

Chapter 2

The Critique of Pure and Practical Reason in Immanuel Kant

2.1. Introduction:

The present chapter tries to link up the critique of reason that has been worked out in the context of Nāgārjuna's dialectic of *Sūnyatā* with the Kantian encounter with grounding the concept of reason. As in the case of Nāgārjuna, Kant also problematizes Reason to be limited and limiting concept. Immanuel Kant as the greatest representative of the western enlightenment, modernity and its idea of autonomy and reason are discussed in the present chapter in order to align them with the ethics of critique of reason that is operational as a substratum of the theorizing and guiding spirit.

2.2. Immanuel Kant: A Brief Biographical Sketch

Kant was born in 1724 in the Eastern Prussian City of Königsberg, where according to Gardner: "he spent almost all of his days¹." According to Gardner, Kant and his family belonged to a faith known as Pietist, to which he had a great sympathy though but critical to some of its dogmatic foundations and "condemned the hollow, mechanical religious observances...²"

At the University of Königsberg Kant became "exposed" to Leibniz-Wolffian rationalist system that dominated the German Universities and Newtonian theories of Physics. According to Thilly, from 1760 to 1770, Kant "came under the influence of English empiricism³." In 1770, Kant received a professorship at the University of Königsberg.

According to both Thilly and Gardner, Kant started to foster significant considerations in the world of Philosophy from the year 1770 itself starting considerable contributions in rationalist backgrounds. Finally, in 1781, Kant published his *Critique of Pure Reason*⁴ of which a second edition followed in followed in 1787, “incorporating great changes.”⁵ Kant produced the *Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics* in 1783 and then the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* in 1785. Kant relocated his moral theory in the second *Critique*, the *Critique of Practical Reason* in 1788. Kant condenses his esthetic theory and the teleological aspects of his moral values in 1790.

2.3. Immanuel Kant and Reason (I)

The crux of the critique of reason in Kant has its causal links with the foundation of convictions of the Enlightenment with which it started as well as the causes leading to its failure. The fundamental problem with Kant regarding Reason is to determine the scope of reason in cleansing its way of all sorts of pseudoscientific or constructive determinations that the Enlightenment reflects as the cause of its self-declination. For Kant, reason is rather a means than an end in itself⁶. It is a means in the form of only being a regulative principle and not a constitutive principle in itself. He therefore aspired to put forward a theory that would clarify Reason’s capacity not as a constructive principle of knowledge, but as a regulative principle. His main purpose was to free Reason of its ambiguities that are associated with *knowledge* situation. Knowledge starts with experience, and guided by reason, it ends up in understanding. As Richard Aaron says:

“What is necessary is to distinguish between knowing and thinking (whilst yet not making them distinct faculties) and to recognize a third feature in addition to knowing and thinking, namely reason, whose function is to check and moderate the spontaneity of thought by bringing what is known to bear upon that spontaneity⁷.”

The ambiguity pertaining to the use of Reason as a source of knowledge, that Kant aims to critically analyze consists in the use of the term Reason so far as both knowing and thinking is concerned and that it needs to be distinguished from them. That is why, Aaron is of the opinion in relation to the determination of the characteristics and function of Reason that, as knowledge, basically starts from sense-experience in Kant and guided by reason to the understanding, the function of reason should be strictly determined to the testing and verification process of the judgments, and the hypothesis human being thus formulates, while thinking persists as his natural disposition⁸.

Like his other predecessors Immanuel Kant faced the problem of the possibility and certainty of knowledge. But a critical review reveals that unlike them his theory was more than a speculative discourse of epistemological problems. From the skeptical outlook and the awareness of the deep *dogmatic slumber* of the Rationalist school, his theory rises from mere speculative to a critical framework in the history of both the schools Modern Western thought and does it quite emphatically as the graph of Kantian thought grows from ‘critiques’ to the normative engagements which move from the world of the critique of the transcendental dialectic to the world of the postulates of moral life.

For Kant, human rational insight is an inward initiative, a cognitive necessity for the understanding to formulate a judgment in its totality. Without the

rational phenomenon, human cognition lacks the necessary foundation of relations among different objects of cognition that makes up the knowledge of the world as a whole⁹. That foundation of relations that completes our cognition and gives it a meaning in its relation as well as distinction to other things in the world is unconditionally presupposed by all the other things that are conditioned, and inherently depends upon that unconditioned totality from which its meaning is derived. Kant identifies this necessary foundation of knowledge guided by reason quite inevitable for the understanding to formulate meanings and that all the other objects of sense-perception as conditioned and demand an unconditioned totality that becomes a ground for the meaningful possibility of knowledge, but is not dependent on anything else.

Reason, as a natural phenomenon guiding cognition inevitably leads the understanding to form a judgment of such an ‘unconditioned’ foundation of knowledge¹⁰. This unconditioned totality which is presupposed of all the cognitions and thought is the metaphysical background of things; it is not a fact of experience, rather posits a question of logical necessity and legitimacy pertaining to so far as cognition is considered a rational phenomenon. Therefore, it can be securely said that Metaphysics is the rational way of seeing the world¹¹.

Kant recognizes the possibility of universal and necessary knowledge without question¹². But at the same time, he also determined the criteria of knowledge in distinction to analytic and synthetic knowledge. Knowledge proper, for Kant is *synthetic a priori* knowledge. Analytic knowledge or knowledge of pure science is not knowledge proper for Kant in the sense that it is not synthetic or does

not provide any new information to the consciousness. But the property that analytic knowledge possesses is that of necessity and universality which an essential criterion for knowledge proper is. On the other hand, synthetic knowledge is not universal and therefore contingent. “He agrees with both the rationalists and the empiricists that universal and necessary truth cannot be derived from experience¹³.” This form of universal and necessary knowledge would also become his basis for a moral cognition. Kant’s critique, therefore, both of the pure reason as well as sense-experience was aimed at the refutation of these faculties as the secular sources of knowledge.

On talking about the mechanism of knowledge Paul Guyer writes of Kant:

“He actually announces his rejection of the idea that pure reason alone can give us real knowledge of objects beyond the limits of our senses in the final chapter of the “Transcendental Analytic,” on the “distinction of all objects in general into *phenomena* and *noumena*,” for in arguing as he does there that we can have no knowledge of objects as “noumena in the positive sense” what he means is precisely that we can have no knowledge of objects through pure reason alone, for noumena in the positive sense would be nothing other than objects known by intellect (in Greek, *nous*) alone¹⁴.”

The knowledge of the thing-in-itself for Kant is impossible because knowledge must commence from the sense-experience which the intellect arranges the way their nature presupposes. Rational cosmology, theology or psychology is out of question because rational knowledge in Kant is always limited in its scope by the sense-experience.

The basic conceptual problem regarding the origin and source of knowledge that the pioneers and wayfarers of Enlightenment were subjected to was that they considered Reason as the sole source of knowledge, as the basic principles of

thinking, that it cannot be acquired by any other means, should check the different prejudice and other inclinative influences that might corrupt human mind¹⁵. For Kant, Reason, in both pure and in practical use of it is a means and not an end. Reason guides the understanding as well as the will in knowing as well as in acting¹⁶. Reason interprets experience and elaborates to the understanding on the basis of the *a priori* conditions of knowledge what has already been given by the sense-experience.

2.3.1. Kant and *Critique* in Modern Philosophy

Critique of knowledge is the critique of the scope of knowledge that shall “investigate the possibility or impossibility of universal and necessary knowledge, its source, extent and boundaries¹⁷.” The scope of critique in Kant, therefore, broadly, is to liberate and conserve knowledge from its non-defining characteristics trying to define it, i.e., its natural ambiguities. The problem of knowledge is basically the problem regarding the possibility of knowledge where the subject encounters with the objective world (i.e. in ‘representation’). Kant, in his Transcendental Method proves for the first time ever in the history of Western Philosophical thought that knowledge of the objective world is after all determined and grasped by the subjective conditions applied to them by Reason.

Gardner illustrates critique in Kant; he says: “‘Critique’ does not for Kant imply a negative evaluation of the object: it means simply a critical enquiry, the results of which may equally be positive.”¹⁸ The objective of criticism in knowledge is not a criticism of the nature of the objective world that corresponds or coheres our knowledge; rather it is on the scope of the understanding or the

subjective conditions and the use of rational faculty that assists in knowledge situation. Modern philosophy is marked by the rational use the intellect in the knowledge of the world of nature. The chief problem of Modern Philosophy in the west is that the Reason has been considered as the sole source of knowledge.

A logic is needed which shows the forms of mathematical argument, since natural knowledge must, as far as possible, assume the form of mathematical demonstration. Natural science must, as far as possible, be abstract and general and indifferent to qualitative distinctions. Laws of motion and change provide a rational explanation of phenomena only if they are stated in the most general terms possible; ideally, they should apply not merely to things of a particular kind, qualitatively distinguished, but throughout the physical realm without restriction. Therefore metaphysicians are led to represent the subject to which natural laws apply as a single, qualitatively undifferentiated substance, called Matter or Extention; all qualitative changes of state within the single system of material or extended things; the qualitative differences apparent to human senses are irrelevant to the true understanding of the motions of material things¹⁹.

The rational view of the world consists of freeing oneself from the clutches of dogmatic thinking and to see the world devoid of all induced prejudices that actually presupposes the seed of criticism in it. Rational thinking consists in distinguishing knowledge from the misconceptions carried out as knowledge proper i.e. incentive prejudices. But in checking the prejudiced form of thought by knowledge itself, it appears that Reason itself is the source of knowledge in its justified sense of the term. Reason is not a producer of knowledge, it is just a moderator. Therefore, it would be also wrong to say that Reason should lay universal standards of thinking or to pass a judgment which is unconditionally accepted.²⁰ To quote Richard Aaron here:

“What is necessary is to distinguish between knowing and thinking (whilst yet not making them distinct faculties) and to recognize a third feature in the addition to knowing and thinking, namely reason, whose function is to check

and moderate the spontaneity of thought by bringing what is known to bear upon that spontaneity²¹.”

Universal or necessary knowledge is possible only when discrete objects of knowledge of particular experiences are seen in a necessary causal relation, but on the other hand, this takes the form of scientific knowledge, where the particular objects are analyzed in their relations with other objects preceding or succeeding them and infer the necessity of the relation between them on the basis of their distinctive objective characteristics. Kant identifies universal and necessary knowledge with that of the general propositions of science and mathematics. Critical philosophy intervenes with a reflective engagement with the ‘Scope’ of knowledge or rather, the scope of Reason as a *source* of knowledge. The purpose of the critique in Kant is to analyze and dissociate metaphysics and Reason- that rational metaphysics is impossible. Critique of knowledge that inversely determines its limits and possibility is expressed as the critique of Reason as the sole source of knowledge. Reason’s self-assertion making its stand in the power of human intellectualism to attain knowledge in its attempt to justify itself as the forbearer of the knowledge of the possibility of all Arts and Sciences including Theology and Cosmology was bound in a certain point of time to stand the question of its extant and methods. The plight Reason encountered in its race against the conventions lies in the theoretical problematic of Reason’s method and cause of such development that it remained no longer a part of the Schoolmens’ closet, rather, perhaps the most effective tool of the common man to serve the need of the time, to free the self from the clutches of the dark mysticism, irrational propositions of Theology and superstitions.

Thilly writes of Kant:

“Philosophy, he (Kant) thinks, has hitherto been dogmatic: it has proceeded without previous criticism of its own powers. It must now become critical, or enter upon an impartial examination of the faculty of reason in general; with this end in view Kant writes his three *Critiques*...”²²”

The purpose of Kant's critical investigation on the epistemological capacities of the faculties of cognition and their other sanctions is in the favour of the trial that whether Metaphysical knowledge or the knowledge of the thing-in-itself is possible in demonstration. However, that would not be a science of fact or a logical necessity, but as the necessity of a special kind that presupposes the possibility of knowledge as a rational awareness²³. The whole framework of the critical pedagogy of Kant pertaining to the problem of Metaphysics in accordance to its structure of epistemological and moral sanctions is based on the dialectical engagement on reason's cognitive capacities and conditions²⁴. The fundamental *ides* of reason which forms the basis of other knowledge by inference has no epistemic sanction in the positive sense but has a positive moral sanction.

Enlightenment indeed inspires the birth of the critique on the limits of the reason as the standard of all the aspects of human life including even Religion and theology²⁵. The spirit of Enlightenment that started with the slogan of the autonomous use of Reason and the critique of the '*irrationalities*' was now on the point of severe criticism by the faith-philosophers who rejects the Reason on the ground on its limits of establishing standards pertaining to faith in God and the divine revelations. The problem of reason is that it rejects everything as irrational that it fails to establish the concomitance or necessary relation between predicating variables. Consequently, the problem of Enlightenment is basically the problem pertaining to that limited use of reason in human intellect that results in frustration/dilemma of theory as it is unable to circumscribe the reality in its totality.

Sebastian Gardner opines that "...Enlightenment received its chief inspiration from the success of scientific revolution in the sixteenth and seventeenth century, and was concerned with defending what Western thought now takes for granted: the right of each to make up his own mind on theoretical or practical substance, in place of appeal to establish authority or tradition. An identical Reason was held to exist immanently in human nature, needing only to be brought to the light of the day through appropriate pedagogic means."²⁶ Having been failed to realize that knowledge in rational understanding actually commences from the sense experience of the world, the rationalist thinkers try to convince themselves of the constructive understanding of the nature and content of the universe promulgated by the virtue of their own ways of *perceiving* the same, contradictions of reasons follows as an obvious consequence. What Kant observes is that the problem basically lies in the use of Reason as the constructor and source of knowledge. Reason or Rational use of the intellect is not unwarranted in itself, but becomes problematic when used as the sole source of knowledge. The problem is actually assessed not as a positive way of reason's ambiguity i.e., rational use of understanding is not tempted to any sort of folly, rather the problem assessed by Kant pertaining to the use of reason is in a negative manner, which means that the Reason is used so far is devoid of something very genuine to knowledge i.e. perception.

Kant's purpose in his first *Critique* is an investigation of the sources of knowledge as shared both by Leibniz and Hume²⁷ and to find an answer to the possibility of synthetic *a priori* knowledge in order to not only clarify the problem of metaphysics but also paving out the necessary conditions for its possibility²⁸.

There are analytic propositions which are known *a priori*. Analytic propositions are judgments that are reached by the logical analysis of the concepts that comes *a priori* to any further material cognition. *A priori* knowledge is the knowledge of the forms of a particular object of cognition, that has formed a concept in our mind on the basis of its logical necessity and on the basis of which a judgment is passed. The objects of the concepts are however collected from the sense perception. Whereas objects cognized from mere sense-perception, as if in a particular case, without the application of any *a priori* forms of necessitation would be a contingent knowledge devoid of a consideration which is universal in nature²⁹. An *a priori* judgment predicates of its object without any exception and therefore *a priori* accounts for the universal unification of knowledge³⁰. The *a priori* categories as necessary conditions to knowledge when applied to the object of cognition direct the understanding into an unified form of intuitive experience. *A priori* elements of knowledge does not involve empirical objects but is necessary factor for knowledge as such as a necessary ground of unification of all our cognitive elements.

The concept of substance and extension are *a priori* and in the form of concepts that does not involve any empirical element in itself but directs the understanding to the unification of experience of the essential qualities into the knowledge of a 'body'. Thus Kant shows that these are the two forms of knowledge traditionally followed, each of which involves one of fundamental non-compliances of knowledge proper. Therefore the *Critique* in Kant takes up the issue to identify the problems involved in these forms of knowledge which his predecessors have ignored without regret. The problem of non-originality in case of

the former and non-universality in case of the later has been solved by him in the *Critique*, as he takes up to a form of knowledge which, according to him, not only exists in the contents of pure mathematics and the basic principles of natural sciences, but also in form prior to him though unrecognized³¹; and that is knowledge in the form of synthetic *a priori* judgment.

Metaphysics, for Kant like other disciplines such as Mathematics, Geometry is an independent and autonomous discipline that can be demonstrated³². The fundamental propositions of Philosophy, the contents of pure Mathematics as well as the basic principles of natural science are synthetic *a priori* propositions³³. The purpose of Kant behind his first *Critique* is to explain the presuppositions of knowledge that necessarily refers to its scope and limitations. There would have been least a chance for Metaphysics as an independent discipline without the provision of logic if all the necessary and *a priori* judgments would be analytic. But according to Kant, “Metaphysical judgments, whilst being a priori, are synthetic (A9-10/B13-14)³⁴.” Therefore, some metaphysical judgments, though they are necessary and a priori, they succeed to extend our knowledge³⁵. Thus Kant establishes the fact that Metaphysical judgments are demonstrable as a secular discipline independent of any logical or speculative provision on the virtue of their pre-suppositional criterion, that is, some of its propositions are synthetic though a priori. But Kant is yet confused about the source of such knowledge. The proposition ‘every event has a cause’ is necessary because the subject is related to the predicate irrespective of any possible exceptions even though the predicate is not contained in the subject or it may be also be said that the connotation of the predicate is in no way contained in the connotation of the subject. But since thus it

is synthetic, it suggests the scope of empirical interference to some extent. But the necessity of the relation between the subject and the predicate is out of any empirical scope whatsoever. However, Kant is yet dogmatically hopeful about metaphysics on that that as metaphysics as a secular discipline independent of logical or empirical provisions its predications should be seen in the light of logical categories- that metaphysical problematic must transcend both logical as well as empirical possibilities. Gardiner says again:

“...but Kant has shown that metaphysical judgments cannot be rejected for Hume’s reason, that is, simply on the grounds that they do not derive from either logic or experience: mathematics and geometry, which Hume did not doubt, show that it is possible for us to have knowledge which is necessary but not logically necessary, so there is reason for thinking that metaphysical knowledge which lays claim to the same status, may equally be possible.³⁶”

Thus, with reference to Pure Mathematics, Pure Science and Geometry, Kant shows that it is indeed possible to think of Metaphysics as a branch of knowledge that transcends both logical and empirical scopes of knowledge³⁷. But the readers of Kant are yet in oblivion to determine exactly why Kant seems so considerate to Mathematics and Pure Science to see the scope of Metaphysics in their scope. The way mathematics and geometry have been a prey to wrong analysis at the hands of Leibniz, Kant supposes that the scope of metaphysics should also be critically analyzed that was so far being treated a part of analytical principle under logic or completely discarded by Hume for its exclusion from empirical cognitivity. Yet it is thus also a possibility that Metaphysics is being treated by Kant in the light of disciplines like mathematics and pure science for the sake of its demonstrability in human knowledge. Whatever it may be, by giving the argument in favour of

synthetic a priori judgment and proving its scope in metaphysics successfully, Kant has been able to at least free metaphysics from the clutches of logical and analytic captivity or empirical impossibility. Thus in the *Critique of Pure Reason* Kant has successfully justified the possibility of metaphysics and its scope in knowledge as synthetic a priori judgments in the line of mathematics and geometry³⁸. The critique of reason in what it illegitimately been affirming so far and the critique of empiricism in its denial of metaphysics thus gives way to the projection of a new form of knowledge as *synthetic a priori judgment*.

2.3.2. Problematizing the Universal Conflict in Reason³⁹

Decline of the Enlightenment is a marked example of the conflict in Reason whereby it tries to provide the only picture of reality that can only be measured by human intellect. “The faculty which leads human intellect to the unconditional, the totality or the whole knowledge is called reason.”⁴⁰ As a result, having been unable to grasp the total mystery of the causal relations among things, human intellect took refuge quite satisfactorily in the speculative disposition of dogmatic Reason.

Unlike metaphysics, scientific analysis adopts the process of forming out a hypothesis and verifying it in observance of the nature; whereas, material world as nature apparent to us provides a least conditions for metaphysical analysis, the task being vested upon the dialectical use of Reason or the Transcendental Dialectic and not the observation of the atomic facts of nature in formulation of hypothesis and verification principle that it usually adopts from science. All the *a priori* forms that belong to reason in its structuration of the cognitive world are basically regulative and not constitutive. These forms are being actually applied to the perceptible, but

having been misunderstood them as constitutive principles, the structure and function of knowledge exceeds its limit to get hold of the unconditioned. In order to provide a *rational* explanation of things and their forms in absence of the transcendental dialectic, human intellect adopts the scientific method, i.e. waving out a hypothesis and to attempt a verification principle that would presuppose empirical observation in disguise, i.e., for the verification process of that hypothesis, the reason has to fall back again on to sense experience that somehow seems to contradict the causal relation in the hypothesis under verification. Consequently, a conflict in reason would follow⁴¹. Organization of knowledge into science or a systematic unity by the adoption of its pure part is the genuine function of reason that is universal in character, i.e., the process of systematization is universal and presupposes in each case the metaphysics of science or the universal possibility of nature even before taking for granted its particularities⁴². While ascribing the constitutive function in reasoning consists in diverting reason from its universal character of unification and systematization of knowledge to a constitutive characteristic which varies in its particular cases of constitution. The conflict of all these ad hoc particular constitutive considerations actually converts metaphysics into no less than a battle field according to Kant⁴³.

According to the historical accounts of the direct consequences often conflict faced by Reason in its competence to be the only source of knowledge [as presented by Thilly in his comprehended work on the History of Western Philosophy], Rationalism was facing a two way attack both from Empiricism as well as faith philosophers and mystics.⁴⁴ Rationalism was exhibiting both limit as well as limitlessness⁴⁵. While the limits of the intellect were being questioned by

the mystics and faith philosophers over the question that rational thinking depicts a mechanized and determinate picture of the world of nature, its over-exaggeratedness was ridiculed by the Empiricists on the ground of its emphasis of the unconditioned. As Reason was so challenged the outcome seemed to be that rational theology, rational psychology and rational cosmology are beyond the intellectual cognitive capacities that can only be known through a speculative leap of the intellect to an unconditional totality from that which has been presented to us by sense-experience. The use of reason as the sole source of knowledge was leading to a mechanized and concretized world-view; a theoretical investigation into the problems, among others, that hinders Reason to be an absolute source of knowledge would shed some light on the internal conflict Reason is subjected to.

The problem of generalization faces the risk of explanation in theoretical expressions. But to the most misfortune of Metaphysics, Reason overlooks the risk. Reason thus knowingly or unknowingly transcends the distinguishing line between Physics and Metaphysics. The possibility of Physics in Kant also makes possibility of Metaphysics somewhat consistent in the form of Knowledge. But that possibility actually originates from a different domain.

“There is no science except where two conditions are fulfilled. There must be ordinary or systematic thinking, and there must be a definite subject-matter to think about. In the ‘science of pure being’, however admirably the first condition is fulfilled, the second cannot be⁴⁶.”

The idea of reason that guides the understanding does not constitute our knowledge, but regulates it. But in transcendental illusion where these ideas seem to be the content of knowledge, reason appears to be an elementary source of knowledge. It neither formulates the a priori principles or the absolute standards of

truth on the basis of which thinking must be done.⁴⁷ The term Reason has been used so far for both knowing and thinking, and needs to be distinguished from them. Richard Aaron thus opines:

“The role of reason is that of checking and guiding thinking in the light of the available knowledge both of what is certain and of what is probable. To think rationally is to think in accordance with what one knows about the natural world and about oneself and others⁴⁸.”

Reason starts with a problem in particular and exaggerates it to the furthest limit, i.e. to the universal. The understanding formulates experience the way reason formulates understanding by *a priori* categories and ideas. Reason's scope is much broader. It strives to exceed the limits of understanding; it tries to formulate upon the scope of understanding beyond its sensible periphery and tries to reach that which is not given in experience, i.e. supersensible. *A priori* categories are applied to the phenomenal experience. These categories *have no meaning* in the supersensible world.⁴⁹ Kant's metaphysics starts with the *a priori* categories of understanding. The principles that the Reason used in formulating the knowledge in understanding are the *a priori categories* of understanding that are only applicable to the phenomena and not noumena, to the imminent and not the transcendent. Therefore, Kant distinguishes between the features of transcendent and the imminent principles of reasoning. Kant's metaphysical philosophy actually starts from that distinction between imminent and transcendent principles. The metaphysics that originates from the analytical characters of the *a priori* principles is what Kant calls the metaphysics of experience. Metaphysics sometimes transcends the limits of cognitive sanctions and falls prey to misrepresentation of thought expressed in theoretic *Ideas*. This is not *knowledge*, for the transcendent

knowledge beyond the scope of cognitive sanctions in understanding is basically produced by reason; but the function of Reason is not to produce knowledge, but to regulate knowledge to practical principles. Reason falls under the prey of self-contradiction.

Conflict in reason commences the moment reason, which is responsible for the moderation of knowledge provided by the object of senses in the understanding; it is the derision of a regulative faculty to be constructive. The conflict is a conflict of understanding of the non-sensible as sensible.

“The rationalist would agree that a man’s thinking, which might be influenced, for instance, by prejudice, whim, or assumption, should be checked by knowledge. But he also views reason itself as a source of knowledge, a knowledge of basic principles that cannot be acquired in any other way⁵⁰.”

Here, Aaron does mean here by knowledge is the *a priori* knowledge.

Again, the function of Reason or the actual meaning of what rational knowledge means, he states thus:

“I find it most convenient...to reserve the word ‘reason’ for the third feature, namely the checking, judging or testing of thought in the light of what is known. Thus, to speak concretely, the person who knows also thinks, speculates and put forward hypothesis about what he does not know, but he then tests his speculation by what he is sure of and by what he feels constrained to accept, and in doing this, I hold, he proceeds in a rational manner⁵¹.”

What makes reason’s scope so broader than understanding that it transcends the cognitive sanctions? Understanding can grasp only that which is represented to it by the senses. Reason is the unifying principle of the perceptible. Reason unifies cognition into a systematic unity or science⁵². This systematization involves

something new into knowledge. Reason guides the understanding in cognitive sphere where as it guides the will in the practical sphere.

2.3.3. Kant's Metaphysics of Experience

Kant's Metaphysics of experience is divided into two broad and *exclusive* spheres of epistemological mechanisms: the science of the categories of understanding and the science of the regulative principle of systematic cognition or ideals of systematicity⁵³. These two metaphysical principles of Kant pertaining to knowledge are not only forwarded as exclusive by him but they also pose to be abstract principles. The metaphysics of experience in Kant also concerns Kant's metaphysics of Freedom to the effect that it entails necessarily the teleological/purposive end of knowledge pertaining to its objects. Metaphysics of knowledge in Kant culminated into the concept of Freedom or the capacity of unlimited power that point to the knowledge of the ultimate or *the purposive* use of all the objects.

In Kant, the problem of Metaphysics provisionally follows, as a mere inward disposition of all rational beings, which transits via the problem of the presuppositions of Representation of objects and the *a priori* conditions of knowledge to the necessary postulate of Morality in Practical Reason. However, though it is manifold in Kant's reading to determine what he actually means by the term Metaphysics, but initially it appears that it was his prior intention to produce Metaphysics as a science, for which he is said to have composed the first critique.⁵⁴ On the other hand, it is also relevant to think on the basis of the reading of the Critique of Pure Reason that metaphysics has not been a science in the sense

Metaphysicians, earlier, and Physicists wanted to see their own disciplines (Kantian intentions apart)⁵⁵, rather it is an investigation of the possibility of sciences, or more specifically, the possibility and impossibility of knowledge. Whatever the criteria might be, but Metaphysical discussions basically involve the discussion of the formal structure of knowledge as a whole, that enquires into the basic questions of the possibility of the objects of knowledge, the faculties of understanding, their limits and scopes. The scope of knowledge proper, according to Kant, as synthetic *a priori* judgment lies in the contemplation of the formal structure of knowledge, both in sense-experience as well as understanding, which originates in the mind of the knower⁵⁶. Knowledge presupposes the knower, the known and the relation between them. Metaphysics, for Kant justifies the relation between the knower and the known. It is on the basis of this relation between the knower and the known that knowledge becomes possible. The autonomy of human cognition presupposes that the fundamental form of knowledge which is located in the mind in the form of the categories of understanding, are executed upon the object of knowledge and not vice versa⁵⁷. The Ideas of Reason that form the logical or formal ground of the experience and knowledge unifies the understanding in a complete whole and represents the object as a mere conditioned being that necessarily follows from the Ideas of Reason as the unconditioned⁵⁸. The world of reality that is being presupposed in knowledge to have provided the datum in experience is dependent upon the mind for understanding it. The possibility of the sciences as universal knowledge depends upon the categories that actually make knowledge possible. Metaphysics, therefore, in Kant consists in the investigation of the conditions that makes knowledge possible⁵⁹. Therefore, metaphysics is rather

being the critique of Being in Kant is actually the critique of the knowledge of Being, its scope and the logic of its limits. Collingwood says in this regard that, ‘With reference to Bacon for whom science of nature begins when man begins ‘putting nature to question’, Kant suggests that in Metaphysics too the path of scientific progress would be found when metaphysics began putting their questions in an ordinary and systematic way, instead of arguing blindly, as they now did, in the hope of seeing what came of it⁶⁰.’

Collingwood is of the opinion that Kant reflected upon the presuppositions of both Physics and Metaphysics to analyze the framework of the Absolute presuppositions that forms the basis of the questions that make them sciences. And the statement of these presuppositions occupies that part of ‘Critique’ which is called ‘Transcendental analytic’.⁶¹

Also as Sebastian Gardner says:

“Metaphysical enquiry employs the same cognitive power as is employed in the common sense and scientific judgments about the world of experience: the very same principles of reasoning as are employed in empirical judgments about tables and atoms, are employed, in a purified form in metaphysical judgments about God and the soul⁶².”

Therefore, metaphysics is a natural disposition of reason that forms the basis of knowledge at best of its experience. Metaphysics is the rational way of seeing the world⁶³. The possibility of metaphysics is inevitable so far as it presupposes the phenomenon of cognition as a rational activity. Or it would not be illegitimate to concern metaphysics with the possibility of cognition itself, at least as that which takes into account the possibility of the objects of knowledge in consciousness. Metaphysics in Kant is likely to be a branch of knowledge or a science, if not

science in the physical sense of the term, which investigates the possibility of knowledge as science. Therefore, it might be impossible to contradict metaphysics as a branch of knowledge that investigates the nature and source of knowledge, and also the subjective conditions responsible for it i.e., to repudiate metaphysics is to repudiate “cognition as a rational phenomenon⁶⁴.”

Knowledge presupposes the application of the categories of understanding that inevitably forms its precondition. The understanding in unifying its object of experience applies its categories on the sensibilities and thus forms knowledge. But those categories can only be applied to the sensible or only the datum that is provided to our senses⁶⁵. The transcendental Metaphysical beings are not provided to the senses because on the basis of that alone our knowledge provided by the sense-experience is possible; they form the basis of all our knowledge or the unifying ground of our experience. They form the unconditioned conditions of the possibility of the objects of knowledge. The unconditioned is not experienced all over again for they would not be unconditioned anymore and would be in need of some other unconditioned conditions that form the basis of their possibility all over again involving itself in the fallacy of infinite regress. Therefore, as the application of categories is not possible on the unconditioned conditions of knowledge, they are not our objects of knowledge in a positive sense of the term. They are known indirectly or inferred as the necessary preconditions of our knowledge, and thus cannot be absolutely denied of existence⁶⁶.

Paul Guyer says:

“By the “unconditioned,” Kant means something that is a condition for other things but not itself dependent on any

other condition, for example a primary subject that has properties but is not itself the property of anything else. Kant's view is that reason inevitably leads us to form ideas of such "unconditioned" realities, that we cannot think of such things as if they were given by sensibility because everything given by sensibility is inherently conditioned...and so we inevitably think of "unconditioned" as if it were an object that lies beyond and transcends the limits of sensibility- in other words, as a noumenon in the positive sense. Thus the faculty of reason hijacks the harmless concept of a noumenon in the negative sense to express its own positive conception of the unconditioned⁶⁷."

Again he adds:

"...the faculty of reason inevitably posits completeness in its chain of inference, in two senses: it posits that there are no insurmountable gaps in our chains of inference, but also that every chain of inference can ultimately be carried back to some first premise that is not itself the conclusion of yet another chain of inferences. Such a first premise would be something "unconditioned". Reason thus gets its principle that for everything conditioned there is also an unconditioned by combining our ordinary conception of reason as the ability to perform inference with its own assumption that every chain of inference must have an ultimate starting-point⁶⁸."

The transcendental Ideas of Reason being not experienced in itself has its imminent use in organizing our knowledge as sciences. The Ideas of reason and the categories of understanding thus be produced and have their locus on the Reason itself. The supersensible objects of metaphysics thus, does not enhance any scientific knowledge of itself nor a metaphysical investigation could be equated with scientific method of investigation for it is that which makes scientific investigation on objects of knowledge possible. Metaphysics is a critical enquiry of the possibility of (the existence of) Being as objects of knowledge in science along with its scope and limitations.

Thilly observes:

“The transcendental Ideas have their immanent use in guiding inquiry...they have a regulative use, that is, they direct the understanding in its enquiries: they unify the manifoldness of concepts, just as the categories bring unity into the manifoldness of objects. Through the Ideas reason aims to systematize our knowledge in conformity with a single principle. This systematic unity indicated by the Ideas is merely methodological; it urges the reason to keep on unifying its knowledge; but the systematic unity but the systematic unity is subjectively necessary as a method, not objectively necessary as constituting transcendental realities⁶⁹.”

2.3.4. Problem of Knowledge and a Possible Solution

Metaphysics, for Kant is practical. In *The Critique of Pure Reason* Kant declines the theoretic use of metaphysics, that is, that the ideas of pure reason *alone* are unable to yield knowledge in its true form⁷⁰. Kant's negative dialectic as the critique of metaphysics in Plato and other subsequent metaphysicians is a methodological tool to justify the transcendental framework of metaphysics that has been so far identified with *knowledge proper* of transcendental objects such as God or the immortality of souls etc. by the misappropriation of pure reason of the intellect⁷¹. Metaphysics for Kant is something for which knowledge becomes possible. Metaphysics in Kant is transcendent of its theoretic exposure of pure reason. That is to say, the problem of metaphysics in Kant transcends theoretic or rather speculative use of pure reason. Problems of metaphysics in Kant consist in both objective conditions of the representation of the *things* of knowledge as well as the subjective *a priori* categories of knowledge.

The task of the first *Critique* of Kant is to justify the possibility of knowledge of the objective world that actually transcends the appearance. The misconception that is involved with knowledge of the objective world with the

involvement of pure reason or pure sensibility as its source exclusive of each other misleads the philosophical enquiry in its epistemic part. The conflict of equally sounded antithetical arguments (which are nothing but rational consequences without a proper understanding about their limits) made Kant doubt the very competence of reason *as the sole source of knowledge*. The conflict of reasons naturally calls forth a skeptical attitude about the possibility of metaphysics altogether, but it seems that Kant's dogmatic outlook towards the competence of reason in its pure practical part that it is a false assumption to presume that knowledge can be attained by the pure reason alone without the assistance of sensibility⁷². Kant argues that the knowledge concerning metaphysical inferences on the ideas of pure reason is not actually the objectives of pure reason alone but has a practical moral reference in the 'realm of ends'. Therefore the ideas of pure reason are inferred practically from the laws of morality as their ultimate ground shaping their necessary Forms.

Gardner says:

“The task of the *Critique* is rested as that of finding an answer to the question of how synthetic a priori judgments are possible (B19)...It is designed to clarify significantly the problem of metaphysics and even advance the case of its possibility⁷³.”

The critical transcendence of both Rationalism and Empiricism aims at the significant clarification of metaphysics and even to advance the case of its possibility. It would be somewhat convenient to analyze matters related to Kant's epistemological conventions that has always aimed for a determinate valuation of the problematic pertaining to the disposition of Reason in the judgment of the objective world to start with what he calls 'representation'. The problem of

representation in Kant (that he mentions in his letter to his friend Herz) is to determine and theorize the phenomena of relation between the senses and the objects. Gardner says: "...anything subjective that can play a role in composing a judgment or knowledge claim counts as a representation for Kant (its sense is thus philosophical, not psychological).⁷⁴" The problem of representation could have been solved if either of the following would have been taken into account: either the representation caused its object, or objects caused representation. But if either of the two has been accepted, problem of representationism could have been solved only provisionally, but it could not have answered the questions pertaining to the problem of appearance and reality. As he says, representation can only bring the appearance into the cognition, but not the *things as they are*.⁷⁵ As a matter of fact Kant does not altogether reject the conviction of the *Real* existence of objects where real means existing apart from and independent of sense perception⁷⁶ and argues that the reality of existence of objects entails for the possibility of knowledge. Representation, for Kant has two aspects: Intuition and Concept. The Intuition is the indeterminate perception occurred in relation of the sense organs with the objective world. Concepts are the a priori conditions that combine the indeterminate sense datum a conceptual meaning.

When the question of relevance and extension concerns and determines the validity or invalidity of knowledge, it has been a matter of primary concern in the history of Philosophy, both East and West, to distinguish between knowledge proper and miss-apprehension. Kant argues in *Transcendental Analytic* that knowledge has no warranty what so ever without the sense perception, and thus saves empiricism from falling the prey of Skepticism. That obviously implicates

that transcendental metaphysics fails to give any knowledge if knowledge has to be considered a synthetic judgment about the objective world. The claim of natural disposition of reason on matters concerning transcendental metaphysics as a problem challenges reason itself of its consistency on methods of demonstration. The problem of knowledge in the history of philosophy is to distinguish knowledge from miss-apprehension that consists in a critical re-appraisal of what has been so far defined as knowledge, i.e., determining its limits, scopes and extension in a critical aptitude. Knowledge, for Kant is that which can be demonstrated in ideas, therefore, the knowledge claims that have been misrepresented in the historiography of metaphysical theories should be dialectically re-intervened, in other words, the claims and function of Reason are to be re-investigated in relation to its limits and scope and the degrees of its cognitive concomitance with the objective world that concerns for the knowledge proper. The function of reason in the formulation of knowledge is passive in character i.e., it regulates and moderates sense-experience to knowledge in understanding. Knowledge occurs through concepts, it occurs in space and time, so the concept of space and time are pure concepts or transcendental ideas. To know something rationally is not that to consider reason as the sole source of knowledge, rather, the phenomena of knowing consists in going from the known to the unknown with the help of reason that tests the hypothesis on the basis of the previous experience and justification of the causal connections. Thus how reason is related to knowledge. Therefore, problem of knowledge in Philosophy means the problems related to the *consideration* of the relation between Reason and knowledge. The relation between Reason and knowledge is categorical and justified. Error consists in miss-apprehension

between faculty of reason and knowledge- whether the relation is a constructive or a regulative one. A critical examination of the faculty of reason means an examination of the scope of reason in its relation to knowledge. This apprehension of the relation is subjective. Consideration of the of a constructive relation between reason and knowledge results in speculative use of Reason.

Kant obtains the method of demonstration as the criteria of knowledge and therefore compares genuine knowledge, i.e., knowledge necessary and universal, with scientific knowledge. The aim of Kant is to establish demonstratively the logical necessity of predication and thus knowledge would be provisionally solved if the causal connection between the subject and the predicate is established necessarily and universally. The establishment of a universal causal connection is done by the reason alone whose autonomy has already been presupposed by Kant.

2.3.5. From Critique of Pure Reason to Critique of Practical Reason

A critique of Metaphysics pertaining to its teleological use that has been the sole purpose of the all the editions of critiques in Kant is worth precised here and the best be the way as Frank Thilly puts it. In his historical analysis of Kant's critique of metaphysics he clearly says:

“The transcendental Ideas have their immanent use in guiding inquiry, but when they are mistaken for concepts of real things, they are transcendent and deceptive of their application. They have no *constitutive* use, that is, they are not concepts productive of objects; they have a *regulative* use, that is, they direct the understanding in its inquiries: they unify the manifoldness of concepts, just as the

categories bring unity into the manifoldness of objects. Through the Ideas reason aims to systematize our knowledge in conformity with a single principle. This systematic unity indicated by the Ideas is merely methodological; it urges the reason to keep on unifying its knowledge; but the systematic unity is subjectively necessary as a method, not objectively necessary as constituting transcendent reality⁷⁷.”

So far as regarding the constitutive use of reason, metaphysics does not confer to the knowledge of any objective reality, while regarding the use of Metaphysics as the regulative practical of systematization, Metaphysics, he says, the objective context confers to a different consideration:

“The Ideas have objective reality in a certain sense; not in the sense that we can find anywhere in experience an object corresponding to them—we cannot see anywhere a highest genus or a lowest species or the infinite number of intervening transition-species; but in the sense that they give rules to this understanding. They outline the procedure or method for understanding to follow; they say: keep on seeking for a highest genus for a lowest species, and for a continuous series of intermediate species. In this way they have an indirect effect on the objects of experience, by bringing consistency into the functions of the understanding⁷⁸.”

Metaphysics, in Kant is actually, at least by his hypothesis of teleology, presupposed from the very existence of the objects of experience at least on the basis of the Idea of the ground of origin or cause⁷⁹ and thus the very pragmatics of metaphysics as necessary methodological ideals⁸⁰ in Kant is also established.

2.4. Kant and Reason (II)

Reason expresses itself practically in the intellect as the unifier of knowledge of the universe where a good and favourable consequence of actions

could be hoped for. The hope for a good consequence of action presupposes an inspiration of conduct, necessarily 'good' i.e. moral. Apart from its use as regulative principle in experience, reason, and the pure Ideas of reason as the unifier and ground of all knowledge, also assumes a practical use as the basic principles of morality in Kant. A moral will is necessarily a good will that requires reason to be guided by.

Paul Guyer quoting Kant writes on Reason's contribution to human autonomy thus:

““the property of the will by which it is a law to itself” (G, 4:440)- is possible only through pure reason, because only pure reason can give our will a genuine law to act upon. In other words, Kant's grand argument...is that theoretical autonomy of pure reason alone is an illusion, but practical autonomy, self-government in our moral choice and actions, can be achieved only through pure reason⁸¹.”

The practical principles of morality should be based on the determination of the will not by the matter of empirical world but by their form which consist freedom. Humanity, which presupposes the rational disposition of the practical principle, for Kant in his Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, is the ultimate locus of the moral or a good will.

2.4.1. Freedom of Will and the Foundation of Moral Rationalism

Freedom endorses (subscribes) to Moral Rationality in practice. Action presupposes a will (guided and addressed by a determining principle of action) as an agent. A free will is a moral will and a moral will is a Rational will. A free will is a moral will because the will, here has attained the ultimate purpose of its knowledge and action and that is freedom. Therefore morality presupposes freedom

i.e. freedom of will. A Moral will is actually a Free will (in accordance to the Universal Law of Nature and thus presupposing Humanity as the ultimate Rational/moral principle) and a free will in turn is a Rational will. Rationality, for Kant, is a natural inherent to human being (Humanity) which can at least be psychologically or anthropologically concerned of. Therefore a free will is necessarily a Rational will.

Morality in Kant, like Justice in Plato, subscribes to its *due* or the ultimate purpose, the freedom. The purpose of Rationality is Freedom, taken for granted as Morality in practice, and the nature of a Rational End (Freedom) is dialectical in its characteristics. Morality springs from the commitment of a Rational Purpose that endorses to the Teleological Hypothesis of Kant.

Practical Reason is thus dialectical in character (sometimes ironically based on *abstract* principles of moral judgment). History of Philosophy is thus but the critique of methodologies as they try to navigate to Freedom. Rationalism as dialectic proceeds through logical character of its respective methodology but ultimately transcends it to culminate into the practical affairs of morality and mysticism.

Metaphysics or Ideas of Pure Reason, for Kant, which also have a cognitive share to dispose as the ground of systemeticity is but recognized by him in terms of a pragmatic concern in practical reason as only presuppositions of morality.

To state a quotation from Paul Guyer:

Kant calls our beliefs in the existence of freedom, immortality and God the “postulates of pure practical reason”, “not theoretical dogmas but presuppositions

having a necessary practical reference,” which “do not extend speculative cognition” but “give objective reality to the ideas of speculative reason in general (by means of their reference to what is practical) (5:132)⁸².”

The attempt of Kant in the *Critique of Practical Reason* is to give the traditional objects of speculative rationality a newer rational meaning as postulates of moral conduct in particular aspects, and thus makes the most abstract Ideas of reason fit into the objective reality of the every-day world. Freedom, among other postulates of morality comes *a priori* to knowledge and is the condition of morality. It is only in the realization of freedom as not only the ultimate end of human individuality that also exposes himself socially but also as a natural trait of human psychology that presupposes moral law as an inevitable entity concerning particular aspects of human conduct. Pure Reason is used to derive the fundamental principles of morality as laws that guides human principle towards the moral good or happiness that actually belongs to everyone’s due. Reason is only a means, though not in an instrumental concept, while Freedom makes human being an end in oneself. The concept of freedom makes Human a rational being. Reason, as Kant justifies in *Groundwork* as not valuable in its totality, but as that which justifies human freedom in context of everyday life. The practical use of reason consists in derivation of the concrete principles or laws of action from the most abstract ideas that reason sets out for itself. The purpose of the second *Critique* is thus to free the objects of speculative reason from their traditional use of cognitive principles and set forth a newer tradition of a practical use of the ideas of reason and thus justify their meaningful existence.

The autonomy of the moral law cannot be proved, but the freedom of will can be inferred from the autonomy of the moral law itself.

Metaphysics as the ground of supreme moral principle is something that represents objective principles as a Law that is universal in nature⁸³. The rational will is the subjective principle that has to conform to the *representation of certain laws*⁸⁴ of the objective principle of morality. On the question of the objective principle of laws, freedom of will presupposes “the relation of will to itself insofar as it determines itself only by reason...”⁸⁵. Reason is a means by which maxims are deducted from the universal formula of the moral law. And to will according to the maxim thus derived from the universal formula of moral standard is to pursue Freedom in its Kantian sense of the term. Reason processes the derivation of the laws from the principles of the ultimate moral standard which is an end in itself and cannot be derived further from any other principle and thus is inevitable to the realization of freedom.

Kant emphasizes on the law of *nature* to illustrate Freedom. Freedom derives its connotation from the ability of the acting (willing) according to the maxim drawn from the formula of the universal law which is to be regarded as identical to the law of nature⁸⁶. Paul Guyer defines Kant’s conception of the law of nature thus:

“...all that Kant officially means by a law of nature is an unexceptionable uniformity in the behavior of some specified domain of objects: nature is just “the **existence** of things, in so far as that existence is determined according to universal law.”⁸⁷”

Again, even Kant puts the same thing in the *Critique of Practical Reason* thus:

“The rule of judgment under laws of pure practical reason is this: ask yourself whether, the action you propose were to take place by a law of the nature of which you were yourself a part, you could indeed regard it as possible through your will. (5:69)⁸⁸.”

The meaning that is derived from Kant's presupposition of a perfect social order which is necessarily a moral order with concept of duties derived from the maxims formed out of having been considered *Humanity* in one self as well as in others as an *end* in itself and not as a means, also considers Man being a rational being as also social being. Freedom presupposes as well as reflects a certain type of social relation in Kant which is inclusive of the considerations of rights of free choice of beings as an end in oneself or in the other and that is something that reflects the autonomy of will in Kant. Kant, by exposing his formulations of categorical imperative in various forms and standards of moral implications ultimately falls back to the concept of the autonomy of the will as a law giver from the maxims derived from the law of nature as a universalability of free choice of all humans at the same time considering and respecting the freedom of free choice in others as well and thus considering humanity in oneself as well as in others as an end and not as a means. Respect for the humanity as a postulate of *freedom of free choice and at the same time considering and respecting the right of free choice in others* is something that can be identified with respect for freedom. Freedom presupposes the preservation and development of will's capacity to free choices of action by the rational individual as an end and not as means. Freedom is the capacity to choose and pursue end for one's own as well as for others. Freedom of will is a means, not the end. It is the first postulate of morality. Freedom is the capacity to choose the *right* than *good*. It is yet not disposed will. Disposition of the right choice by the virtue of freedom can be said to be *the* end in itself. The disposition of the will signifies the practical reason that is, it represents the law⁸⁹.

The disposition of will is the derivation of actions from the law⁹⁰. The ‘ought’ or the moral imperative consists in the disposition of choosing and action from pure practical reason alone. Reason is the natural determiner of will⁹¹ i.e. if the will is at all determined it is only through the reason and not by sensational impulses. A free will is a rational will. A will determined by the sensational incentives is a determined will and is not free. The will instigated by intensives other than reason for an objective principle at hand, would be subjectively contingent, i.e. the relation of the objective laws to the will should also cohere or at least relate to the relation between the subjective laws and the will and vice versa. Laws determining the actions in objective principles cohere in subjective principles as well, because that is how the natural signifier of the will is determined⁹².

Freedom of will is a means, not the end. It is the first postulate of morality. Freedom is the capacity to choose the *right* than *good*. It is yet not disposed will. Disposition of the right choice by the virtue of freedom can be said to be *the* end in itself. The disposition of the will signifies the practical reason that is, it represents the law⁹³. The disposition of will is the derivation of actions from the law⁹⁴. The ‘ought’ or the moral imperative consists in the disposition of choosing and action from pure practical reason alone. Reason is the natural determiner of will⁹⁵ i.e. if the will is at all determined it is only through the reason and not by sensational impulses. A free will is a rational will. A will determined by the sensational incentives is a determined will and is not free. The will instigated by intensives other than reason for an objective principle at hand, would be subjectively contingent, i.e. the relation of the objective laws to the will should also cohere or at least relate to the relation between the subjective laws and the will and vice versa.

Laws determining the actions in objective principles cohere in subjective principles as well, because that is how the natural signifier of the will is determined⁹⁶.

2.4.2. Metaphysics of Pure Practical Reason

Pure reason has an inherent limitation as a source of knowledge. And that limitation consists in its own reliability/justification of the representation of the knowledge of the objective world including the supersensible world. The pure concepts of understanding have but a practical use and not theoretic use as such; and thus have been saved by Kant from being objects of speculative pedagogy. Freedom as a postulate of morality presupposes all practical reasoning whereas God and immortality of soul as concepts of pure reason forms the object of morality. The will as the subject of practical reason is determined by the laws of morality which are derived from the concept of freedom or humanity that is the necessary characteristics of human being and thus differentiates him from other lower creatures.

What is freedom in Kant? Freedom is inferred from ‘the fact of reason’, the immediate awareness of the obligation under the moral law in the practical context. Freedom for Kant is the freedom from the might of the inclinations, the freedom of oneself that belongs to him to determine his will in strict moral obligations. The laws are supreme, and thus adherence to the laws of action consist freedom.

Kant opines in Groundwork thus:

“But suppose there were something the *existence of which in itself* has an absolute worth, something which as *an end in itself* could be a ground of determinate laws; then in it, and in it alone, would lie the ground of a possible categorical imperative, that is, of a practical law⁹⁷.”

To start with Kant's object of morality as not the categorical imperative, rather the *happiness* as a natural goal of human disposition, should be explained in terms of moral considerations that makes 'happiness' a worth considering as a goal. "...our reason commands moral laws, and the moral laws are necessary."⁹⁸ The highest derived good in actually the laws of affairs that are derived from the necessary moral laws which cannot be proved in turn; they are necessary laws. "The necessity of moral laws has certain implications for God, freedom and immortality."⁹⁹ This is a necessary practical postulate of morality that commands moral law in particular practical affair with an objective of the highest happiness that results as a system from the realm of ends which the Ideas of pure reason account for¹⁰⁰.

Guyer writes:

"Kant calls our beliefs in the existence of freedom, immortality, and God the "postulates of pure practical reason," "not theoretical dogmas but presuppositions having a necessarily practical reference," which "do not extend speculative cognition" but "give objective reality to the ideas to the speculative reason in general (by means of their reference to what is practical)" (5:132)"¹⁰¹

The postulates of morality, for Kant, is not an object of theoretic speculation or discussion, rather these refer to practical grounds of objects that forms the basis of any theoretic framework; and which cannot even be proved either. The postulates of morality that are the ideals of the highest good also forms the ultimate goal of the pure reason¹⁰² from which the highest good of real states of affair is always derived as the basis of 'happiness' in the world¹⁰³.

The Ideas of Reason that forms the conceptual ground of practical reason is what metaphysics of pure practical reason.

The idea of metaphysics of morals or that of practical reason is an ideal concept, as according to Guyer, of the very ‘system of happiness’¹⁰⁴ that can be observed/followed derivatively in particular instances as based on and justified by the reason. The ideal that thus followed from *The Critique of Pure Reason* regarding the concept of happiness as not that which an individual should follow to have reached the natural goal of his/her happiness, rather the state of affairs that would result from the *realm of ends*.

Kant presents the metaphysics of practical morality as the ground and cause of ‘happiness’ in the natural world which is at a transcendental shift to the ideal world of morality. The ideal world is a moral world which results from our conduct in the affairs of practical reason in derivation of

2.4.3. The Possibility of the Metaphysics of Pure practical Reason: the Kantian Lineage

The object of pure practical reason cannot be morally subjected to sensations of pleasure and pain. Therefore, to vest upon mere experience for the sanction of the determining ground of good and evil as identified with pleasure and pain respectively would be misleading for the reason. The *concept* of pleasure and pain cannot be connected to any idea *a priori*, it can only be connected with the *concept* of good and evil, with the condition that conceptually the idea of good and evil should be separated from that of pleasure and pain; the concept of good and evil, thus, is based on the *ideas a priori*, and consequently belongs to the reason in

its pure form¹⁰⁵. But the will never contains any object which is good in itself. *Something is good for something*¹⁰⁶. The concept of good, as such is always a means that not only follows something rational/follows from an *idea* of reason, but also the *idea* is a locus to good. The laws as the determining ground of the will should be *a priori* to be a universal law otherwise all the formulations of the moral laws would be empirically conditioned and would possess an immediate relation to feeling and sensation.

2.4.4. The Kantian Distinction between Pure Practical Reason from Pure Theoretic Reason

The pure practical principle of reason determining the will, *the categories of freedom*, as Abbott calls it in distinguishing it from the categories of pure theoretic reason does not have to be dependent on sensibility for its purpose like that of its later counterpart and produce reality themselves that they refer to.

Abbott says:

“These *categories of freedom*- for so we choose to call them in contrast to those categories which are categories of physical nature- have an obvious advantage over the later, in as much as the latter are only forms of thought which designate objects in an indefinite manner by means of universal concepts for every possible intuition; the former, on the contrary, refer to the determination of a *free elective will* (to which indeed no exactly corresponding intuition can be assigned, but which has as its foundation a pure practical *a priori* law, which is not the case with any concepts belonging to the theoretic use of our cognitive feature); hence, instead of the form of intuition (space and time), which does not lie in reason itself, but has to be drawn from another source, namely, the sensibility, these being elementary practical concepts have as their foundation *the form of a pure will*, which is given in reason, and therefore in the thinking faculty itself. From this it happens that as all percepts of pure practical reason have to do only with the *determination of the will*, not with the physical conditions (of practical ability) of the *execution of one’s purpose*, the practical *a priori* principles in relation to the supreme

principle of freedom are at once cognitions, and have not to wait for intuitions in order to acquire significance, and that for this remarkable reason, because they themselves produce the reality of that to which they refer (the intention of the will), which is not the case with theoretical concepts¹⁰⁷.”

It is a practical law and not a physical law depending on the empirical principles of determination. The object of morally good is supersensible. The practical difficulty that belongs to the law of pure practical reason having been not related to the empirical contingencies is that the laws (of pure practical reason) and the judgment thus belongs are subject to be “applied to the actions, which are events taking place in the world of sense, and which so far, belong to physical nature.”¹⁰⁸

“When I subsume under a *pure practical law* an action possible to me in the world of sense, I am not concerned with the possibility of the *action* as an event in the world of sense. This is a matter that belongs to the decision of reason in its theoretic use according to the law of causality, which is a pure concept of the understanding, for which reason has a *schemain* the sense intuition. Physical causality, or the condition under which it takes place, belongs to the physical concepts, the schema of which is sketched by transcendental imagination. Here, however, we have to do, not with the schema of a case that occurs according to laws, but with the schema of a law itself,...since that fact that the will (not the action relatively to its effect) is determined by the law alone without any other principle, connects the notion of causality with quite different conditions from those which constitute physical connection¹⁰⁹.”

2.4.5. Pure Practical Reason and the Object of Morality

To quote Kausahal Kishor Sharma:

“The peculiar Character of pure reason lies in the fact that it can in no sense be satisfied with anything short of unconditioned or the totality of conditions as the necessary presupposition of any given conditioned. But as the unconditioned for any given conditioned cannot be found in the sphere of phenomena, reason leaves the world of experience and attempts to rich it in the sphere of things in themselves¹¹⁰.”

Discussing the Nature and Scope of the Autonomy of Pure Practical Reason and the Concept of *Highest Good* in Kant, Kant's attempt is to show that actions are not good or bad in itself, nor they are good or bad in whatever the result it yields as a consequence, but the motive, the objective or the maxim with which the agent's will is guided by is subjected to absolute good or absolute evil; in other words the concept of good and evil does not relate itself to the object of action, but only the motive or objective, the *manner of acting* itself, i.e. the maxim by which the will of the agent is determined. The principle of determining the will that is empirically guided by the objective of pleasure and pain cannot be an end in itself and always would be a means to something else. In such case the good is not good for its own sake or a moral motive rather good for something the possibility of goodness of which is highly contingent in nature. The principle that is capable of determining the will is *a priori* and the motive of the act as presented by the pure practical reason¹¹¹. The concept of good or bad as a concept does not follow directly from the reason. It follows in accordance to the moral law that follows *a priori* from pure practical reason i.e. instead of determining the morality of an action by the concept of good or bad it is the moral law that would justify an action to be either good or bad. The will and not the action is determined by the laws that follows the universal moral concepts of pure practical reason.

Reason has been subject to use in both theoretically and practically; the difference is that while in the theoretic use of reason the *a priori* conditions of knowledge are applied to the object of intuition and thus assumes the perceptible, the object of practical reason follows itself from the pure reason. Kant acknowledges the possibility of an outside world which is the cause of the intuition

and is nevertheless free from the realm of our knowledge, both theoretic and practical.

Therefore, the problem at hand is whether Metaphysics for Kant is:

- a. The *recognition* of the thing-in-themselves, as the ground of intuition,
- b. The problem of Pure Reason that tries to *interpret* the Universe and,
- c. The causal relation, or the *factors* involved in the causal relation between the Universe of the Thing-in-themselves and the Pure Reason in its both theoretic as well as practical use.

Whatever may be the case, the total framework of discussion pertaining to the metaphysics of both pure practical and pure theoretic reason is leading to the possibility of the *factors* of Pure Reason and the universe of thing-in-themselves, a third element, which is independent of both the Pure Reason as well as the universe of thing-in-themselves, but on the contrary, both of them remains dependent on them which causes for their relation in both pure reason and in practical reason as the factor of unification of knowledge and as the postulate of moral laws respectively. These are known as the ideas of pure reason. The *Ideas* of Pure Reason, thus, work as a relatum that helps in relating the Universe of Thing-in-themselves and the world of Pure Reason. The Ideas of pure reason works as a catalyst in the relation as the ideas stay completely separate as a distinct entity without being effected to the relation.

Thus, the whole problem of metaphysics in Kant is basically the problem of the employment of reason in its relation to the Universe of the Thing-in-

themselves and encounters it in its expression in the order of phenomena. The dogmatic faith of Kant on Reason of the theoretic and practical postulation of knowledge and morality thus, makes him no less than a rationalist.

The autonomy of reason in its formulation of the practical principles which is originally devoid of any empirical contingency finds difficulties in its implementation in the world of senses. *Happiness*, then, becomes an initiating ground, a practical moral condition of pure practical reason in its implementation to the world of senses. The *Highest Good*, in Kant, that is regarded as the condition of empirical use objective of the practical reason bridges the gap between pure practical reason with its inherent unconditioned moral law *and* the conditioned empirical world. The maxim that Pure Practical Reason formulates for itself is transcendental to any empirical objectivity. But the same problem arises in practical reason also regarding the employment of the transcendental laws (employment of transcendental categories in case of pure theoretic reason) to the world of empirical contingency, in other words, as K.K. Sharma writes: “Here, reason demands the practically unconditioned (the *highest good*) for the practically conditioned (conditioned good or goods) and demands the unconditioned for them in the world of experience¹¹².”

Importance of the Dialectic: the condition of the practical conditioned employment of reason as the maxim as unconditioned is the objective of the *highest good*. The highest good, for Kant is a composite of a matter and a form: the moral law as the form and happiness as the matter¹¹³. However, the concept of the *highest good* cannot be the soul determining ground of will. The only determining

ground of the will is the autonomy of the moral law which is good in itself. The concept of the *highest good* as happiness only serves the purpose of becoming an empirical condition for the implementation of the unconditioned moral laws in the conditioned empirical world¹¹⁴.

2.4.6. Postulates of Practical Morality: Freedom as the *Highest Good*, the Existence of God and the Immortality of Soul

The ideas of pure reason are negatively appraised by the categories of pure theoretic reason because the ideas transcend those categories of knowledge (both sensibility and thought), and emerge only with a practical use. An appraisal of the ideas of reason as a unifying ground of knowledge in the Critique of Theoretic Reason. The *ideas* of pure reason are supersensible and can never be made sensible because knowledge in its totality presupposes them. Theoretic reason is limited to sensible objects only. Therefore, any attempt of the theoretic reason to appraise the ideas would be just a negative venture.

“Human life has an intrinsic or unconditional value or end. The only unconditioned and final end of life to which all practical use of our theoretical or speculative knowledge must ultimately refer is practical. Thus, everything gravitates towards the practical or morality which is the final end set forth by nature for us, to which all our ends are subject or subordinated¹¹⁵.”

The inability of the application of the categories of sensibility as well as thought over the cognitive possibility of the *ideas* of pure reason expresses Kant's agnosticism. The ideas does not entertain any cognitive constituency except being itself the ground of the regulative principle of knowledge for the theoretic reason. It only possesses the category of pure reason that is necessary for a moral life.

2.4.7. Metaphysics of Experience and Metaphysics of Morals: Establishing the link

The *Purpose* of knowledge in Kant is Ethical. The relation between Metaphysics of Knowledge and Metaphysics of Morals lies in the theory of purposive or teleological relations in Kant. The Universal Law of Nature on which Kant moral philosophy is based finds its consistency in the concord of the ultimate purpose of Nature and its objects.

Reason not only accommodates the conditions for pure theoretical knowledge, but also provides grounds for reason's practical apprehension. The previous paragraph thus attempts to show the practical purposes of pure reason by bringing together the assumptions of the relation between theory and practice under the obligation of moral principles served as under the possibilities of cognitive interest. More theoretically, in Kant's disposition, the relation between the metaphysics of experience and that of the metaphysics of morals consists not only in the realization of metaphysics as an *a priori* condition of human action (as moral action) that not only justifies his cognitive constitution but also obliges him under the autonomy of the fundamental moral laws (which remains ever in the justified domain of *belief* and unproved theoretically); and the justification of the proper disposition of reason not as a faculty contextualizing the pedagogy of the supreme speculative principles rather limiting the scope of reason a supreme source of knowledge both in theoretic and practical aspect.

The universal Ideas of reason as Metaphysics of experience unifies the discrete empirical cognition into a universal knowledge of the objective world and

as Metaphysics of morals, is the object of reason, which, devoid of anything empirical, sets forth *a priori* and also as objects of morality¹¹⁶ provides the will universal laws of morality and guides it accordingly to the particular practical dispositions. Therefore the metaphysics in Kant has cognitive as well as practical moral sanctions that bring it down from a highly speculative realm. The Ideas of pure reason comes *a priori* to knowledge that unifies knowledge into its universal forms and thus confers it to the realm of ends.

The concept of freedom comes *a priori* to the disposition of morality with reference to humanity as an end in itself but how the cognitive world is related to the moral world. Exactly what purpose do ideas of pure reason serve in cognitive sphere as well as in moral sphere and what is their relation.

2.4.8. Towards the Hypothesis of the Teleology/Purpose and its relation to Ethics in Kant

The purpose of pure reason in its practical employment refers to the consideration of the *a priori* Ideas of reason, the transcendental ideas is more theoretical than practical. The Ideas thus refers to a purposive use of metaphysics in experience. Kant demonstrates the importance of the *a priori* categories of reason as the principles of the unifying ground of understanding purposively as enumerated by reason in its practical employment, rather than the theoretical assumption that can hardly demonstratively appraise the significance of these presuppositions.

Thilly therefore writes,

“If the world is to harmonize with our practical reason, our reason in its moral employment, demands that it must be regarded as derived from an idea, the idea of the highest good. It demands the union of virtue and happiness; there is no assurance of this union unless we ascribe a moral purpose to the world; a moral being must exist to realize the purpose. In other words, we are led to teleology and God through the moral law¹¹⁷.”

The appraisal of nature is purposive. This purpose is not a mechanical purpose but a conscious purpose of reason’s practical interest¹¹⁸. *Contemplation of nature* (both in theory and in practice) by reason is a cognitive process that recognizes the importance of the purposiveness of knowledge recognized by reason. This is a practical recognition by the reason, the ground of which, for Kant, is set by the pure *forms* of understanding. The theory of purpose in Kant’s ethics, that is the teleological concern of metaphysical disposition is one of the major ethical concern that guides the principle of reason.

The regulation of understanding that pure reason serves cognition with, is practical. The cognition presupposes a practical purpose and thus involves a normative engagement. The comprehension of nature as a moral stage is thus presupposed by the subject where he could dispose his rational will through actions under the autonomy of the moral law.

2.4.9. A Critical Re-estimation of the Critique of Reason and its Ethical Consensus: The Contribution of Enlightenment and Beyond

Critique of knowledge as a reaction, presupposes a *crisis* expressed through monopoly of science over the domain of knowledge of the nature. The monopoly is

of the nature that it objectifies knowledge into specialized compartments from which frequent clashes among those objectified compartmental fragments of knowledge perks up. The crisis is a mis-conceptualization of regulatory principle of reason for constructivity, the fundamental idea of the problem of reason following the Kantian line. But the story of the crisis and its subsequent theoretic critique does not seem to end here, rather, accomplishes the task left over by Kant, Hegel and Husserl, as long as the critical theorist members of Frankfurt School are competent enough to detect the crisis. The task is as not only reconstructing a critique of the positivistic vitiation of socio-political rationality and knowledge but also reformulating a bridging principle between theory and practice

The crisis that actually and gradually manifested itself not only in principles of knowledge or historiography but also in political-economy and the essential structures of social and cultural life in the early part of the 18th Century will be covered under a detail historical investigation and also a critical re-endeavour of emancipation that undergoes certain reformulative structurization of knowledge and the role played by reason.

The spirit “of revolt against medieval society, its institutions and conceptions, and as the self-assertion of human reason in the field of thought and action”, as has been related by F Thilly that starts the Philosophical turn in the story of Enlightenment¹¹⁹. Enlightenment mirrored the striving of time¹²⁰, the inculcation of an entire intellectual movement that shows great confidence and reliability upon the competence and capability of human intellect, the power of Reason to exert itself considerably on thoughts related to basic concerns that

engulfed human problems related to social, political, cultural as well as religious life: the thoughts on *God, World, Soul of Man*, and also all other things in general¹²¹. It was a social movement that had been acquainted with the voice of people in the form of speech and action and also intelligible to average intellect, ultimately brought political reformations as well within: “the Revolution was the result of the propagation of the new ideas.”¹²²

“The respect of human reason and human rights which characterized nearly all the important modern philosophical doctrines, became universal in the eighteenth century, and the words humanity, good-will, natural rights, liberty, equality and brotherhood were on every tongue. Even the paternalistic government regarded it as their function to contribute to the happiness and welfare of mankind¹²³.”

The main problem of philosophy that posed before Kant was the ultimate questioning concerning the problem that formed his first Critique, is followed by his skepticism on the capacity and competence of human rationality and also the limits to knowledge. The ‘base’ depending on which Modern Philosophy begins its speculation is the “faith in the power of the human mind to attain knowledge...¹²⁴”

The problem that the true knowledge had to satisfy the mathematical method and purpose, began to be characterized by the evidences of all the criterions of self-evident proposition¹²⁵. “Descartes, Hobbes, Spinoza and Leibniz constructed systems of metaphysics which they deemed to be as valid logically as the Euclidean geometry.”¹²⁶ History could not regain itself from the supersensible abstraction, yet the modern intellect must justify its state and prove its competence with the new ideas. Therefore the initial argumentative presuppositions pertaining to speculative philosophies and the methods of demonstration thus obtained and

developed by a constitutive rationality. "...he (Bacon) held that the existence of God could be demonstrated and the eternal essence of things or laws of nature discovered. Nevertheless, doubts began to arise concerning the competence of the human intelligence to solve ultimate problems, or even problems of lesser scope¹²⁷." But the spirit of criticism that made enlightenment possible now doubted its consistent possibility. In other words, the spirit of criticism has been one of the major forces behind the making of history that has constantly relocated itself upon the competence of human reason making out for his own freedom. "The spirit of criticism which had undermined authority and tradition and enthroned reason was now bringing reason itself to the bar and denying reason's authority."¹²⁸ Skeptical motions against the competence of Reason or the intellect were simultaneously raised from different camps of philosophers who were no less engaged in methodological developments of their own to prove their respective competences for the valid knowledge. Two of them were the empiricists and the faith philosophers¹²⁹ who "distrusted the deliverances of the intellect" and sought for other means and methodological developments¹³⁰.

The frustration that Philosophy had to suffer under the perusal of the pressing discursive, self-destructive critical forces of intellect's aptitude on knowledge proper, demanded appropriate justice that would justifiably weigh all the major contending intellectual forces of the time, struggling for supremacy¹³¹.

Kant yet maintains, quite in the line of enlightenment philosophers, that the universal and necessary knowledge possible only on the basic assumptions of science of Physics and Mathematics¹³² whereas discards the possibility of rational

metaphysics including rational cosmology and theology from the periphery of necessary knowledge since no such object is presented to our senses experience. “The content of our knowledge are derived from experience (empiricism), but the mind *thinks* its experiences, *conceives* them according to its native a priori, that is, rational, ways (rationalism).”¹³³ The problem of knowledge that belongs to Kant and his metaphysics of experience becomes the point of Hegel’s critique of Kant. One of the very important questions that seemed to have been left over by Kant, as some of his contemporary critiques would like to say is about the problem of theoretic understanding of the conditions of knowledge, that it presupposes i.e. the theory suffers a weakness of critical re-consideration of the foundation of the possibilities of any possible knowledge in general. They would say that Kant does not demonstrate his ‘principles’; he doesn’t clarify the scope of the knowability of his formulative speculations on the conditions of knowledge, enough, as to meets the demand of critical philosophy, properly so called, to consider even the reconditions of knowledge within the critique. “The critical philosophy (kritizismus) demands that the knowing subject ascertain the conditions of knowledge of which it is in principle capable before trusting its directly acquired cognition¹³⁴.” The problem belongs to the situation of knowledge where it includes *a priori* even the a priori categories that are themselves responsible for knowledge: i.e. the metaphysics of knowledge itself becomes the object of knowledge¹³⁵. Therefore, perhaps it is the case that radicalism in the critique of the presuppositions of knowledge cannot be philosophically bared¹³⁶. But on the other hand it may also be assumed that epistemology, which, by the virtue of its orientation to knowledge and later its critical foundations counts for the First

Philosophy and that might seem impossible for it to reconsider the importance of the pre-conditions of knowledge within the area of problematic. Hegel's transit is founded on the very problems of the radicalism of critical re-considerations of the prerequisites of knowledge or the inadequacies of epistemology as providing the grounds of the first philosophy¹³⁷.

Kant argues that the use of metaphysics in experience is transcendental in nature and criticizes the objectivating attitude of intellect towards those Transcendental Ideas as the unification principle of judgment, as that of sciences: "Though the transcendental Ideas produce an irresistible illusion, they are as natural to reason as are the categories to understanding."¹³⁸ Hegel's objection belongs to the consideration of the uncriticized presupposition or acceptance of the categories and the transcendental Ideas within the domain of knowledge proper. The speculative measurement of reason over the necessary preconditions of knowledge and morality as transcendental elements of logical and phenomenological importance makes him to certain extent dogmatic in nature and follows the speculative theoretic footstep of his enlightenment theorist predecessors.

Kant's morality can be expressed and reduced to a form of principle or law. The knowledge of moral law is a necessary knowledge. Reason commands moral law and that counts for the necessity of moral law¹³⁹. The anthropological and teleological aspect of human rationality tells that I should act "so that I will be deserving happiness¹⁴⁰." He says that the relation between morality and happiness exists in Ideas only and not in the phenomenal world of experience. Kant's

speculative line somehow follows his predecessors, the enlightenment philosophers. He keeps in the provision for faith and practical philosophy in the things that he demonstrate by the use of pure theoretic reason. The existence of God cannot be demonstrated as such, but can be inversely presupposed by the fact that the natural world-order which is also a moral world-order must have an author who is rationally perfect.

“Now if God is the author of the natural order, it is legitimate to hope that this natural order is also a moral order, or rather, that in such a natural order happiness will accompany morality. Our reason compels us to regard ourselves as belonging to a moral world-order in which happiness and morality are connected¹⁴¹.”

Again,

“God, therefore, and a future life are two presuppositions which, according to the principle of pure reason, cannot be separated from the moral law which reason imposes upon us¹⁴².”

The necessity of moral law, for Kant, is thus established by reason on the basis of the a priori Ideas of pure reason, which cannot be in turn demonstrated by the pure reason, but are necessary principles of practical reason and is being proved by that. The ideas are but the only rational demand of a moral purpose: the product of reason as its own necessary principle. But Hegel’s critique of Kant’s moral abstract universalism states that since the categorical imperative has always been a universal abstraction resulting to formal separation of the universal from the particular, its effect follows even to the materialization of the moral principles of the particular individual cases. Therefore, a judgment considered to be valid in terms of universals would “necessarily remain external to individual cases and insensitive to the particular context of a problem in need of solution¹⁴³.” The

importance and abstraction of 'ought' from 'is', as Habermas relates in his reading on Hegel's critique of Kantian moral principle in *Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action*, through a strict separation between what is and what should be, it "fails to answer the question of how moral insight can be realized in practice."¹⁴⁴ Thus, Hegel's objection on the very nature of Kant's formalism which follows as an effect from the enlightenment historiography follows that the nature of abstraction of the concept of duty from the categorical imperative necessarily leads to a tautological judgment¹⁴⁵. On the terror of *pure conviction* and Hegel's reaction to it, Habermas writes: "Since the categorical imperative serves the pure postulates of practical reason from the formative process of spirit and its concrete historical manifestation, it necessarily recommends to the advocates of the moral worldview a policy that aims at the actualization of reason and sanctions even immoral deeds if they serve higher ends¹⁴⁶."

2.5. Kant and the Foundation of Critical Philosophy: Towards Higher Metaphysical Tradition of Argumentation among the Post-Kantians

Human being has a natural ambition to transcend from empirical realm to a purely transcendental realm of unity that fuses all his particular knowledge into a transcendent whole. The transition from the empirical to transcendental, from particular to universal involves certain limitations, the limitations that might lead the consciousness to some sort of an illusion about the objective world as principles of intellectual speculative contingency. Pure reason has an inherent limitation as a source of knowledge. And that limitation consists in its reliability/justified representation of the objective knowledge of the world including the knowledge of

the supersensible world. Metaphysics, for Kant, is about the possibility of the *object*(in sensible or supersensible world) at least in knowledge in its justified form that has its practical significance in the life of human being as an *end* in him/herself. The metaphysics of pure and practical reason in Kant has been both the cause of the unification of knowledge as well as the postulate of morality. The transcendental dialectic justifies metaphysics from an object of speculative pedagogy, and gives them a transcendental form not as something behind the objective world of cognition, but something as the necessary condition of knowledge. Metaphysics as the transcendental dialectical constant that carries out the problem concerning the question of the possibility of justified true belief of the world has been a problem before Kant to initiate a critical inquiry particularly in the issues concerning the possibility of knowledge claims that are rationally justified to be true on the basis of reason's speculative autocracy. Metaphysics, considered as the *act* of pure reason used exclusively of empirical cognition and its inherent limitations leads to illusion.

2.5.1. Fichte's Transit:

For Fichte, knowledge is an achievement, not a possession which presupposes the consciousness of the pure ego or the pure rational principle, the unifying principle of all knowledge and the world of senses. Knowledge, which creates our world of experience and develop history is a practical principle whose objective is freedom. The Concept of Freedom is inherent in reason and it is the sole source of the laws of action or morality and knowledge itself. Absolute knowledge is absolute freedom, the knowledge of the ultimate utility of all things.

Reason as a practical regulative principle appears as a purposive condition to the cognitive function of the subject, at the same time forming not a subjective but an objective order of moral apprehension. The practical principle presupposing the objective moral understanding of the world is the *interest* that reason actually provides to the objective disposition of the subject.

Fichte uses the scientific procedure of deductive principle to sort out the common root of both theoretical and practical nature of philosophical understanding and critique of Kant.

“The purpose of the other Critique however, shows us that the notion of the thing in itself develops as we advance in our knowledge of the critical system. Conceived, at first, as a mere abstraction it becomes a necessary idea of reason, a regulating principle expressing the rational demand for unity by means of the ideas of the soul, the world, and God. The idea of freedom is found to be a possible or thinkable ground of all things; the moral law, moreover, demonstrates the reality of this idea and vouchsafes the existence of God, a spiritual kingdom, and immortality. The thing-in-itself which began as an abstraction is interpreted in the sequel as freedom, practical reason, will. There is, then, a higher kind of truth than that offered by scientific intelligence; the moral law within us is a sure guarantee of the existence of the supersensible world, which is inaccessible to the psycho-mathematical method of the understanding¹⁴⁷.”

The competence of Reason as re-establishing the human-nature relations through contingent contradictions pre-supposes the practical purpose of reason in the realization of the ‘ego’ as both a cognizing and acting self, not as a mere link in the causal chain, but as free individuals. The ego becomes conscious of the law of duty in the act of the free will. Duty presupposes the universal law of *Nature* and a will, necessary free in itself, to realize the law. The competence of reason appraised as an abstract principle of guiding the understanding yet resides into the realm of a

technical-tactical functionary of a discursive reason itself to grasp its proper critical contingents. The purpose of the self-realization of reason as a guiding/regulating principle of the understanding basically presupposes the contingent condition of the moral purpose that the ego or the free individual as the social actor adheres to. Fichte realizes the insufficiency of the pure concept of understanding or the intellect to grasp the real, which is multi-dimensional and practical in its content and can only be known through the adequacy of the special *a priori* faculties of the understanding, that though conceived as the pure and abstract faculties of the understanding, but satisfies its real purpose in forming the practical principle of the ego to transcend the ordinary understanding of the world through pure and technical principles.

“Fichte shares Kant’s view of the insufficiency of the intellect: we cannot grasp the living reality by the discursive understanding with its spatial, temporal, causal ways of thinking; only when we have seen through the nature of ordinary knowledge, detected its superficiality and relativity, can we grasp the living realities behind the surface: freedom, the moral world-order, and God. If we are limited to scientific intelligence, we could never rise above the notion of an inexorable causal order, and would ourselves be unable to escape the machinery of nature. But there is a way out. In an act of *intellectual intuition*, which is itself an act of free will, we become conscious of the law of duty, or the universal purpose, which commands us to be free persons, to free ourselves from the determinism of nature, to refuse to be mere links in a causal chain¹⁴⁸.”

The universe as a moral ground is presupposed by the *a priori* conditions of understanding and unification of knowledge in the realization of freedom and the law of duty. The realization of the moral purpose of the universe is the realization of the universal purpose, a moral purpose, conceived by the ordinary faculties of understanding, thus transforming the ordinary subject to a level of an extra-

ordinary level. The realization of freedom and the purposiveness of the moral universe rests, in the ordinary sense experience, on the method and sense of an extra-ordinary competence of instrumentalizing the universal moral purpose. Our ordinary knowledge gained by sense perception is a practical instrument for achieving freedom. Hence, the ordinary experience presents us not only with the practical purpose of the moral world order, but also with a practical world to struggle against and overcome.

“Acceptance of the law of duty and the freedom which it implies will give our life worth and meaning; it will enable us to understand the world as the instrument of universal purpose – the realization of freedom – and thereby to transform ourselves from blind tools of the purpose into its willing helpers. Now it becomes clear that our ordinary knowledge gained by sense perception is a practical instrument for achieving freedom; it presents us with the resistance needed for the exercise of will: we cannot become free without putting forth efforts, hence we need a world to struggle against and overcome. The world would have no meaning, therefore, if the command of duty to achieve freedom were not realizable; but it is perfectly intelligible to us in the light of the deliverance of the moral consciousness¹⁴⁹.”

Philosophy, for Fichte is the critique of the *choice* of the ego in context of moral disposition by the free individual. The realization of the ego as a self-determining is actually practical in nature and transcends all the barriers of pure understanding and the technical nature of the intellect. Fichte’s principle of *commission* of practical disposition by the free self-determined individual ego consists the foundation of philosophy as a critique of action as practical, moral disposition. Freedom, for Fichte, is more than and transcends the faculty of pure understanding and speculative reasoning. Freedom is no more a pure form of knowledge but has become the ultimate practical pre-supposition of all knowledge and activity. The

practical philosophy of Fichte necessitates the demand of Freedom as the ultimate practical principle *for* and *by* the ego that satisfies the demand of our moral nature and “gives our life meaning and worth.” It is the realization of the primacy of the free self-determining being as the ego that is essentially moral in nature and governs philosophy as the nature of practical choice and disposition of will by the free individual. This principle of the practical ego or the primacy of the free self-determining principle in the ego is not merely a subject-matter of a theoretical reason but a practical self-realization through choice of actions and practical moral dispositions.

“We cannot prove to theoretical reason the primacy of a free self-determining being – for theoretical reason never ceases to search after grounds – but we accept such a principle as ultimate, because it alone can satisfy the demands of our moral nature and give our life meaning and worth. An ethical decision is basic to philosophy and “the choice of one’s philosophy depends on what kind of man one is¹⁵⁰.”

Thereby,

“The man who has freed himself from the slavery of the senses, who is a self-determining agent, regards himself as a power superior to everything sensuous, and cannot conceive himself as a mere thing¹⁵¹.”

The ego, for Fichte is not an object of knowledge, but the pure ego as the subject and the moral disposer of action, and also as the ultimate presupposition of all experience and understanding. But this self-consciousness is passive upon us; i.e., the freedom or the absolute moral autonomy of the ego is not revealed upon us, rather it awaits to be realized through an act of freedom. The immediacy of self-consciousness, the primary principle of Fichte’s idealism, conceives the passive realization of itself through the free commission of the will, the act of the free

individual as a moral performer in the practical life-world. The spirit of human consciousness or the ego has its self-realization only in the active principle of the individual and not vice-versa. The ego is both expressed and realized in spiritual activities, the activities that the spirit freely determines as a self-realizing principle.

“...the basic reality for idealism, the ego, appears in consciousness, not as an object of experience nor as a phenomenon or link in the causal series, but as an ego-in-itself, as something real, above all experience. There exists an immediate self-consciousness of free mental action. But such consciousness does not free itself upon us, we must proceed it in ourselves by an act of freedom. If we cannot perform the act, we will not understand the idealistic philosophy, we will get no glimpse into the real world of mind¹⁵².”

Thus,

“We cannot prove conceptually that there is such an act of intellectual intuition, nor what it is. Everyone must find it directly in himself, or he will never know of it...it can be pointed out to everyone that it occurs in every phase of his consciousness. Every person who ascribes activity to himself tacitly appeals to such an intuition. Fichte holds that wherever there is spiritual activity, there is consciousness of it, even though it escapes the attention of the dogmatist¹⁵³.”

Fichte’s Practical Philosophy thus Continues:

“Fichte also points out that the truth of idealism can be verified by experience. If the presupposition of idealism is correct and if the correct deductions have been made, the final result must be a system of necessary ideas, or the sum-total of experience. If the results of a philosophy do not agree with experience, the philosophy is certainly false, for it has not kept its promise to deduce the whole of experience and to explain it by the necessary action of intelligence. But idealism does not keep experience in view as a goal to be reached; it pays no attention to whatever to experience. In its procedure, it evolves its propositions from the basal idea, regardless of what the result may be. That is what Fichte says, but, as a matter of

fact he does pay attention to experience; he asks us to observe the intelligence in its operation, to watch the mind at work. What he is suggesting is that mere observation of such acts would not be philosophy, that genuine philosophy demands an understanding of these acts, of their ground and purpose, and that such an understanding can only be reached by logical thought¹⁵⁴.”

2.5.2. Hegel's Transition:

For Hegel, nature presupposes thought. Reality is essentially rational in nature. Hegel equates nature with thought, metaphysics with logic. The nature of thought is not static. Instead, it is a dynamic process, an evolutionary process. The purpose of philosophy, is therefore, is to study the relation between nature and human experience in context of reason in its “eternal essence, harmony and law¹⁵⁵.” Hegel determines things of nature with a rational order and meaning which can only be apprehended through a rationally sound thought and thus associates nature essentially with the nature of rational thought. The logic that presupposes the forms and structure of thought itself becomes metaphysics in Hegel's thought.

The *notion* as the understanding of nature by reason is in the process of *evolution* through a dialectical process. The dialectic (the process of evolution) in Hegel refers to a normative presupposition that resides in the cognitive interest of the nature.

“In evolving that is undeveloped, undifferentiated, homogeneous and, in Hegel's sense “abstract”, develops, differentiates, splits up, assumes many opposing or contradictory forms, until at least we have a unified, concrete, particularized object, a unity in diversity¹⁵⁶.”

And Thereby,

“The indefinite, abstract ground from which we have proceeded has become a definite concrete reality in which the opposites are reconciled or united in the whole. The higher stage in the process of evolution is the realization of the lower, it is really what the lower intends to be, in Hegel’s language, it is the “truth” of the lower, its purpose, its meaning¹⁵⁷.”

The history is a perfect social order of absolute rational status. The absolute is a universal whole; the opposites presuppose the evolution, the development. The absolute is rational and ideal and tries to overcome every aspect of material opposition.

Again,

“The opposites are opposites with respect to one another, but not with respect to the unity or whole of which they form the part¹⁵⁸.”

Therefore,

“...all nature strives to overcome its material being, to divest itself of its phenomenal encumbrances and to make manifest its true essence¹⁵⁹.”

The Absolute or the perfect social order, which is essentially rational in nature and the development thus the history goes through is a dialectical process of historical evolution towards the perfect realization of the nature and purpose of the real¹⁶⁰.

The nature is actually purposive in *notion*. The world is essentially rational in the realization of its purpose. For Hegel, things realize its purpose only in rational dialectical process. The Nature dialectically overcomes its material counterpart in notion and becomes a part of the united rational whole. In other words, the nature realizes its potential purposiveness in the dialectical evolution of the notion. The perfect social order in the unified whole pre-exists in the notion

itself. It is only expressed in the dialectical process¹⁶¹ of transcending the opposites. The purposive-normative potentialities of nature, in notion, can thus be *epistemologically* apprehended in pure reason. The purpose of the nature is thus realized in the notion in a dialectical format where reason tries to overcome and transcend its material contradiction. In this universal process of evolution of history, both the purpose and the end of nature is realized dialectically. The universal whole or the complete organic whole¹⁶² is purely rational in its practical moral realization. The organic whole thus realizes its concept where its form, meaning, purpose and end is fully realized. The *truth*¹⁶³ of the organism is revealed only in in the dialectical evolutionary process patronized by pure reason¹⁶⁴.

“In all instances of the revelation of reason, whether in nature or in mind, reason appears in an infinite validity of temporal and transitory forms. These accidental shapes showing on the surface are not the subject matter of philosophy. It is the business of philosophy to understand the reason in things, the essence or substance of nature and mind, the essential harmony and order, the immanent law and essence of nature, the meaning of human institutions and of history, the essential element shining through the temporal and accidental, the inner pulse beating in the external shapes. Moreover, this reason in things we can know only conceptually, through dialectical or logical thought, and the only knowledge worthy of the name is a priori or philosophical knowledge. The two fields of metaphysics or “applied logic” are philosophy of nature and philosophy of mind¹⁶⁵.”

And,

“The system of concepts which we think in logic, form an organic whole and represents the true essence of things. Logic is not merely a subjective process occurring in our mind. It is a relational structure exemplified in the world-process, in nature and in mind, in the individual mind and in the social mind, in the history of the world and in human institutions¹⁶⁶.”

2.6. Conclusion

The critique of reason in Kant, as it traverses from critique of pure reason to the practical reason, creates a horizon of meaning that presupposes the moral domain along with the concept of God and freedom. In Kant, the critique of reason becomes the critique of a sphere beyond enlightenment. It paves the way for a critical trajectory to understand reason as a metaphysical tool of practical reason that which redeems the moral domain and releases the ethics of critique of reason.

Notes and References:

1. Gardner, Sebastian; 1999; **Routledge Philosophy Guide to Kant and the Critique of Pure Reason**; Routledge; p. 9

²Ibid.

³“Locke and Shaftesbury, and then Hume, made a great impression on him; it was the latter who, as he himself said, “aroused him from his dogmatic slumbers.””; Thilly, Frank; 2001; **A History of Philosophy**; Central Publishing House, Allahabad; p. 410;

⁴Gardner, Sebastian; 1999; **Routledge Philosophy Guide to Kant and the Critique of Pure Reason**; Routledge; p. 11

⁵Ibid.

⁶“...as Kant put it in lecture in “natural right” (political philosophy) that... “If only rational being can be an end in themselves, this is not because they have reason, but because they have freedom. Reason is merely means.” Guyer, Paul; **Kant** 2006, Routledge, New York; p. 78

⁷Aaron, Richard I; 1971; **Knowing and the Function of Reason**; Oxford; p. 175

⁸ “I find it most convenient...to reserve the word ‘reason’ for this third feature, namely the checking, judging or testing of thought in the light of what is known. Thus, to speak concretely, the person who knows also thinks, speculates and puts forward hypothesis about what he does not know, but he then tests his speculation by what he is sure of and by what he feels constrained to accept, and in doing this, I hold, he proceeds in a rational manner.”; *ibid*; p. 177

⁹ “Through the Ideas reason aims to systematize our knowledge in conformity with a single principle. This systematic unity indicated by the Ideas is merely methodological; it urges the reason to keep on unifying its knowledge; but the systematic unity is subjectively necessary, not objectively necessary as constructing transcendent realities.”; Thilly, Frank; 2001; **A History of Philosophy**, Central Publishing House, Allahabad; p. 437

¹⁰ “By the “unconditioned,” Kant means something that is a condition for other things but not itself dependent on any other condition, for example a primary subject that has properties but is not itself the property of anything else. Kant’s view is that reason inevitably leads us to form ideas of such “unconditioned” realities, that we cannot think of such things as if they were given by sensibility is inherently “conditioned”...and so we inevitably think of “unconditioned” as if it were an object that lies beyond and transcend the limits of sensibility- in other words, as a noumenon in the positive sense. Thus the faculty of reason hijacks the harmless concept of a noumenon in the negative sense to express its own positive conception of the “unconditioned” Guyer, Paul; 2006; **Kant**; Routledge; p. 131;

¹¹ “...to repudiate metaphysics is to repudiate cognition as a rational phenomenon.” Gardner, Sebastian; 1999; **Routledge Philosophy Guide to Kant and the Critique of Pure Reason**; Routledge. London and New York; p. 21

¹² “He accepts the existence of universal and necessary knowledge as an established fact, hence he does not ask whether synthetic a priori judgments are possible, but only how they are possible.” Thilly, Frank; 2001; **A History of Philosophy**, Central Publishing House, Allahabad; p. 415

¹³Ibid; p. 414

¹⁴Guyer, Paul; 2006; **Kant**; Routledge; p. 129

¹⁵ “The rationalists would agree that a man’s thinking, which might be influenced, for instance, by prejudice, whim, or assumption, should be checked by knowledge. But he also views reason itself as a source of knowledge, a knowledge of basic principles that cannot be acquired in any other way.”; *ibid*; p. 177

¹⁶ “Knowledge would be impossible without the cooperation of sensation and perception on the one hand, and thinking or understanding on the other. These two preconditions of knowledge are

fundamentally different, but supplement each other. “Percepts and concepts constitute the elements of all our knowledge.” Percept without concept are blind, concepts without percepts are empty. All that the intellect can do is to elaborate what is given by sensibility.”; Thilly, Frank; 2001; **A History of Philosophy**, Central Publishing House, Allahaba;p. 416

¹⁷Thilly, Frank; 2001; **A History of Philosophy**, Central Publishing House, Allahabad; p. 413

¹⁸Gardner, Sebastian;1999; ‘**Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Kant and the Critique of Pure Reason**’;; Routledge, London and New York; p. 23

¹⁹**Kant’s Transcendental Dialectic: The Three Critiques and the ‘Opus postumum’**; Contributions by Stuart Hampshire; 1989; Stanford University Press California; p. 13

²⁰“It is not the function of human reason to lay down absolute standards of truth in accordance with which thinking must be tested, nor to pass infallible judgment on what is thought.” Aaron, Richard I; 1971; **Knowing and the Function of Reason**; Oxford; p. 177

²¹Ibid; P. 175

²²Thilly, Frank; 2001; **A History of Philosophy**, Central Publishing House, Allahabad; p. 414

²³“Though the transcendental Ideas produce an irresistible illusion, they are as natural as are the categories to the understanding. The later, however, convey truth, i.e., agreement of our concepts with their objects. Every faculty has its use, provided we can discover its right direction, and the reason with its Ideas is no exception. The transcendental Ideas have their immanent use in guiding inquiry, but when they are mistaken for concepts of real things, they are transcendent ad deceptive in their use.” Ibid; p. 437

²⁴“...overcoming the opposition of rationalism and empiricism is a subsidiary theme in Kant’s philosophy: primarily, it is a response to the deep problem bound up with the project of enlightenment that dominated the eighteenth century.”; Gardner, Sebastian;1999; **Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Kant and the Critique of Pure Reason**;Routledge, London and New York; p.2

²⁵“J.G. Hamann (1730-1788) and F.H. Jacobi (1743-1819), though very different, both strove to defend what, in their view, reason is too limited to grasp: what the Enlightenment condemned as valuelessbecause contradictory to reason, they regarded as a refutation of reason’s claim to supremacy. For Jacobi, this meant the power of feeling that reveals directly the God of theism; for Hamann it means poetry, generous and divine revelation through Christian scripture and the particulars of language and history.” Gardner, Sebastian;1999; **Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Kant and the Critique of Pure Reason**; Routledge, London and New York; p. 7

²⁶Ibid; P.3

²⁷“For all their massive disagreements, both Libniz and Hume regard our knowledge as divided into two fundamental types- necessary and *a priori* Knowledge, and contingent and *a posteriori*- and each type as accounted for in a single way, their accounts of which are fundamentally similar. Libniz divides all our knowledge into what he calls truths of reason and truths of fact: truths of reason are necessary, and necessary truths are held to be true by virtue of logical principles (they can be analyzed into statements of identity or statements the opposite of which implies a contradiction): truths of fact are contingent and known through experience. Metaphysical knowledge falls of course on the side of truths of reason, along with mathematics and geometry; it is regarded as derivable from logical principles. In parallel fashion, Hume divides knowledge into what he calls relations of ideas and matters of fact: relations of ideas are necessary and “discoverable by the mere operation of thought without dependence on what is anywhere existent in the universe”, and again include mathematics and geometry; matters of fact are contingent and distinguished by the conceivability of their contradictory (for any matter of fact ‘x is F’ we can conceive ‘x is not F’). Hume’s critique of causation, and general repudiation of metaphysics, is based on these divisions: there is, he argues, no room for knowledge of causation constructed as necessitation because causal relations are not elations of ideas (the contradictory of any judgment is always conceivable) and yet cannot derive from experience (there is no ‘impression of necessity).

Leibniz and Hume agree in bifurcating human knowledge, while disagreeing about its scope.” Ibid; p. 52

²⁸ “The task of the *Critique* as that of finding an answer to the question of how synthetic *a priori* judgment are possible (B 19)...It is designed to clarify significantly the problem of metaphysics and even advance the case of its possibility.” Ibid; p. 51

²⁹ “*A posteriori* knowledge is always knowledge of something contingent for Kant, who accepts the position earlier argued by Hume that “Experience teaches us, to be sure, that something is constituted thus and so, but not that it could not be otherwise.” (B 3) Experience tells us only that those objects that has actually been observed are a certain way, not that all objects, even of some particular kind, must be that way.”; Guyer, Paul; 2006; **Kant**;Routledge; London and New York; p. 46

³⁰ “To determine whether we have *a priori* knowledge, Kant proposes two criteria: a judgment is *a priori* if it is necessary or if it has what he calls ‘strict universality’ (B3-4). A judgment has strict universality if no exception is possible to what it predicates of its object, i.e. if it is necessarily true of its objects.”; Gardner, Sebastian;1999**Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Kant and the Critique of Pure Reason**; Routledge, London and New York; p. 53

³¹ “In the *Prolegomena* and in some passages carried over from that work into revised introduction of the second edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant makes it seem as if everyone already knows that there is such a thing as synthetic *a priori* cognition- in pure mathematics and pure physical science- and that the task of philosophy is just, first, to explain *how* such cognition is possible, and then, second, to demonstrate *from* that explanation that that there are some *further* synthetic *a priori* cognitions in metaphysics itself.”; Guyer, Paul; 2006; **Kant**;Routledge; London and New York; p. 48

³² “The introduction thus undermines Leibniz’s claim that knowledge of reality is derivable from logical principles, and opens the door to demonstrating against Hume, the possibility of metaphysics.”; Gardner, Sebastian; 1999; **Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Kant and the Critique of Pure Reason**; Routledge, London and New York; p. 58

³³ Guyer; Guyer, Paul; 2006; **Kant**; Routledge; London and New York; p. 47

³⁴ Gardner, Sebastian; 1999; **Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Kant and the Critique of Pure Reason**; Routledge, London and New York; p. 55

³⁵ “Consider ‘every event has a cause’. Because it is necessary, it must be *a priori*. But it is not analytic, for the concept of the predicate is not contained in the concept of the subject: the concept of an event (something happening) does not contain that of being an effect. That is why the judgment is informative, and that makes it synthetic.”; *ibid*; p.55

³⁶ *Ibid*; P. 57

³⁷ “‘Transcendental Analytic’ is not about metaphysics but a clue to an analogical relation between physics and metaphysics”; Collingwood, R.G.;1969; **An Essay on Metaphysics**; Oxford at the Clarendon Press; p. 241

³⁸ “Kant intended when he wrote his first ‘*Critique*’ to clear the way for a future metaphysics by criticizing the errors that had vitiated metaphysics in the past. In writing it he actually promised that when it was done he would write and publish the new system of metaphysics for which it would have prepared the way. But he never did so; and when reminded of his promise he answered that the ‘*Critique*’ was itself that system.; *ibid*;p. 237

³⁹ The title appears in Murti’s work, **A Central Philosophy of Buddhism A Study of Mādhyamika System**;MunshiramManoharlal Publishers Pvt. Ltd.

⁴⁰ Mashi, Y; 1999; **A Critical History of Western Philosophy**; MotilalBanarsidass Publishers; p. 374; 8.26

⁴¹ “Philosophy...is not the *explanation* of things on a particular hypothesis or pattern, however grand it may be. That is the way of science, and is valuable there, as the hypothesis can be verified by appeal to sense-experience. The procedure, however, carries a necessary limitation with it. Systems of philosophy adopt this procedure, but discard the limitation; they seek to comprehend the entire universe in their scope and attempt to reach the unconditioned.” Murti, T.R.V.; 2006; “**The Central Philosophy of Buddhism: A Study of the Madhyamika System**”; MunshiramManoharlal Publishers Pvt. Ltd.; p. 210

⁴² “...Kant claims that natural science “*properly* so called” must begin with a “metaphysics of nature,” which both has a “transcendental part” that makes “possible the concept of nature in general, even without relation to any determinate object of experience,” but must also “concern itself with a particular nature of this or that kind of things, for which an empirical concept is given, but still in such a manner that, outside of what lies in this concept, no other empirical principle is used for its cognition.”(4:470)”; Guyer, Paul; 2006; **Kant**;Routledge; London and New York; p. 158

⁴³Ibid; p. 127

⁴⁴ “It was not the empiricists alone, however, who were weighing rationalism in the balance and finding it wanting; protests against its supposed pretensions and results also came from the camp of the mystics and faith-philosophers, who distrusted the deliverance of the intellect and sought in other phases or functions of the human soul a means of stilling the longing for certainty. According to them, the discursive understanding can never pierce the covering of reality; truth has its source in feelings, faith, or mystical vision of some sort; the deepest realities cannot be conceived by reason, but only felt by the heart.”; Thilly, Frank; 2001; **A History of Philosophy**, Central Publishing House, Allahabad; p. 413

⁴⁵Ibid.

⁴⁶ Collingwood, R.G.; 1969; **An Essay on Metaphysics**; Oxford at the Clarendon Press; p. 14;

⁴⁷ “...reason is not itself a knowing, nor is it a source (and the soul source) of principles known a priori; reason’s task is to test thinking by what is known. It is not the function of human reason to lay down absolute standards of truth in accordance with which thinking must be tested, not to pass infallible judgment on what is thought.”;Aaron, Richard I; 1971; **Knowing and the Function of Reason**; Oxford; p. 177

⁴⁸ P. 178; *ibid*

⁴⁹Thilly, Frank; 2001; **A History of Philosophy**, Central Publishing House, Allahabad; p. 430

⁵⁰ Aaron, Richard I; 1971; **Knowing and the Function of Reason**; Oxford; P. 177

⁵¹ P. 177; *ibid*

⁵² “...any science must be a “system, that is, a whole of cognition ordered according to principle,” in the ‘*Metaphysical Foundation of Natural Science*’ (4:467)”; Guyer, Paul; 2006; **Kant**;Routledge; London and New York; p. 157

⁵³Ibid; p. 165

⁵⁴ “Kant intended when he wrote his first ‘Critique’ to clear the way for a future metaphysics by criticizing the errors that had vitiated metaphysics in the past. In writing it he actually promised that when it was done he would write and publish the new system of metaphysics for which it would have prepared the way. But he never did so; and when reminded of his promise he answered that the ‘Critique’ was itself that system”; Collingwood, R.G.;1969;*An Essay on Metaphysics*; Oxford at the Clarendon Press; p. 237

⁵⁵ “In the first ‘Critique’ Kant is attempting to do for metaphysics what metaphysicians and physicists have already done for their respective branches of knowledge: namely to introduce a new method which will transform it from a mere ‘groping about’ into a science.”; Kant, Immanuel; 1998; **Ground Work of Metaphysics of Morals** Mary GragorTrs. And *etd.* With an introduction by Christine M. Korsgaard; Cambridge University Press; p. 86

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- ⁵⁶ "...in order to understand the possibility of synthetic *a priori* knowledge, he has argued, we must realize that the fundamental forms of both sensibility and understanding have their origine within our own minds, and that we impose these forms upon our experience of objects rather than depending upon objects for them."; Guyer, Paul; 2006; **Kant**;Routledge; London and New York; p. 129
- ⁵⁷ Guyer, Paul; 2006; **Kant**;Routledge; London and New York; p. 129
- ⁵⁸ Ibid; p. 130
- ⁵⁹ Traditional metaphysics is a body of *a priori* synthetic propositions about supersensible objects. Kantian metaphysics is a system of the *a priori* concepts and principles which make objectives of experience possible.; Kant, Immanuel; 1998; **Ground Work of Metaphysics of Morals**; Mary Gragor Trs. And *etd.* With an introduction by Christine M. Korsgaard; Cambridge University Press; p. 86
- ⁶⁰ Collingwood, R.G.; 1969;**An Essay on Metaphysics**; Oxford at the Clarendon Press; P. 239
- ⁶¹ Ibid; p. 240
- ⁶² Gardner, Sebastian; 1999; **Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Kant and the Critique of Pure Reason**;Routledge, London and New York; p. 21
- ⁶³ "...to repudiate metaphysics is to repudiate cognition as a rational phenomenon."; *ibid*; p. 21
- ⁶⁴ "Because the problem of metaphysics is ultimately a matter of reason's relation to itself, the route to its solution, Kant argues, must also be reflexive. That is reason must examine itself. To do this is to forebear from seeking knowledge of reality and instead to make cognition itself an object of philosophical enquiry."; *ibid*; p. 22
- ⁶⁵ "Kant begins his chapter by concluding from the preceding chapters "That the understanding can therefore make only empirical use of all it's *a priori* principles, indeed of all its concepts, but never transcendental use" (A 238/B 297, see also A 246/B 303)"; Guyer, Paul; 2006; **Kant**;Routledge; London and New York; p. 129
- ⁶⁶ The Idea of a ground or cause of the objects of our experience helps us to organize our knowledge. The psychological, cosmological, and teleological Ides are not referred directly to an object corresponding to them; yet by presupposing such an object in Idea we are led to organize and extend our knowledge without ever contradicting it."; Thilly, Frank; 2001; **A History of Philosophy**, Central Publishing House, Allahabad; p. 439
- ⁶⁷ Guyer, Paul; 2006; **Kant**; Routledge; London and New York; p. 131
- ⁶⁸ Ibid; p. 132
- ⁶⁹ Thilly, Frank; 2001; **A History of Philosophy**, Central Publishing House, Allahabad; p. 437
- ⁷⁰ "He (Kant) actually announces his rejection of the idea that pure reason alone can give us real knowledge of objects beyond the limits of our senses of the final chapter of the 'Transcendental Analytic'..."; Guyer, Paul; 2006; **Kant**; Routledge; London and New York; p. 129
- ⁷¹ "His aim in the "Transcendental Dialectic" is thus a critique of the pretentions of pure reason in the hands of Plato and all subsequent metaphysicians, especially his recent predecissors such as Leibniz, Wolff, and Baumgarten, to provide knowledge of objects beyond the limits of sensibility, such as God or our own soul."; *ibid*; p. 126
- ⁷² "The conflicts are central to Kant's critique of pure reason, because they are the kinds of conflicts that call forth a skeptical attitude about the possibility of metaphysics altogether, but they also suggest to someone with faith in reason that beneath such disputes there must somewhere be a false assumption that can be discovered. This false assumption is in fact the idea that knowledge of objects can be gained by pure reason *alone*, without the assistance of intuition from sensibility, and thus without restriction to the limits of sensibility."; *ibid*; p. 128
- ⁷³ Gardner, Sebastian;1999; **Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Kant and the Critique of Pure Reason**;Routledge, London and New York; p. 51

⁷⁴Ibid; p. 29

⁷⁵Ibid; p. 30

⁷⁶ It was a risk in Kantian idealism that his theory of knowledge based on subjective disposition of the object of knowledge went very near to the misrepresentation of rejuvenating the Barkelyan idealism in a new format.

⁷⁷Thilly, Frank; 2001; **A History of Philosophy**, Central Publishing House, Allahabad; p. 437

⁷⁸Ibid; P. 438

⁷⁹ “The only purpose of the Idea of a Supreme Being is to preserve the systematic unity in the empirical use of our reason. The Idea of a ground or cause of the objects of our experience helps us to organize our knowledge. The psychological, cosmological and theological Ideas are not referred directly to an object corresponding to them; yet by presupposing such an object in Idea we are led to organize and extend our knowledge without ever contradicting it.” ;ibid; pp. 438-439

⁸⁰Ibid; p. 439

⁸¹Guyer, Paul; 2006; **Kant**; Routledge; London and New York; p. 129

⁸²Ibid; p. 211

⁸³ “...what serves the will as an objective ground of its self-determination is an end, and this, if it is given by reason alone, must hold equally for all rational beings.” Kant, Immanuel; 1998; **Ground Work of Metaphysics of Morals**; MaryGragorTrs. And *etd.* With an introduction by Christine M. Korsgaard; Cambridge University Press

⁸⁴ “The will is thought as a capacity to determine itself to acting in conformity with the *representation of certain laws*. And such a capacity can be found only in rational being.” Ibid.

⁸⁵ Ibid; p. 36

⁸⁶ “Our actions take place in the natural world, so the question we are asking when we ask whether we could will it to be a law (Formula of Universal Law) is the same question as whether we could will it to be a law of nature.”; Guyer, Paul; 2006; *Kant*; Routledge; London and New York; p. 192

⁸⁷Guyer, Paul; 2006; *Kant*; Routledge; London and New York; p. 192

⁸⁸ Ibid; p. 192

⁸⁹“Everything in nature works in accordance with laws. Only a rational being has the capacity to act *in accordance with the representation* of laws, that is, in accordance with principles, or has a *will*.”; ibid; p. 24

⁹⁰ Since *reason* is required for the derivation of actions from the laws, the will is nothing other than practical reason.; ibid; p. 24

⁹¹ Kant implies very conditionally the presence of will with that of the presence of reason i.e. only a rational being as such can be said to act in accordance with the and can be claimed to have a will. “Only a rational being has the capacity to act *in accordance with the representations* of laws, that is, in accordance with principles, or has a *will*.” ibid.

⁹² “...if reason solely by itself does not adequately determine the will; if the will is exposed also to subjective conditions (certain incentives) that are not always in accord with the objective ones; in a word, if the will is not *in itself* in conformity with reason(as is actually the case with human beings), then actions that are cognized as objectively necessary are subjectively contingent, and the determination of such a will in conformity with objective laws is *necessitation*: that is to say, the relation of objective laws to a will that is not thoroughly good is represented as the determination of the will of a rational being through grounds of reason, indeed, but grounds of which this will is not by its nature necessarily obedient.” Ibid.

⁹³“Everything in nature works in accordance with laws. Only a rational being has the capacity to act *in accordance with the representation* of laws, that is, in accordance with principles, or has a *will*.” Ibid.

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⁹⁶ “...if reason solely by itself does not adequately determine the will; if the will is exposed also to subjective conditions (certain incentives) that are not always in accord with the objective ones; in a word, if the will is not *in itself* in conformity with reason(as is actually the case with human beings), then actions that are cognized as objectively necessary are subjectively contingent, and the determination of such a will in conformity with objective laws is *necessitation*: that is to say, the relation of objective laws to a will that is not thoroughly good is represented as the determination of the will of a rational being through grounds of reason, indeed, but grounds of which this will is not by its nature necessarily obedient.” Ibid.

⁹⁷Ibid; p. 36

⁹⁸Thilly, Frank; 2001; **A History of Philosophy**, Central Publishing House, Allahabad; p. 441

⁹⁹ ibid

¹⁰⁰ “The highest good, in other words, is the state of affairs that would under ideal circumstances result from the establishment of the realms: it would be the state in which all were happy because their ends were fulfilled in the name of morality.”; Guyer, Paul; 2006; **Kant**; Routledge; London and New York; p. 231

¹⁰¹Ibid; p. 211

¹⁰² “...as he (Kant) puts it in the ‘Canon of Pure Reason’ in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, his first discussion of the postulates, “the ideal of the highest good” is the “ultimate end of pure reason”. p.230; Guyer; ibid.

¹⁰³ “In particular, God turns out to be the “highest original good” from which the “highest derived good,” the happiness of all as a result of the morality of all, is derived...”; Guyer, Paul; 2006; **Kant**; Routledge; London and New York; p. 232

¹⁰⁴Ibid; p. 231

¹⁰⁵“Since, however, this is opposed even to the usage of language, which distinguishes the *pleasant* from the *good*, the *unpleasant* from the *evil*, and requires that good and evil shall always be judged by reason, and, therefore, by concept which can be communicated to everyone, and not by mere sensation, which is limited to individual subjects and their susceptibility; and, since nevertheless, pleasure or pain cannot be connected with any idea of an object *a priori* the philosopher who thought himself obliged to make a feeling of pleasure the foundation of his practical judgments would call the *good* which is a *means* to the pleasant, and *evil*, what is a cause of unpleasantness and pain; for the judgment of the relation of means to ends certainly belongs to reason.”; Kant, Immanuel; (1997); **Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason and Other Works on The Theory of Ethics**; Thomas Kingsmill Abbott, *Tr.*, Surjeet Publications, Delhi; p. 1

¹⁰⁶Abbott Kant, Immanuel; (1997); **Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason and Other Works on The Theory of Ethics**; Thomas Kingsmill Abbott, *Tr.*, Surjeet Publications, Delhi; p. 149

¹⁰⁷Ibid; p. 157

¹⁰⁸Ibid; p. 160

¹⁰⁹Ibid.

¹¹⁰Sharma, KaushalKishor; 2002; **A Commentary on the Critique of Practical Reason**; Indus Publishing Company, New Delhi; p. 100

¹¹¹ “Now admitting that there is a principle capable in itself of determining the will, that principle will be *a priori* law of action and pure practical reason will simply form itself the motive for determining the act.”; *ibid*; p. 74

¹¹² *Ibid*; p. 101

¹¹³ “In order to understand Kant’s arguments on the subject, it is necessary to dissect the concept of the *highest good*, which is very important in his practical philosophy. In fact, Kant’s moral philosophy stands or falls with the possibility or impossibility of the concept of the *highest good*. This concept has the following characteristics according to Kant.

- a) It is not a simple, but a composite concept consisting of two heterogeneous elements (virtue and happiness).
- b) It is an *a priori* synthetic concept, since it requires a necessary connection between the two heterogeneous elements.
- c) It has both form and matter (the moral law as form and happiness as matter”); *ibid*; p.102

¹¹⁴“...if the will be determined by an object called the *highest good*, which is a composite concept involving both form and matter, it will not be determined by the moral law.”; *ibid*; p. 102

¹¹⁵ *Ibid*; p. 110

¹¹⁶ The concept of Freedom is an *a priori* condition of morality as the practical use of reason whereas the concept of God and immortality assumes the ‘objects’ of morality.

¹¹⁷Thilly, Frank; 2001; **A History of Philosophy**, Central Publishing House, Allahabad; pp. 441-442

¹¹⁸ “Human reason will never be able to discover a natural purpose by searching for mechanical causes...the only kind of purpose we know are the conscious purpose of man.”; *ibid*; p. 440

¹¹⁹ “The work begun by the Renaissance was continued in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries; the Reformation, the Thirty Years’ War, and the political and social revolution in England and in France were symptoms of the change. The great Continental systems of rationalism and English empiricism, with their various offshoots, added fuel to the flame which had produced them; and the spirit of independent inquiry slowly but surely transformed the view of life. But the new ideas had to be popularized and disseminated over large areas, and this task was performed during the eighteenth century, which has been called the century of Enlightenment: it represents the culmination of the entire intellectual movement which we have been describing. It is an age in possession of principles and world-views; full of confidence in the power of the human mind to solve its problems, it seeks to understand and to render intelligible human life – the State, religion, morality, language – and the universe at large.”; *ibid*; p. 400

¹²⁰*Ibid*.

¹²¹ “It is an age of philosophical dogmas, an age that has the courage to write books like Wolff’s *Reasonable Thoughts on God, the World, and the Soul of Man, also on All Things in General*.” Thilly, Frank; 2001; **A History of Philosophy**, Central Publishing House, Allahabad; p. 400

¹²² “The revolt against medievalism culminated in the great social and political upheaval that marked the close of the century, and the old regime gave way to a new society.”; *ibid*.; p. 401

¹²³ *Ibid*.

¹²⁴*Ibid*; p. 412

¹²⁵ “Empiricists and rationalists alike conceived genuine knowledge as universal and necessary, and nearly all of them down to Hume declared that self-evident propositions were possible in some fields.” *ibid*.

¹²⁶*Ibid*.

¹²⁷Ibid.

¹²⁸Ibid; p. 413

¹²⁹ “It was not the empiricists alone, however, who were weighing rationalism in the balance and finding it wanting; protests against its supposed pretensions and results also came from the camp of the mystics and faith-philosophers, who distrusted the deliverances of the intellect and sought in the other phases or functions of the human soul a means of stilling the longing for certainty.”; *ibid*; p. 413

¹³⁰ “What particularly provoked such anti-rationalistic outburst as these in the modern era was the mechanistic and deterministic world-view to which scientific and rationalistic thinking seemed to inevitably to lead and which degraded the individual to the role of a marionette. To many minds the unaided natural intelligence appeared to end other in a hopeless and cheerless skepticism, or in a tragic fatalism that mocked humanity’s deepest yearnings and rendered fictitious its most precious values.”; *ibid*; p. 413

¹³¹ “To the intellect’s destructive criticism of its own competence and the will’s demand for the recognition of its moral and religious views philosophy was now compelled to make some answer.”, *ibid*; p. 413

¹³²Ibid; p. 414

¹³³Ibid.

¹³⁴Habermas, Jürgen; (1971); **Knowledge and Human Interest**; Trans. Jeremy Shapiro; Boston, Beacon Press; p. 7

¹³⁵ “It is argued that one cannot at the same time take all principles as problematic. The set of presuppositions that defines the frame of reference of a given investigation should be assumed as unproblematic for the course of the investigation.” *ibid*.

¹³⁶ “The methodical...meaning of its approach would be inverted if it bound critique to conditions (that is if it allowed presuppositions) that are themselves the preconditions of the critique of knowledge without being subject to it.” p. 8; *ibid*

¹³⁷ “Because epistemology, in virtue of its claim to providing its own and the ultimate foundation, appears the heir of First Philosophy... it cannot dispense with the strategy of beginning without presuppositions. This explains how Hegel can praise Rainhold, who clearly perceived the circular character of epistemology, with rejecting the problemetic method that was to escape it.

Hegel’s argument is conclusive. It is directed against the intentions of First Philosophy.”; *ibid*.

¹³⁸Thilly, Frank; 2001; **A History of Philosophy**, Central Publishing House, Allahabad; P. 437

¹³⁹ “...our reason commands moral laws, and these moral laws are necessary. The necessity of the moral law has certain implications for God, freedom and immortality. The law tells me to act so that I will be deserving of happiness; this is a necessary practical law. Since reason commands this, it follows that I may hope for happiness. Morality and happiness are inseparably connected in Idea only.”; *ibid*; p. 441

¹⁴⁰Ibid; p. 441

¹⁴¹Ibid; p. 144

¹⁴²Ibid.

¹⁴³Habermas, Jürgen; (1992); **Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action**, Trans. Christian Lenhardt and ShierryWeber Nicholson; London, Polity; p. 195

¹⁴⁴Ibid; p. 196

¹⁴⁵Ibid; p.195

¹⁴⁶Ibid; P. 196

¹⁴⁷Thilly, Frank; 2001; **A History of Philosophy**, Central Publishing House, Allahabad; p.451

¹⁴⁸Ibid; p. 455-456.

¹⁴⁹Ibid; p. 456

¹⁵⁰Ibid.

¹⁵¹Ibid.

¹⁵²Ibid; p. 457

¹⁵³Ibid.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵⁵Thilly, Frank; 2001; **A History of Philosophy**, Central Publishing House, Allahabad; p. 478;

¹⁵⁶Ibid; p. 479

¹⁵⁷Ibid; p. 479

¹⁵⁸Thilly, Frank; 2001; **A History of Philosophy**, Central Publishing House, Allahabad; ibid.

¹⁵⁹Ibid.

¹⁶⁰“...thought and being, subject and object, form and content are one. The form of categories of thought which logic evolves are identical with the forms of reality: they have both logical and ontological, or metaphysical value.” ibid.; P. 484;

¹⁶¹“The dialectical movement is the logical self-unfolding of thought.”; ibid; p. 155

¹⁶² “Speculative or dialectical thinking...is a process that seek to do justice to moving, living, organic existence, a process in which differences are reconciled, in which distinctions are not merely made, but comprehended. The philosophical notion is an organic unity of differences, a totality of parts, a unified and yet differentiated whole.” ; ibid; p. 482

¹⁶³ “...no simple concept, not even the highest, represents the whole truth; all concepts are only partial truths; truth or knowledge is constituted by the entire system of concepts, every one of which has evolved from a basal concept.” ibid.

¹⁶⁴“There is a rational necessity in the structure of absolute thought which is reproduced in our individual thinking. Thinking evolves or develops rationally; it moves logically and dialectically. In this sense it is universal, trans-empirical, transcendental, or, as Hegel calls it, metaphysical.”; ibid; p. 482

¹⁶⁵Ibid; p. 485

¹⁶⁶ ibid.