authenticity and Otherness: Habermas and the Concept of the Experience of Life in Contemporary Philosophical Discourses, in **Salesian Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences,** Vol.1, No.2. p. 99

[101] David Ingram. p.26.

[102] Theory of Communicative Action; Vol. 1; p. 285.

[103] p. 274.; ibid.

[104] J. Habermas,1979; **Communication and the Evolution of the Society**, Trans. Thomas McCarthy, Boston Beaco,.p.1.

[105] Johnson B. Thompson, 'Universal Pragmatics', in **Critical Debates**, Eds. Johnson B. Thompson & David Held, London, MacMillan, 1982. p.125.

[106]Habermas, Jürgan; 1992; **Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action**, Trans. Christian Lenhardt and Shierry Weber Nicholson; London, Polity.

[107]Ibid; p. vii

[108]Ibid; p. viii

[109]Ibid; p. 145

[110]Ibid.

[111]Ibid; p. 66

[112]Ibid; p. 66

[113] "This principle of discourse ethics (D),… already *presupposes* that *we can* justify our choice of a norm."

[114]"If we keep in mind the action-coordinating function that normative validity claims play in the communicative practice of everyday life, we see why the problems to be resolved in moral argumentation can be handled monologically but require a cooperative effort. By entering into a process of moral argumentation, the participants continue their communicative action in a reflexive attitude with the aim of restoring a consensus that has been disrupted. Moral argumentation thus serves to settle conflicts of action by consensual means."; Habermas, Jürgan; (1992); **Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action**, Trans. Christian Lenhardt and ShierryWeber Nicholson; London, Polity; pp. 66-67

[115]Ibid; p.89

[116]Pius V Thomas, 2013; "Habermas and the Significance of the Depth Hermeneutics of Understanding", in Assam University Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences, Vol.8, No.1. p. 145

[117] Ibid