

## **Chapter II**

### **Concept of Person in Different Schools of Indian Philosophy**

## Part- I

### 2.1 Introduction

J. N. Mohanty rightly observes that it is wrong to think that Indian Philosophy does not have concept of person, but for him, in Indian Philosophy still the concept of subject is a dominating concept, under it the concept of person is underdeveloped. Person is a psycho-physical organism which is unitarily self conscious.

As person is the most wonderful creature, it has been offering the most obstinate problem to philosophy and science. He is an integral unity of matter, life, mind, reason and spirit. That he is a psycho- physical organism which is unitarily conscious. Since, study in person requires an analysis of its constituents, which is composite of body and consciousness (*cit and acit*). All Indian philosophical schools agree with the view that body is material and constituted by atoms. Regarding consciousness different schools offer different views, except Cārvāka almost all schools regard consciousness as a quality of *Ātman*. So, study of consciousness in person to study self is essential. Simultaneously person is not an isolated creature. He is a social being, having relation with other individuals, nature and God. As ethical being only person's activities are judged according to moral principles. So activity is not only part of person, at the very same time he has to act by following moral principles of the society. Person is different from other animals for his ethical and spiritual aspects. Besides his biological needs, he has some other intellectual and spiritual needs. Since, he engages in some intellectual exercise and perform some spiritual activities, craving and searching for cosmic and divine support for his life and activities. So, person is a material, psychological, social,

ethical and religious being. The problematic of this chapter is how person, his ideals and values are understood in different philosophical traditions of India. The study of person includes the study of everything that is pertaining to him; epistemology, logic, ethics, religion and much else besides. In this chapter, my intention is to critically analyze person as a ‘psycho-physical’ organism, mechanism of knowledge and his value from the stand point of different Indian Philosophical traditions.

## **2.2 Concept of Person in *Upaniṣads***

In the *Upaniṣads* person is conceived as creation of the Lord as abode, the meeting point of their realm of activities and field of enjoyment. It is a form created out of beings of gods, and unifying principle of activities of gods. It consists of *Ātman*, mind, sense organs, organs of action and their corresponding objects. *Ātman* supervises the whole body. *Upaniṣads* make distinction between body and spirit, between person’s physical body and *Ātman*. *Ātman* is one’s real and ultimate self but body is unreal and under destruction. *Taittiriya Upaniṣad* gives a clear description of creation of person (body)- “*ātman* which is Brahman, ether (*ākāśa*) is born; from it air; from air fire; from fire water, and from water earth. From earth is born plants and from plants food is derived; and from food person is born.”<sup>1</sup>

In *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* *Ātman* is conceived as like the sun and subordinate gods become the presiding deities of mind and the senses and their objects. Thus, in *Upaniṣad* a correlation was established between person’s psychological nature and physical world outside. There is a semi-mythological narration found in *Aitareya Upaniṣad*. The *Ātman* once existed alone and wanted to create the lord of the world. He then created upper and

lower worlds, then creates a form (world person) and meditates on it. It opened the mouth, from the mouth speech came and from speech god of fire came forth. It opened nostrils and comes life (*prāna*) and from life air came forth. From the sense and mind other gods came out. The gods wanted a habited and substances. First, they were given a cow and a horse, they were not satisfied. Finally they were given person and were satisfied. Thus the senses and mind of person their corresponding objects becomes the realm of the gods of the world. Fire becomes speech and entered the mouth of person; the sun becomes sight and entered the eye; and in that way all the gods become the function of person's organs and entered him.<sup>2</sup>

But how does the *Ātman* create person? For it the *kāma* (wish, desire, or will) *kratu* (sacrifice) and *tapas* (penance) of the *Ātman* is related. The *Ātman* desired, willed, did penance and perform sacrifice, which is meant for strengthening the creativity of desire. Person is the result of the creativity of the *Ātman*.

Originally in *Upaniṣads* one supreme soul is recognized, there is no duality, everything is in that Supreme. "It is the soul, which is within all."<sup>3</sup> In *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* the soul is described "He who while dwelling in the earth, the water, the fire, in space, wind, heaven, sun, etc. is distinct from them whose body they are, who rules them, all from within, 'he is the soul, the inner guide, the immortal. He sees that is not seen, hears but is not heard, comprehends but is not comprehended, knows but is not known; there is none beside him that sees or hears or comprehends or knows."<sup>4</sup> *Ātman* is the only knower, he is the only existent, he is everything beyond Him nothing exists. That is why Śaṅkara admits only Supreme *Ātman*, everything is *Ātman* and *Ātman* is everything. This is the

pure Idealism. The *Ātman*, which alone exists and creates the universe and then entered into it as soul.<sup>5</sup>

*Upaniṣads* made a distinction between the soul imprisoned in *samsāra* and of the divine impersonated soul to discuss the condition of bondage in *samsāra*.<sup>6</sup> In *Katha Upaniṣad* we find the real distinction of Supreme and the individual soul.

Two, quaffers of the recompense for their deeds,

Yonder in the other world, entered into the pit;

Light and shadow are they called by him who knows Brahman.

(Katha-3.1)

The individual are ‘quaffer of the recompense’, have to enjoy the fruits according to their deeds. The Supreme soul is designated as the light to which the individual soul clings a mere unsubstantial shadow. In *Praṣna* it is said, “From the *Ātman* this *prāna* originates; as the shadow on a person, so it projects itself on the other” (3.3). The individual self is the *bhoktra*, the enjoyer i.e. he has to enjoy all the fruits of his presiding life. And become enjoyer from the union of the *Ātman* with the organs, personas and indriyas.<sup>7</sup> In *Svetak Upaniṣad*, verses 7-12 a description of individual self is found. Individual self is endowed with thought, self consciousness and *buddhi* (*sankalpa*, *ahaṅkāra* and *buddhi*), enjoys the fruits of its action. It is an inch in height, small as needles point, small as the ten thousand parts of the tip of a hair and it is immortal, neither male nor female but not neuter. It takes the form according to the body he chooses and became empirical reality.

After getting rid of the delusion of empirical reality, we recognized this infinitely small individual soul as identical with the infinitely great Supreme soul.<sup>8</sup>

In *Upaniṣads*, organs are regarded as effects of the Supreme *Ātman*. After creating the empirical universe as soul, He entered into it. The soul pervades the whole body. In *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* it is explained “right to the tips of the finger, he fills the body, and is hidden in it like the knife in a sheath or fire in the fuel. Therefore he is not seen, for he is divided; as breathing he is called breath, as speaking speech, as seeing eye, as hearing ear, as understanding mind; all these are only names for his effects”(Bṛh. 1.4.7.). When a person sees or desire to smell, that is the *Ātman*, the eyes or nose that serves only for space or odoure.<sup>9</sup> The *Ātman* and the organs are essentially identical from the empirical standpoint, all these are creation of it ‘from it originates breath, the mind, and all the senses.’(Mundka 2.1.3). *Chandogya Upaniṣad* (6.5) states, persons, *prāna* and speech are most subtle product of the element, food, water and heat created by *Ātman*. To the organs of the individual *Ātman* there corresponds in the universe the cosmical *Ātman*. *Aitareya Upaniṣad* (1.1-2) represent the gods *Agni*, *Vāyu*, *Aditya* etc. as originating from the mouth, nose, eyes, ears etc, of the primeval person, these then enter into the individual person as speech, smell, sight, hearing.<sup>10</sup>

Regarding the names and numbers of organs, *Upaniṣads* present different views. *Chandogya*, *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* and *Katha Upaniṣad* conceived the organ as the physical forces in person. In old texts the organs are collectively called the *prānas*, the vital breaths.<sup>11</sup> It is frequently mentioned that person, like *Prajapati* in his character as the moon consist of sixteen parts (Bṛh. 1.5.14). These sixteen organs, ( Bṛh. X.4 1.17) where the sixteen syllables of the words *loman*, *tvac asrij*, *medas*, *mamsam*, *snavan*, *asthi*,

*majja* (hair, skin, blood, sap, flesh, sinew, bones, marrow) do duty as such. In *Praśna* the sixteen parts are enumerated as (1) *prāna*, (2) *sraddha* (faith), (3-7) the five elements, (8) *indriya*, the organs of sense considered as one, (9) personas, (10) *annam*, food, (11) *viryam* (strength), (12) *tapas*, (13) *mantrah*, (14) *karman*, (15) *lokah*, (16) *nama*. “It is perhaps on this sixteen fold enumeration of the parts of a person that the later summary of the organs as the ten *indriyas* with personas and the five *prānas* depends.”<sup>12</sup>

### 2.2.1 The Subtle Body and Moral Qualification

The body can be classified into two- the primitive substance (*bhutasraya*) i.e. the subtle body and ‘the foundation of work’ (*karma-āsraya*) i.e. the moral qualification, which conditions the future life. According to *Chandogya Upaniṣad* (6.5) the organs, personas, *prānas* and speech are derived by means of food, water, heat from the ‘one being without a second’; so in a similar way at death they are again resolved into it as the supreme godhead.

In *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* (4.4.5) it is described “In truth this self is *Brahman*, consisting of knowledge, personas, life, eyes and ear, consisting of earth, water, wind and ether, consisting of fire and not of fire, of desire and not of desire of anger not of anger, of justice and not of justice, consist of all. Exactly as a person in this life consists of this or of that, exactly as he acts, exactly as he moves, so will he be born; he who does good will be born good, he who does evil will be born evil, he becomes holy by holy deeds and evil by evil.”<sup>13</sup> *Upaniṣads* conceive that the action of the soul (*karma āsraya*) accompany it in the other world and determine the formation of next life.

The gross body is the vehicle of physical organs distinguished from subtle body, which the soul abandons at death (Bṛih.4.3.36). The body is the *prānas* habitation, of which the head forms the roof, in which it is bound to the breath as posts by food as the rope. It is *Ātman* “consisting of the juice of food” *annarasamaya* in which is enclosed the *prānamaya* *Ātman*, in this again the *manomaya*, in this the *vijñānamaya*, and in this the inner most, the *ānandamaya*.<sup>14</sup> In *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* (2.5.18) and *Chandogya* (8.1.1) the body is described as the city of *Brahman* (*brahmapuram*). The body has eleven (Katha. 5.1), usually nine gates (Svet 3.18), where navel and *Brahman* orifice (*brahmarandhram*) are added.

In *Upaniṣad* the heart is given more importance than the head. In it the vital breath resides. The five *prānas*, eye, ear, speech and personas originate from the heart (*Chandogya* 3.13.1-5). Personas also reside in the heart, so it is the centre of conscious life. In sleep, the organs, and soul remain in the heart and also gathered at death (Bṛh. 4.4.1). Through the heart we recognize forms, faith, beget children, know the truth, speech is also based on it (Bṛh 3.9.21-25). Organs are not alone; they are based upon and supported by heart. It is the empirical home of Brahman. Heart is called *hridayam*, because “it is he who dwells in the heart” (Chand 8.3.3). Small as a grain of rice or barley; (Bṛih 5.6) an inch in height, the *purusha* dwells in the midst of the body, as the self of created things in the heart (Kāṭha 2.20, 4.12, 6.17).<sup>15</sup> Veins are also originated from the heart.



### 2.3 Person in Cārvāka System

Cārvāka is the only materialistic school of Indian Philosophy. We have not found any authentic text of them, doctrines are found basically in the discussion of different schools, Epics, Vedas and Upaniṣads. Our chief source is the polemic work of other schools. About Cārvāka P. T. Raju remarked “The literature of this school is very scanty. We find only one systematic work on it, Jayarasis *Tattvaplavasimha* (The Lion that Devours all Categories) of the seventh century AD, which shows that no category (*tattva*) can be proved to be real, that nothing can be real except what we see with our senses, and that therefore that person does is justified.”<sup>16</sup>

Regarding the construction of person Cārvāka accepts only existence of body, totally denied the self. Body is the combination of the earth, water, fire and air- the four ultimate principles. These are eternal and can explain the development of world. There is no eternal self behind the physical body. Consciousness is the byproduct of matter, for its residence there is no need to assume a non-material object self or *Ātman*. Intelligence is the modification of the four elements. ‘that intelligence which is found to be embodied in modified forms of the non-intelligent element is produced in the same way in which the red colour is produced from the combination of betel, areca nut, and lime.’<sup>17</sup> For Cārvāka so-called self is nothing but a mind body complex qualified by consciousness. Consciousness is an emergent quality of the physical parts coming together in certain proportion. In general ‘we say that ‘I have a tall body, handsome body, if I is not different from the body, how can we say it? Cārvāka replied that the use of ‘have’ in the expression is only conventional created by the false notion that I is different from the body.’<sup>18</sup> Apart from our body no one sees the self. Consciousness is invariably found in

connection with the body. The life of individual exist, so long as the mind body complex is exists, end of life means no consciousness. After death nothing remains and the question of rebirth is meaningless on the basis of self.

Cārvāka conceives mind as consciousness in its knowing function, which is not separate from the body. Mind is conscious in its experiencing function it knows the external world through the senses. Cārvāka accepts only sense perception as a valid source of knowledge and rejects both inference and verbal testimony. They reject inference because in inference the major premise cannot be proved. Verbal testimony is not reliable source of knowledge, even Vedas are self contradictory.

## **2.4 Concept of Person in Jainism**

Jainism accepts mainly two categories ‘*jiva*’ or soul and ‘*ajiva*’ or matter. *Ātman* or soul is the *jiva* in its pure states and *ajiva* is the *jiva* in its impure state. The *jiva* bound by karma constitutes person. So, person is the *jiva* bound by matter and assuming the gross physical body. Performing both good and evil action, the *jiva* goes from birth to birth, assuming various forms limiting itself to the bodies of those forms. P. T. Raju remarked, according to Jainism, the five causes, false knowledge (*mithyādarśana*), incontinence (*avirati*) person. He is the *jiva* full of karmic matter. He has a mind, the five senses, and organs of action.<sup>19</sup>

According to Jainism, physical body is composed of matter or *pudgala*. *Pudgala* has two states, *paramānu* or atom and *skandha* or aggregates of atoms. *Paramānus* are discrete or uncombined reality, while *skandhas* are composite reality of similar nature of atoms. *Skandhas* are perceptible and *paramānus* are transcended sense experience. The physical

world and every perceptible object is a *skandha*. Body, sense organs, mind, object, *prāna*, *aprāna* etc. are all effect of *pudgala*.<sup>20</sup>

Physical body has two forms- subtle and gross. Gross body is formed by the gross material, which is perceptible by ordinary people. It constitutes nourished matter and destroyed at the time of death. The subtle body formed by the *karma pudgala*, which is called *karma śarira*, is imperceptible by ordinary people. It exists with the self even after death and forms a new gross body in the next birth. When the self attains liberation the subtle body is destroyed. Jainism accepts five kinds of bodies (1) *audārika*, the material body, (2) *vaikriyika*-the fluid body, (3) *āhāraka*- the body composed of *suddha* or pure *pudgala* (4) *tejas*- the body composed of subtle *pudgala* endowed with the quality of heat and (5) *karmana*- the subtle body made of five *karmic* matters.<sup>21</sup>

Jainism holds that self is real, which is pure, free, perfect and divine and is endowed with *anantacatusaya* i.e. four infinite qualities, infinite knowledge, infinite vision, infinite bliss and infinite power (BDS 15). But this real nature of self is obscured and enveloped by the *karmic paramānus* or atoms, which are attracted by own *karmas* and are absorbed into its body. It makes the self impure and its four infinite attributes become finite. This is the state of *jiva* in bondage, because of ignorance. Again when the self through proper spiritual practice and right conduct, stop entrance of fresh *karma* atoms (*samvara*) and wash out the *karma* particles already absorbed into its body (*nirjarā*), it understands its infinite qualities. This is the state of liberation.

According to Jainism consciousness is both essence and the quality of self. Self and consciousness are both identical and different from each other. If the self is not of nature

of consciousness, as held by *Naiyāyikas*, knowledge could not arise. In all *jivas* the consciousness exists, but in lower organism this consciousness is latent or implicit, while in person it is generally explicit.<sup>22</sup> Consciousness revealed as *jñāna* or knowledge and *daršana* or vision, which are jointly called *upayoga*. *Upayoga* essentially exists in all selves and does not exist in other category. Because of *upayoga* we differentiate self from other categories.

Three states of the self are accepted by Jainas, namely *bahirātmana*, *antrātmana* and *paramātmana* or *siddha*. *Bahirātmana* is the bodily self, which identifies itself with senses, the body and other external belongings through ignorance. For it sensual or worldly pleasure is the highest thing to be achieved. The *antarātmana* does not identify with external belongings; it acquires discriminative knowledge and realizes that the self is the highest thing to be attained. *Paramātman* is pure and perfect, totally free from the influence of *karma*. It is the Supreme self, the end of spiritual endeavor, endowed with the pure and perfect knowledge.

The self is endowed with *prānas* or life-powers, which are of two types- *bhāva-prāna* and *dravya-prāna*. *Bhava-prāna* is concerned with consciousness or *cit* and those concerned with *pudgala* is called *dravya-prānas*. When both *bhāva-prāna* and *davya-prāna* are maintained continuously without any interruption in all the three points of time, then the *jiva* is called ‘*samsārin*’ or bound. The liberated *jiva* maintains only the *bhāva-prāna*, *jñāna*, *daršana* and *sukha* etc. (SDS-52).

During the worldly life the self co-existed with the body. The relation between the self and body is one of identity-cum-difference. They are identical, since the self experience

the pain and pleasure of the body; they are different as the self is not destroyed with the destruction of body. The self is many, since it is different in every individual (VTP 50-51). If the self is one, as Advaitins maintain there would not be happiness, sorrow, bondage, liberation etc. So for Jainism selves are many, different from one another. Even in liberation also, they do not lose their identity.

In the act and progress the *jiva* or self is free and self-guided. Jainism does not postulate any God or *Isvara* to control the activity of self. In their view, a living being goes on by itself, and in this journey of life, the guiding principle is the law of karma. It is the self's own karma, that determines its life and lead to bondage and liberation. When the self intermix its part with the *karmic* particles by its *karma*, it becomes bondage. And when these *karma* particles stop to enter into the self (*samvara*), and destroy that have already entered the self (*nirjarā*), by its right karma and practices, it becomes liberated. Thus, K.P. Sinha rightly remarked that “the performance of *karma*, the relation between the self and fruits of *karma*, liberation from the effect of *karma*- all these are to be explained only with reference to the nature and activities of the self.”<sup>23</sup>

#### **2.4.1 Knowledge in Jainism**

Jainas maintain that consciousness is both essence and quality of self. Self can get knowledge from two ways- knowledge having form (*sākāra-jñāna*) and knowledge without having form (*nirākāra-jñāna*). First one is called ‘*jñāna*’ and second one is called ‘*darśana*’. In *jñāna* consciousness takes the form of object and in *darśana* consciousness does not take any form. Knowledge of external object is *jñāna* and self's internal action or self consciousness to know external object is *darśana*. *Jñāna* is like

what *Naiyāyikas* called *nirvikalpa-jñāna* and *darṣana* is like *savikalpa-jñāna*. Consciousness reveals itself and the object in all its acts of cognition. But it has the original power to reveal the objects directly without the help of mind and senses.<sup>24</sup> Accordingly Jainas accept two kinds of knowledge, immediate knowledge and mediate knowledge. Immediate knowledge is direct knowledge, which is obtained directly by the consciousness of the *Ātman*. It is three kinds, namely *Avadhi*, *Manahpariyāya* and *Kevala*. *Avadhi* is directly derived by the self, without the instrumentality of the mind and sense organs. One can attain this kind of knowledge, when one partly succeeds in destroying the impurities of action. It is produced by right vision and has for its object only special and limited material substances having form and colour. *Manahpariyāya* is the clear and definite knowledge of the thought past, present and future of another mind, which is produced by the removal of all obstruction of knowledge by right discipline and conduct. When a person gets rid of hatred, jealousy, etc., he rises to this stage, and entering the minds of others, can know all they contain (TB-1.20). *Kevala jñāna* is the highest kind of knowledge and without error. It is the direct, pure, unalloyed and unlimited knowledge of all the objects of the world with all their modification. When a person gets rid of all action and its impurities through practice of right conduct, he becomes *Kevalin* and his knowledge is called *Kevala-jñāna* (TB 1.21).

Mediate knowledge is obtained through the medium of senses and mind. It has two varieties- *mati* and *sṛuta*. *Mati* is sensual and mental knowledge, which is obtained through the five sense organs and through the mind. It has four sub-divisions- *avagraha* (sensation), *iha* (desire to know or attention), *avaya* (determination) and *dharanā*

(retention). *Śruta-jñāna* is acquired either from the words of an *apta* or seer of truth, or acquired from the scriptures written by the most perfect and omniscient person.

K. P. Sinha mentioned that from the logical tradition Siddhisena, Divākara, Mānikayanandi and others have divided knowledge into two kinds- *pratyaksa* and *paroksa*. *Pratyaksa* is obtained through the direct contact of the sense organs and object and *paroksa* is indirect knowledge. *Pratyaksa* can be explained from the two points of view- *Vyavahārika* and *Pāramarthika*. *Vyavahārika pratyaksa* is the correct, uncontradicted and clear knowledge of the common people about object in space-point. It is two folds, *indriyaja* –that arising from the sense organs and *anindriyaja*- that arising from the mind. *Bāhya* are sub-divided into two; *mati* and *sruta*. *Pāramarthika* is a knowledge which is directly acquired by the self. It is two folds; *vikala* or partial and *sakala* or complete. *Avadhi* and *manahparyāya* are *vikala*, while *kevala* is *sakala* (PNT-24. TB-1.4.5). The *paroksa* or indirect knowledge is subdivided by *Mānikayanandi* and *Devasuri* into memory (*smṛti*) recognition (*pratyabhijñā*), argumentation (*tarka*), inference (*anumāna*) and verbal testimony (*śabda*) (PNT-3.2, TB-1.24).<sup>25</sup>

## **2.5 Concept of Person in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Philosophy**

Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika admits person as a combination of physical body, soul and mind. According to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the self is permanent (*sthira*), substance (*dravya*) and immaterial. Consciousness is its quality, but not essential and inseparable quality; it is only accidental and adventitious quality. The existence of *Ātman* is self-evident, it exists without consciousness and contact with mind. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika holds that without *Ātman* desire, aversion, volition, knowledge, ethical responsibility, etc. cannot be

explained. In contrast to Cārvākas they are of the opinion that it is not the body, sense, mind, and the stream of consciousness that can know, desire and enjoy.<sup>26</sup> It is the *Ātman* that controls and guides the mind, senses and the process of consciousness. God is the Supreme *Ātman* (*Pramātmāna*) and consciousness is its inseparable quality.

For it they put forward several arguments. In our desire, aversion and volition we find something pleasant, pain and harmful, and accordingly we remember it later. Thus desire, aversion and volition however always involve memory. ‘For different being the fact is that what is seen by one is not remembered by another. Thus one who rejects the self cannot account for this (remembrance). Hence it follows that the self exist.(NSB 1.1.10). ‘The point of Gotama and Vatsyāyana is that whenever an internal state involves memory, it becomes a legitimate ground for inferring the permanence of the self. It is the self that organizes experience, originates action for acquiring something beneficial and avoiding something harmful, and account for our identity as person. All of this requires memories, from which the self is inferred.’<sup>27</sup>Naiyāyikas hold that the qualities like desire, volition etc. must be supported by substance, and this substance is the self. It can be proved by the inference called ‘known through the universal’ (*sāmanyatodrsta*) (NSB 1.1.5).

Physical body is a group of atoms brought together by the latent karma. It is unconscious (*acetana*), so is not the enjoyer (*bhoktā*). In the Nyāya view body is the receptacle (*āyatana*) of worldly enjoyment (*bhoga*). The self is substratum of consciousness and the enjoyer. For enjoyment the self must be associated with body. To alive the body, the self must be associated with it. Without self body becomes dead and without body, the self is unconscious and devoid of all enjoyment. The self and body must be together in order to



have a living body in the ordinary sense.<sup>28</sup> The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika holds that a living body is a necessary condition for the origin of conscious state. Although the self is a spiritual substance, it can exist devoid of all consciousness.

Mind or inner sense is also substance and atomic in size. It is imperceptible but is inferred to account for the direct awareness of internal states like pleasure. It is an indispensable instrument like external sense organs. Inner sense is unconscious, by the contact with *Ātman*, consciousness is produced in it. It is sixth sense and pleasure, pain and emotion are its special qualities. But it is not the cognizer and owner of the internal states. Internal states belong only to the self.

Mainly two arguments are given by Naiyāyikas for the existence of inner sense. Generally we think that we have more than one sensation at the same time e.g. watching TV by taking tea. The sensation of perceiving seems to go with the sensation of tasting and the like and this show that such sensations are simultaneous. But Nyāya claims that there is a small temporal gap, between different sensations. We do not often notice more than one thing at a time, in spite of that more than one external sense being activated at the same time. So Gotama inferred that there is an inner unperceived sense organ that also needs to be activated for any cognition (NS-1.1.19). The main point in admitting the inner sense is that we have internal perception. These perceptions are produced without the involvement of the external senses. For these kinds of perception we require an instrument, the inner sense is inferred as the instrument of internal perception (NSB 3.1.16).<sup>29</sup>

As cognition is a quale of inner sense, so it is conscious knower. The difference between self and the inner self is that ‘knower is the controller’, the instrument is the controlled (NSB 3.1.19). Vatsyāyana argued that only a conscious entity can be the controller. The inner sense, being an instrument, is not conscious and not the controller.

Self is different from the external sense organs. Our bodily characters like fatness, tallness, fairness etc. we generally attribute to the self. So we call self is identical with body. But we say my body, my eyes, which support the idea that self is different from the body, eye and so on. According to Gotama, same thing may be cognized through seeing and touching (NS 3.1.1), but each organ is clearly indispensable for each perception, as each organ is restricted to its own objects. So there must be a witness to synthesize the two perceptions. Such synthesizer must be different from each of the external senses and is called the self.

### **2.5.1 Knowledge in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika**

Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika admit existence of objects independent of mind. “Nyāya offers an antiskeptical argument regarding knowledge. The aim is not to show that some arguments are reliable but to show that there are some cognitions that cannot be false or doubtful. A cognition in the Nyāya view is false, if what is featured as the qualifier (*prakāra*) as absent in the qualificand (*visesya*).”<sup>30</sup> Valid knowledge can be ascertained by the valid sources of knowledge. They accept four valid sources of knowledge namely; perception, inference, comparison and verbal testimony. Here I deal basically with perception.

In the process of knowledge the object of the knowledge is very important. According to P.T. Raju, Gotama divided it into twelve kinds *Ātman*, body, senses, object of senses, consciousness (*budhi*), mind (*personas*) action (*karma*), impurity (*dosa*), rebirth the fruits of action (*phala*), pain (*dukha*) and liberation.<sup>31</sup> Unlike Sāṅkhya-Yoga and Vedānta, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika do not conceive *buddhi* as reason, it is only an adventitious consciousness that arises like spark or light, that mind comes into contact with *Ātman*. Through senses mind obtains impression of the object and with the contact of *Ātman* produces consciousness.

Perception is the direct knowledge, which arises from the contact of senses with objects. Nyāya holds that it is always of the form of ‘That is a pot’. In the process of perception mind synthesizes all sense perceptions. ‘The eye sees the shape and colour; touch informs us about the hardness of the pot; the ear tells us of its sound. The mind collects all these impression and carries them to the *Ātman*. As soon as mind comes into contact with the *Ātman*, consciousness arise in the *Ātman*, and the object is known as ‘That is a pot’ or that is an object characterized by the universal potness.’<sup>32</sup> Mind is atomic in size, so it has infinite speed to synthesize all the impressions together, then we are able to grasp the object as a single unitary entity. The consciousness is produced in *Ātman* after its contact with mind. So consciousness is adventitious quality of *Ātman*.

Two stages of perception are accepted by Naiyāyikas: indeterminate and determinate. “The knowledge of a thing without any attribute is known as indeterminate apprehension; such as this is something. Attributed knowledge is determinate apprehension” (TS IV 32) such as ‘That is a pot’. In determinate perception the distinction and relation between a qualificand (*viśeṣya*) and a qualifier (*viśeṣana*) is

cognized and something is cognized as something. Here knowledge identifies the qualities in the substance, e.g. cognizing a rose as a red rose. When cognition is without any qualifier (*nisapakāraka*), it is indeterminate. Here the relation between the qualificand and the qualifier is not cognized and no definite knowledge is produced. It is mere acquaintance with something with which there is sensory connection. Since it is devoid of any qualifier, it cannot be false or doubtful. This opens up the possibility that there are other cases of cognition too that are not false or doubtful (NS 2.1.13).<sup>33</sup>

Nyāya analyses two kinds of perception; ordinary (*laukika*) and extra ordinary (*alaukika*). In ordinary perception the senses directly come in contact with object, then with mind and *Ātman*. It is two folds: *bāhya* (external) and *mānasa* (internal). As sixth organ, like other organs mind also has special objects like desire (*icchā*), aversion (*dveṣa*), effort (*prayanta*), pleasure (*sukha*), pain (*duhkha*) etc. Mind directly comes in contact with these objects and produces consciousness to *Ātman*. Without usual sense contact with object, Nyāya recognized three kinds of extra ordinary perception, with peculiar kind of contact. The first one is *Sāmānyalakṣana* (universal) perception. When we perceive a pot, we perceive universal *potness* there, mind come into contact with that universal. It is because, according to Nyāya, universal is connected with all individuals. Thus, though we cannot perceive all pots, we perceive the universal ‘potness’ in that particular pot.

The second kind is *Jñānalakṣana* perception, it is a contemplative perception. By looking a piece of ice, we say ‘it is cold’, even without touching it. But, how can be coolness seen? This kind of cognition is due to association of perceptions in our mind. Here the object is not directly presented to a sense organ, but is revived in memory

through the past cognition of it, and is perceived through representation. The third kind of extra ordinary perception is *Yogaja* perception. It is an intuitive and immediate perception, without the limits of time, distance and size. It is acquired by *Yogins* through the power of meditation. It is self knowledge.

## **2.6 Concept of Person in Sāṅkhya-Yoga School**

In Sāṅkhya philosophy the status of person is noteworthy, as they attempt to understand the external world from the standpoint of inner being of person, because even the external world is a being for the consciousness of person. In contrast to the scientific explanation of evolution, Sāṅkhya claims that the physical things evolve from the consciousness. For Sāṅkhya person is important for the experience of the independent objective world, because it is only possible by the consciousness of the person. P. T. Raju remarks “Person is more certain of his own conscious existence, although he may not be clear about exactly what it is- than of anything else. And for a philosophy of life the stand point of inner being of person is more important than that of the external world.”<sup>34</sup>

According to Sāṅkhya, person is a combination of *purusa* (*Ātman*), *antahkarana* (internal organs), and *bāhyakarana* (external organ). Reason (*budhi*), ego (*ahaṅkāra*) and mind (*manas*) together constitute internal organs (*antahkarana*), and five sense organs and the five organs of action together are called *bāhyakarana*.

### **2.6.1 Knowledge in Sāṅkhya-Yoga**

Sāṅkhya and Yoga school accept three sources of knowledge; perception, inference and testimony. Here I basically deal with perception among them, as it is directly related with

the physical and mental states of person. Sāṅkhya School propounds an image-theory (*sākāravāda*) of perception. What we perceive are mental modification (*vṛtti*), the image that is imprinted by the perception of external object. *Sāṅkhyakārikā* defines perception as the ascertainment of each respective object by the senses (S.kā-5). The object may be gross or subtle, former are the objects of our perception, while later are perceived by *Yogins* (S.kā-34). So for the perception, there must be an intercourse of sense organs with objects, then with mind and ego, and the *buddhi* or intellect operates on it.

In the process of perception involves the operation of the external organs, the mind, the egoistic principle (*ahaṅkāra*), and the intellect. External sense organs receive impressions from the objects and pass over to the mind. Mind reflects upon it and gives it over to *ahaṅkāra*, which appropriates this and presents to the *buddhi* or intellect. *Buddhi* ascertains the object to know.

Sāṅkhya believes that sense organs are the static, modifications of *ahaṅkāra*, to receive an immediate impression of the object is their main function (S.kā-28). The sense-organs come in contact with the objects and are modified into the shape of the objects as they are.

Mind is admitted by the Sāṅkhya as the sensory organ as well as the motor organ. Discernment is its special characteristics. The sensory organs only take a vague impression of the object, as a homogeneous unit. The mind there upon reflects 'it is such and such, not that' and thus assimilates it to similar objects and discriminate it from dissimilar ones.'<sup>35</sup> Then the *ahaṅkāra* appropriates the indeterminate impression produced by sense organs and is apprehended by mind. The special function of *ahaṅkāra*

is self-appropriation. When mind appropriated the impression the *buddhi* ascertains its duty. This is called *adhyavasāya* (S.kā -23).

## 2.7 Person in Mimāmsā Philosophy

Mimāmsā deals with the *Karmakānda* (*Mantra* and *Brāhman* portion) of Vedas and is called *Pūrva-Mimāmsā* and also *Karma-Mimāmsā*. Mimāmsā regards Vedas as eternal and authorless and of infallible authority. The aim of Mimāmsā is to supply the principles according to which the Vedic texts are to be interpreted and to provide philosophical justification for the views contained therein.<sup>36</sup> Jaimini is the founder of Mimāmsā School who wrote *Mimāmsā-sūtra*. Shabarasvāmi, Shāliknātha and Parthasārathi Mishra were prominent philosophers of this school. Other two well known philosophers of Mimāmsā are Kumārila Bhatta and Prabhākara who formed the principal schools of Mimāmsā named after them.

Mimāmsā holds that person is a combination of body, mind and *Ātman*. Like Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika they admit that physical body of person is a group of atoms brought together by the latent karma. Mind is atomic. Body is the vehicle of enjoyment (*bhogāyatana*). The self through senses enjoy the internal feelings and external things (*bhogaviṣaya*). So senses are the instruments of enjoyment (*bhogasādhana*).

Mimāmsā admits self as eternal (*nitya*), omnipresent (*sarvagata*), ubiquitous (*vibhu*), infinite (*vyāpaka*), substance (*dravya*), which is the substratum (*āshraya*) of consciousness and which is a real knower (*jñāta*), enjoyer (*bhoktā*) and agent (*kartā*).<sup>37</sup> It is different from body, senses, understanding and mind. The soul suffers change, but all the changes the soul endures. It undergoes modification which is its eternal character.

Cognition is the activity of the soul.<sup>38</sup> Soul is not atomic because it apprehends changes in different parts of the body. It pervades the whole body and directs it. The energy of the soul causes the movement of the body. Admitting plurality of soul, Mimāmsā holds that there are many souls, one in each body.

Like Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Prabhākara maintains that consciousness is not essential quality of self, it is only its accidental quality. Self is always subject, the agent of action and the knower in knowledge and is capable of inner self-transformation. It knows itself only when acting and when knowing an object. Cognition, feeling and volition are the properties of the self and arise due to merit and demerit. In *Ātman* consciousness arises after arising of knowledge, which is produced after mind comes into contact with *Ātman* by bringing some information of external world. In *Ātman* reside all the actions in their potential state (merit or demerit). And they produce the consequences even without the knowledge of the *Ātman*. They constitute unconscious will of the *Ātman*, an unconscious force residing in it.<sup>39</sup>

Kumārila differs from Prabhākara who maintains that *Ātman* is the object of I consciousness. Consciousness is the modal change (*parināma*), it is mode, an act, the process of the self by which the *Ātman* cognizes the objects. For Kumārila it is not accidental quality and at the same time essential quality. “Kumarila like Jainas regards self as identical as well as different, changeless as well as changing. As substance it does not change and always remain the same.”<sup>40</sup> Self is not wholly unconscious, it is conscious-unconscious (*jadabodātmaka or chidachidrūpa*). Potential consciousness is the nature of the self (*Jñānashaktisvabhāva*).



Both Kumārila and Prabhākara admit that the self remains as a pure substance divested of all its qualities including consciousness and bliss by the exhaustion of merit and demerit. Kumārila adds that the self then, as in deep sleep, is characterized by potential consciousness.

Kumārila rejects Buddhist concept that the self is a series of ideas, the first idea and the last in the series, from performance to result, the ideas must have a common substratum. “There must therefore be something which processes the potentiality of ideas is eternal and capable of transmigration. This need is furnished by the soul which is immaterial and omnipresent and thus without motion, is able to connect itself with one body after another.”<sup>41</sup>The soul is essentially active. According to Kumarila, soul directs the body to perform action, the act done in each life determines the character of the body to be attained in the next.

Mind is the mediator between the eternal and omnipresent soul and the world. Though soul is eternal, its knowledge is not eternal. The contact of mind with soul is the essential condition for its consciousness in all its forms. Mind is atomic and has the capacity of extremely rapid motion and exists in body. The soul through mind comes into contact with the outer world by means of sense organs and appreciates the outer world. Pleasure pain desire, aversion and effort are the qualities of mind which are directly conveyed to soul.

### **2.7.1 Knowledge in Mimāmsā**

According to Prabhākara, the *Ātman* is unconscious in itself and knowledge produced when mind (*manas*) comes into contact with it. The *Ātman* by itself does not have any

knowledge without contact with mind. But Kumārila argues that even without contact with mind the self has the potency to become conscious and know that objects. For Prabhākara mind is atomic, it instantaneously runs from sense to sense and combines their sensations into a unity. When we perceive something, it produces different sensations to senses and the mind collects and unites all that sensations into one idea and sends to *Ātman* which cognizes it as an object. But Kumārila differs from Prabhākara, maintains that mind is all pervading and so it can receive the sensations simultaneously.

According to Prabhākara, knowledge is self-luminous (*Svapprakāṣa*), it manifests itself. Knowledge has three factors- the object known, the knowing subject and knowledge. Thus Prabhākara theory of knowledge is known as *Tripurī-vāda*. And every act of knowledge the *jñātā*, *jñeya* and *jñāna* are revealed simultaneously. The subject and the object both are manifested by knowledge itself simultaneously with its own manifestation.<sup>42</sup> For its revelation knowledge does not need any other knowledge.

Kumārila does not regard knowledge as self-luminous. It cannot be known directly and immediately, but through an inference. Cognition according to Kumārila confers on the object cognized the attribute of cognizedness (*jñātata*). Through this attribute the presence of object is inferred. Cognition relates the self to the object and enables it to know the object.

In knowledge objective consciousness is produced in the self. There are four elements in the process of knowledge-(a) the knower (*jñātā*), (b) the object of knowledge (*jñeya*), (c) the instrument of knowledge (*jñāna*, *kāraṇa*), (d) the result of the knowledge or cognisedness of the object (*jñātata*). In the act of cognition, certain relationship between

perceivers and perceived are present which involve some activities of perceiver. “The cognition is inferred from the relation between the knower and the known, which is apprehended by internal perception (*māna pratyakṣa*).”<sup>43</sup>

Mimāṃsā advocates intrinsic validity of truth (*Svataḥprāmāṇyavāda*), all apprehensions (*anubhūti*) are intrinsically valid. Criticizing Nyāya view, Kumārila argues that if apprehensions were not in itself valid, it could not be made so by any external power. “Apprehension needs indeed an originating cause, but it does not depend on any external cause, for its power of ascertaining the true nature of things.”<sup>44</sup> For Kumārila there is no single primary truth. All apprehensions are *prima facie* valid, cognitions become erroneous or invalid due to defect in their cause. Like Naiyāyikas Kumārila is of the opinion that non-apprehension is due to the absence of any cause. Prabhākara also maintain the intrinsic validity of truth, like Kumārila, but explains erroneous cognition in different way.

Kumārila says, the validity of knowledge consist in apprehending an object, it is set aside by such discrepancies as its disagreement with the real nature of the object. According to Prabhākara, “all cognition as cognition is valid; their invalidity is due to their disagreement with the real nature of their object. All knowledge is presumably valid, and its invalidity is inferred from a subsequent contradicting knowledge.”<sup>45</sup> The Mimāṃsākas, both in respect, origin (*utpatti*) and ascertainment (*jñapti*) admit the self validity of knowledge.

## 2.8 Person in Vedānta Philosophy

According to Śāṅkara, *Brahman* is the only reality (*Pāramārthikasattā*) from the transcendental view point. The world and *jīva* have only empirical reality (*Vyāvahārikasattā*). Since as an individual being man has only empirical reality. *Ātman* in man is not identical with *Brahman* but same as *Brahman*. “The *Ātman* is the same as the Brahman as involved in the mind, the senses and the physical body, and the Brahman is the same as the *Ātman* without the involvement.”<sup>46</sup> *Ātman* is different from the *jīva*.

Person is constituted by the physical body, *jīva* and *ātman*. *Jīva* is the ethical soul or personality which transmigrates from birth to birth. It has several parts. “They are the causal body, apperceptive reason (*citta*), decision making reason (*buddhi*), ego (*ahankāra*), mind (*manas*) the five senses and five organs of action.”<sup>47</sup> The *jīva* has three states and three bodies. It is unconscious by itself. The *jīva* becomes conscious due to the presence of *ātman*. Pleasure and pain are not directly experienced by *ātman*, it is the *jīva* that experiences them. The *ātman* is the only onlooker (*sākṣi*) of the experience of the *jīva*.

The self is eternal, immutable and complete . “The self is prior to stream of consciousness, prior to truth and falsehood, prior to reality and illusion.”<sup>48</sup> The existence of understanding presupposes intelligent knower, it is the self. The empirical existence I/Me, gross body, vital breath, the senses and the internal organs depend on the relation of *Ātman*.

We do not know the nature of self even there is no doubt about its existence, whether it is finite or infinite, knowledge or bliss, one or many, a mere witness or enjoyer. So

according to Śaṅkara, it is both known and unknown. The self is different from the body, senses, internal organs and self consciousness.

Essential nature of self is self-luminosity (S.B. i.3.22). It is pure consciousness (*caitanya*) and mere awareness. It transcends differentiation of knower, knowledge and known. It is the nature of non objective consciousness. Intelligence is its exclusive nature. It is also of the nature of bliss (*ānanda*).

Activity is not the nature of self. *Ātman* by itself has no agency. Śaṅkara attributes to *Ātman* truth on dependence on its own greatness, omnipresence and the character of being the self of all. He regards the *Ātman* as one universe and infinite. The *Ātman* of Śaṅkara is neither the individual self nor a collection of such selves. “It is true however, that the empirical self is the only reality from the logical point of view and the pure self but a shadow.”<sup>49</sup> But when one have true knowledge about self, then all subject-object duality merged and we realize the truth of ultimate consciousness. There is no plurality. It is as much in one as in another.

### **2.8.1 Knowledge in Vedānta Philosophy**

According to Śaṅkara knowledge is possible through the self. Cognition results from the conjunction of the self, the internal organs (*antaḥkarana*, *manas*, *buddhi*, *vijñāna* and *citta*), the sense organs and the objects.

Śaṅkara argues that in ordinary experience man fails to distinguish knowledge and error because of ignorance (*avidyā*) (VS i). Man is unable to discriminate subject (*viṣayin*) and the object (*viṣya*), ascribes the quality to other and produces superimposition (*adhyāsa*). This kind of superimpositions says Śaṅkara, learned man considers to be ignorance

(*avidyā*) and ascertainment of the true nature of an object by discrimination they called knowledge (*vidyā*).

Knowledge without the notion of subject I cannot be possible, for it there must be an erroneous notion that sense of ‘I’ and ‘mine’ belongs to the body and the senses, etc. For sense cognition the operation of senses is required, and without a substratum (*adhithānam antareṇa*) the senses cannot act. Since self becomes the knowing subject, without which there is no scope for the operation for the means of knowledge. So far, for the knowledge ignorance is important.

The author of *Vedānta Paribhāsa* defines perception as simply consciousness. According to Advaita Vedānta, except consciousness nothing is perceived without mediation. “Therefore, in the strictest sense, according to *Advaita*, consciousness alone is experience, although in a less rigorous sense objects of consciousness are also experienced.”<sup>50</sup>

For Advaitins consciousness is the omnipresent reality and all appearances are superimposed. The perception of empirical object is same consciousness only as it is limited or ‘conditioned’ by the object. The inner sense which is a limitation of consciousness goes out to that object and achieves a formal identity with object.

Consciousness as limited by the inner sense and as assuming the form of the object is called by the *Advaitins* as ‘*Vṛtti*’ (mental mode).<sup>51</sup> The mental mode perceives the veil of ignorance, without it perception of object is not possible. The pure consciousness cannot perceive external objects directly, external object is perceived by the function of psycho-

physical organism. In order to directly perceive the object the *vr̥tti* does not need another *vr̥tti*.

Pure consciousness in the Advaita sense is self manifestation, self awareness, which is beyond the distinction between subject and object. All others external objects or *anubhava* is manifested by the pure consciousness, which is called by the Advaitins as witness-consciousness (*Sākṣin*). “The witness-consciousness manifests an eternal object only when there is an appropriate *vr̥tti* to remove its concealment.”<sup>52</sup>

The Advaitins do not consider the pleasure and pain as *vr̥tti*. They argue that there is no pleasure and pain which is not immediately evident to whoever has them. They are not concealed by ignorance. Though their manifestation is not like self manifestation, the *vr̥ttis* rather are manifested by the witness consciousness directly.

For Śaṅkara all *pramānas* culminated in *anubhava* or experience. *Anubhava* in narrow sense, argues Śaṅkara, is *aparokṣa jñāna*, meaning that this knowledge must be direct and immediate i.e. it must be *sākṣātkāra*. ‘Experience is an interplay of knowledge and ignorance’.

In cognition Advaitins argue that when an object is cognized the object is not only thing that is manifested; cognition of an object accompanied by an immediate self awareness of the cognition. It is called by them as witness consciousness (*sākṣin*), which is not only consciousness of knowing an object, but also consciousness of not knowing the object. Thus in the perception of pitcher, the pitcher is not only the thing that is manifested, the cognitive state whose of the pitcher is also manifested.

Since, in the *Advaita* account the empirical phenomenon is neither the cognitive state nor the object, nor their identity can really belong to consciousness. They are manifested by consciousness by appearing to be its contents in the same way as the real moon is not parts of the water in which it is reflected.

The nature and existence of the *Brahman* is determined perceptually in a *nirvikalpa* perception of mere existence. The idea of *anubhava* in the *Advaita* discourse really entails a direct distinction and if *anubhava* is qualified by the means of an object, such as *ghaṭa*, it only shows how the transcendental discourse is corrupted by the empirical.

For Śāṅkara ultimate reality is the *Brahman* the non-dual spirit. All empirical knowledge pre-supposes the modification of pure consciousness. “The ultimate consciousness is one only (*ekam eva*), pervading all things (*sarvavyapti*), enlightening all, the internal organs, its modification and the object.”<sup>53</sup> The internal organs receive sensation from the senses and reflect the objects. Internal organ (*antaḥkarana*) has no power by itself to reflect objects; it acquires it from its relation to the *Ātman*. *Ātman* is the illuminator and by means of it the internal organ perceives. The modification of internal organ to reveal object is called *vṛtti*. Śāṅkara accepts four types of *antraḥkarana* with its different modes. The internal organ is call mind (*manas*), when it has the mode of indeterminate (*saṁśaya*), *Buddhi* when it has mode of determination, self-sense (*ahaṅkāra*), when it has the mode of self-consciousness (*garva*) and attention (*citta*), when it has the mode of concentration and remembrances (*smaraṇa*).



## 2.8.2 Person in Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta

Rāmānuja advocates the qualified non-dualism (*viśiṣṭādvaitavāda*) and accepts determinate Brahman. *Brahman* is one but *ātman* and material world are its parts (*aṁsa*) that constitute its body. “It is qualified by the *ātman* and the material world, which together constitute the body of the *Brahman*”. *Brahman* is determinate (*saguna*), as it processes qualities like existence, consciousness, bliss and many other great qualities. *Ātman* and material body are His parts, since apart from Him they have no independent existence. They have real existence, but their existence depends on Brahman.

Person is given a unique status in *Viśiṣṭādvaitavāda*. Though all persons have drawn from God, yet they possess spontaneity and choice, they are free spirits. Person is constituted by *ātman*, body, senses, vital breath and *buddhi*. *Ātman* is real eternal existence as part of the Brahman or God. It is self-conscious and endowed with intelligence. It is atomic, without parts unchanging, imperceptible and indestructible. Radhkrishnan explained “Individual soul, though a mode of the supreme, is real, unique, eternal, endowed with intelligence and self-consciousness, without parts, unchanging, imperceptible and atomic.”<sup>54</sup> Self is different from the body, vital breath, senses and organs of action, but it is attached with them due to ignorance and karma. It is knower, the agent (*kartā*), and enjoyer (*bhoktā*). *Ātman* is self-luminous and self-conscious substance and is of the nature of knowledge. Individual soul is the real agent, performs his action freely, and reaps the fruits of its action. Still it is not independent, as it is supported and controlled by God. By this “Rāmānuja tries to reconcile human freedom with divine sovereignty.”<sup>55</sup>

Consciousness is the essence of self, it is not a mere attribute. This consciousness, according to Rāmānuja produced in the self by the contact with *manas*. *Manas* with the help of senses conveys knowledge of the external objects and reveals them to the self. “In the states of bondage and release the soul retains its character of a knowing subject (*jñāta*).”<sup>56</sup> Through its attribute of knowledge, which expands and contracts, in spite of its atomic size, the self is able to feel pleasure and pain all over the body. Self is an active agent, since it suffers the consequence of its action, has to enjoy the fruits of action. *Ātman* is not one with God, it is a part (*amsa*) of it.

### **2.8.2.1 Knowledge in Viśiṣṭādvaita**

In the process Rāmānuja admits both subject and object of knowledge. He holds that knowledge produced in self with the contact of *manas*, which with the help of senses conveys knowledge of external objects and reveals the self. Knowledge is self-luminous (*svayamprakāsa*). Without the contact with external object knowledge is not possible and in deep sleep it does not function, since there is no object. In deep sleep the self remains in its intrinsic state of self-consciousness, with other knowledge, which is not functioning at that moment. “Rāmānuja holds that the nature of consciousness testifies to the existence of a permanent thinking subject, as well as object distinct from the self.”<sup>57</sup> Thus, Rāmānuja rejects Śāṅkara’s concept of pure consciousness. According to him pure consciousness has to be as proved real or not. “If pure consciousness is proved to be real, it follows that it has attributes; if it is not then it is non-existent, like a sky flower.”<sup>58</sup>

Knowledge is both substance and attribute. “It is substance because it possesses the qualities of contraction and expansion and it is also attribute because it belongs to a self or God.”<sup>59</sup> Rāmānuja regards knowledge as *ajāda* or immaterial which is distinguished from both matter and spirit. Knowledge can reveal both itself and its object. It is self-luminous, but it is not self-conscious.

Knowledge is of the essence of the self, it is not accidental quality. It is called *dharmabhūtajñāna* as it belongs to and exists for the self. “Knowledge is unique adjunct of the self and eternally associated with it.”<sup>60</sup>

Rāmānuja distinguishes between *svarūpajñāna* (existential consciousness) and *dharmabhūtajñāna* (phenomenological consciousness). *Svarūpa*, Rāmānuja means, ‘nature’ and he holds that the very *svarūpa* of the *jivātman* is consciousness and bliss. For Śāṅkara Brahman is consciousness. Rāmānuja rejects *Advaitins* view and says that the consciousness is a *svarūpanirūpaṇadharmā* (an attribute that points to the *svarūpa*), but not the *dhārmin* (that which has the attribute).<sup>61</sup>

Consciousness of the outer object is called *dharmabhūtajñāna* (attribute consciousness). P. T. Raju explains this consciousness from the Rāmānuja standpoint like: “In the consciousness of the rose, three things involve. First, there is a rose, which is the object of consciousness. Secondly, there is the consciousness of the rose. It is had by me, since it is my attribute it is called attribute consciousness (*dharmabhūtajñāna*). The third one, then I am conscious of myself a being conscious of the rose. This consciousness of myself is called *svarūpajñāna*, as distinct from *dharmabhūtajñāna*, which is consciousness of the rose.”<sup>62</sup> The *dharmabhūtajñāna* reveals itself, but not the self. On

the other hand, *svarūpajñāna* reveals self to self, neither to *dharmabhūtajñāna* nor to the object.

Rāmanuja holds that *ātman* reveals itself to itself not directly, but through its attributes, which themselves have to be grasped by the *dharmabhūtajñāna*. According to P. T. Raju, “this interpretation agrees with the general *Viśiṣṭadvaita* position that all cognition are possible only through some attributes and that that there is no predicateless cognition or attributeless object.”<sup>63</sup>

## Part- II

### Concept of Person in Two Mahāyāna Schools

#### 2.9 Concept of Person in Yogācāra School

Yogācāra is the idealistic Mahāyāna school. Some notable Yogācāra *Sūtras* are: *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*, *Buddha-avataṃsakasūtra*, *Sandhinirmooanasūtra* and *Ghanauyūhasūtra*. Generally Asaṅga is considered as founder of Yogācāra school. “Considerable evidence has, however been acculating in favor of the view, gradually forcing itself to the real founder of the system was Maitreyaṅāth,”<sup>64</sup> the teacher of Asaṅga. Some great works of Maitreyaṅātha are-*Mahāyānasūtralankāra*, *Madhyāntavibhanga*, *Dharmadharmatāvighanga*, *Utaratantra* and *Abhisamyālankāra*.

Asaṅga (400 A.D.) is the most prominent scholar of Vijñānavāda and his great works are: The *Saptadaśanabhūmi-Sūtra*, *Mahāyāna-Sūtra*, *Upadeśa*, *Mahāyānasamparigraha śāstra*, *Yogācārabhūmi* and *Mahāyānasūtrālankāra*. None of these works are available except last one in original Saṅskrit, only Chinese and Tibetan manuscripts are available. Vasubandhu who was a Sarvāstivādin in his early life, devoted himself in his later life to Vijñānavāda. “He is said to have commented numbers of *Mahāyāna Sūtras*, such as: *Avataṃsaka*, *Nirvāna*, *Saddharmapuṇḍarika*, *Prajñāparamittā*, *Vimalakīrti* and *Śrīmālāṃhanāda*, and compiled some *Mahāyāna sūtras*, such as *Vijñānamātrasiddhi*, *Ratnatraya* etc.”<sup>65</sup> Sthiramati and Dharmapāla are also well known Yogācāra philosophers. Sthiramati was a disciple of Vasubandhu, and he wrote commentary on eight treatises of Vasubandhu. Dharmapāla wrote a commentary on *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*. Later Dignāga and Dharmakīrti founded slightly modified school with the name of Sautrāntika-Yogācāra.

According to Yogācāra, consciousness is the sole reality and the external objects have no real existence, they have mere appearances and do nothing to knowledge. “The object is only a mode of consciousness. Its appearance as though something objective and external is the transcendental illusion, because of which consciousness is bifurcated into the subject-object duality.”<sup>66</sup> Creativity is the special characteristic of consciousness and it is governed by the object. This creativity is manifested in different levels of consciousness. When the object is realized to be illusory its sublation is folded by the dissolution of the subject as well. Thus, consciousness is freed from the false duality of subject-object. It is absolute, the ultimate reality and the essence of everything (*dharmānāmdharmatā*).

Person, in Yogācāra, is combination of the *Vijñāna* (consciousness), the only real existence and *dharmas*, which are not real; they have existence as pertaining to consciousness. Thus, in the conception of person these two notions *Vijñāna* and *dharma* play significant role. It shows the importance of detailed discussion of these two notions in the analysis of person in Yogācāra School.

### **2.9.1 Theory of *Vijñāna***

Yogācāra admits only existence of *vijñāna*, but we perceive infinite plurality of objects. This plurality is reflected in *vijñāna* and for the empirical distinction Yogācāra accepts three kinds of *Vijñāna*: *Ālayavijñāna*, *Manovijñāna* and *Pravṛttivijñāna*. These are not distinct and static categories, but they are different phases of cosmic evolution of *vijñāna*. “*Vijñāna* diversifies itself and gives rise to the whole panorama of empirical existence, and these three *vijñānas* represent different stages of this diversifying process.”<sup>67</sup> Though the evolution process is real, these three *vijñānas* have no real

existence, as evolutes have no ultimate reality. The evolution process is caused by illusory idea and when the idea of objectivity is eradicated all the three *vijñānas* revert to the pristine purity of *Vijñaptimātratā*.

### 2.9.1.1 *Ālaya Vijñāna*

*Ālaya Vijñāna* is the most fundamental *vijñāna* and the first phase in the process of differentiation of pure *vijñāna*. It is the place or receptum in which are contained the seeds or impression (*vāsanā*) of any *karma*. All *dharmas* come from it, it is the cause of everything empirical, so it is called '*Sarva-bijaka*'. "It is called *vipāka*, any karma done by individual in any sphere of existence, leaves its trace in the *Ālaya*."<sup>68</sup> Sogen writes: "The *Ālaya-vijñāna* is a series of continuous consciousness. It is, to use the modern psychological term, a stream of consciousness. It is always running and changing. It is the sole substratum of the transmigration in *saṃsāra*."<sup>69</sup>

*Ālaya* serves two functions in the cosmic process. First, it works as receptum of the impression of past *vijñānas* and then it gives rise to further *vijñānas* by maturing those impressions. "All kinds of *dharmas* which are active in the illusory world (*Pravṛtṭi-dharmas Samudaya-satya*), are manifested by the existence of the *Ālaya-Vijñāna*, and it is due to the existence of the *Ālaya-Vijñāna* that all living beings move on in the *Samsāra (Duhkha-satya)*."<sup>70</sup>

The accumulation of seeds of *vijñāna* in *Ālaya* is called the *Hetuparināma*, while their actualization is the *Phala-parināma*. In both *parināmas*, *Ālaya* undergoes changes, but it is momentary. "*Hetu-parināma* is the development and maturity of *vāsanā* in the *Ālaya*, and *Phala-parināma* is the emerging into existence of the respective effects."<sup>71</sup>

*Vāsana* is the motive force that governs the evolutionary process. It is of two kinds *Vipāka-vāsanā* and *Niḥsyada-vāsanā*. Because of *Vipāka-vāsanā* one goes from birth to birth, as it keeps going the stream of mental process. The activity of *Vipāka-vāsanā* forces the *Ālaya-vijñāna* into new stream, beginning from the next birth of the individual. *Niḥsyada-vāsanā* is the frutification of the present experience; due to the maturity of this, the other *vijñānas* arise.

The content of *Ālaya* is not empirical, since it is nothing empirical. It is indeterminate content that is an objectivity not differentiated into specific form. The *Ālaya* is not pure, as it contains the seed of self-disruption in the form of this implicit duality. “*Ālaya* functions in two ways in the process of consciousness-(a) Internally i.e. consciousness appearing as the constituents of an individual and (b) Externally as consciousness of the undifferentiated objectivity.”<sup>72</sup>

### **2.9.1.2 *Kliṣṭa Mano-Vijñāna***

The *Pravṛtti-vijñāna* is the universe itself as identical with the knowing consciousness. The seeds of consciousness have been started in *Ālaya*. But these two strata of consciousness cannot explain the phenomena, between two consciousnesses *manas* works as a mediator. “The content of *Ālaya* is indeterminate and *Pravṛtti-vijñāna* is wholly determinate, in between this is the process of determination. This transitional function is served by *manas*.”<sup>73</sup> It makes possible the emergence of the object-consciousness out of the *Ālaya*, and simultaneously maintains the distinction between the two.



In *manas* the process of intellection (*manana*) is always going on. “*Manas* breaks up the monotony of the indeterminate objectivity by projecting the later through categorizing; its essence is categorization.”<sup>74</sup> In *Ālaya*, the distinction between form and matter is not possible. It is only possible after the consciousness is determinately categorized. Then one understands the distinction, consciousness and its content and characteristics of empirical knowledge. *Manas* is fructification of the seeds lying dormant in the *Ālaya* into the content-consciousness.

*Manas* is called defiled (*kliṣṭa*) as it is always surcharged with a particular class of mantels (*cittas*), the four *nirvṛtāvvyākṛa* kleśas.<sup>75</sup> When *manas* functions, these four are always accompanied it. They are:

- (a) The false notion of ego (*ātmaḍṛsti*)
- (b) Ignorance about ego (*ātma-moha*)
- (c) Elation over it (*ātma-māna*)
- (d) Attachment to it (*ātma-prema*).

*Manas* by its activity, actualizes the potential forces stored in the *Ālaya*. *Ālaya* supplies the data, on which *manas* operates. *Manas* is not independent consciousness, its status is different from *Ālaya* as well as object-consciousness. The locus of *manas* is *Ālaya*, and it acts as relational function based on *Ālaya*. The indeterminate categories stored in the *Ālaya* are determined empirically by *manas*.

The process of intellection can be stopped by certain meditations and practices. We can overcome the categorization of the determinate content. “In the state of *Arhat* who has

destroyed all the defilements without any residue, the *kliṣṭa* manas does not function; the flow of the *Ālaya* itself ceases there and hence the *manas* is stopped automatically.”<sup>76</sup>

### **2.9.1.3 Pravṛtti Vijñāna**

*Pravṛtti vijñāna* is the determinate awareness of object. It is the only consciousness which matters in empirical discourse. All phenomenal things can be known through this consciousness. So for all practical purposes it constitutes our universe. This consciousness is a class of six kinds of consciousness having common empirical nature. These six consciousnesses can be classified into two groups: external and internal. The five consciousnesses corresponding with the five sense organs produce the external consciousness. These five senses make possible for the awareness of matter (*rūpa*), sound (*śabda*), smell (*gandha*), taste (*rasa*) and the tactual data (*spraṣṭavya*). The internal consciousness is *manovijñāna*, the knowledge and ideas. *Manovijñāna* is different from *kliṣṭa manas*, the transcendental function.

*Pravṛtti-vijñānas* arise from *Ālaya* due to their respective seeds; they can arise either singly or simultaneously. “The number of waves in ocean is not fixed, it depends upon the wind passing over the ocean, likewise the empirical consciousness arises out of the *Ālaya*, due to the presence of *ālambana-pratyayas* (object-consciousness) one or many.”<sup>77</sup>

### **2.9.2 Dharma Theory of Yogācāra**

Yogācāra maintains that only consciousness is real and the rest constituting objective world is appearance, but they accept the *dharma* theory. However, problem arises in finding a relationship between idealism and *dharma* theory. *Dharmas* are not real in

essence. “Only consciousness is real, objectivity is an appearance. Objective *dharmas* are therefore in the same predicament as all things objective are; their independence is illusion.”<sup>78</sup> By nature consciousness is a ‘pure act’ unchecked by any content. *Dharmas* are not real, their existence pertains to consciousness. Pure consciousness harbors no *dharmas*.

“When consciousness is diversified, its moments are qualified by so many overtones as it were; these do not form an integral part of consciousness, but nor can they be granted an independent status. The external *dharmas* pertain to consciousness only in its infected or bifurcated aspect; they evolved only in its phenomenal state.”<sup>79</sup> These *dharmas* for Yogācāra have no ultimate reality; they belong only to the empirical realm. They are real as they pertain only to consciousness. Consciousness is distinguished from one moment to another. For this distinction object is required for the individuality of consciousness. Object is nothing but a mode of existence of consciousness.

### **2.9.2.1 Classification of *Dharmas***

Yogācāra accepts one hundred *dharmas* which can be classified into five headings- (1) the *citta-dharmas*, (2) the *caittas*, (3) *rūpa dharmas*, (4) *citta-viprayuktasamskāradharmas* and (5) *asṃskṛta dharmas* (MSA, XI-37).

### **2.9.2.2 The *Citta-Dharma***

The *citta-dharma* is the mind consciousness. Consciousness is the ultimate reality; it is not one of the real, but reality itself. The other *dharmas* are not coordinated to it. They are real in the sense that they are the only the tonal aspects qualifying consciousness. All

kinds of categories are classed together as *dharma* irrespective of their various ontological statuses. “Some *dharmas* are accepted only in the empirical stages of consciousness, some are noumenal *dharmas*, and again consciousness itself, the centre of the whole system of *dharmas*, is classed along with them.”<sup>80</sup>

Consciousness is fundamentally one, but it has various stages in the process of evolution. The six kinds of consciousness that arise from the six senses are called *Pravṛttivijñāna*. The seventh and eighth are called *Kliṣṭa manas*, the subconscious *vijñānas*, and the *Ālaya* respectively.

### 2.9.2.3 *Cetasikas* or *Caittas* (Mentals)

Yogācāra regards these *caittas* as the only *dharmas*. The various *vijñānas* are reality itself, and not merely *dharmas*. Since everything, however is indifferently categorized as a *dharma*, the *caittas* take their place along with the *vijñānas*. Yogācāra accepts 51 mental states which can be further divided into six subclasses.<sup>81</sup>

- (a) The *Sarvatraga Dharmas* (universal *caittas*): These *dharmas* are present in all types of consciousness. They are the only *caittas* which are present in *Ālaya*. In cognitive distinction between the knower and the known, the *sarvatraga dharmas* accompany the mental state. They are five in number: *sparśa*, *manaskāra*, *vedanā*, *saṃjñā* and *cetanā*.
- (b) The *Viniyata Caittas* (determinate *caittas*): These *caittas* are not universally present, but they are peculiar to some kinds of consciousness. They are also five kinds- *chanda*, *adhimokṣa*, *smṛti*, *samvādi* and *dhi* (*prajñā*).

- (c) *Kuśala* (meritorious) *Caittas*: These are the good mental states that are associated with mind. They are eleven in number: *śraddhā*, *hri*, *apatrapā*, *alobha*, *adveṣa*, *amoha*, *virya*, *praśrabdhi*, *apramāda*, *upekṣā* and *ahiṃsā*.
- (d) *Akuśala Caittas*: These are the 26 bad mental states which include 6 *kleśas* and 20 *upakleśas*. Six *kleśas* are *rāga*, *pratigha*, *moha*, *māna* and *vicikitsā*.
- (e) The *Upakleśas* are not as fundamental as the *kleśas*, they are subsidiary evils. The twenty *upakleśas* are- *krodha*, *upanāha*, *mrakṣa*, *pradāśa*, *irṣyā*, *mātsarya*, *māyā*, *śāṭhya*, *mada*, *vihimsā*, *āhrikyā*, *anapatrāpya*, *styāna*, *auddhatya*, *āśraddhya*, *kauśidya*, *pramāda*, *muṣitā smṛti*, *vikṣepa*, and *asamprajanya*.
- (f) *Aniyata dharmas*: The *aniyata dharmas* can be bad (*kliṣṭa*) and good (*akliṣṭa*) as well. When they are *kliṣṭ*, they are accounted as *upakleśas*. They are four kinds: *kaukrtya*, *middha*, *vitarka* and *vicāra*.

#### 2.9.2.4 *Rūpa Dharmas*

*Rūpadharmas* are those from which the objective world is made. Though this world has no real existence, yet existence of *rūpas* are accepted for supplying the content to the forms of consciousness. Like the *caittas*, *rūpas* are also the creation and projection of consciousness, and their reality is liable for pertaining or qualifying consciousness. “They are adjectival in nature, qualifying and distinguishing the moment of consciousness.”<sup>82</sup>

*Rūpas* are divided into two kinds: the *Mahābhūtas*, the four ultimate constituents of matter and the *Bhautika rūpas*, the derivative of the four. Yogācāra accepts eleven kinds of *rūpadharmas*: the five senses, the five respective sense-data and the last one is

included under *dharmadhātu*. It consists of five kinds of *Rūpas*: “First, the material *Paramānu* (earth, stone, etc.); secondly, the abstract *Paramānu* (light etc.); thirdly, *Avijñapti*; fourthly, the sense object created by *vijñāna* (colour, form, sound etc.); and fifthly, illusion or mistaking as existent something non-existent.”<sup>83</sup> According to Yogācāra, the *rūpa* included in the *dharmadhātu* is not sensuously known. It has objective existence, or it is rather imagined to exist.

### **2.9.2.5 Citta Viprayukta Saṃskāra Dharmas**

These *dharmas* are always associated with consciousness, for their existence they must ultimately pertain to consciousness. They are the forces or functions which are specifically neither material nor mental; they can function either way. It is a miscellaneous class which includes all kinds of categories. Yogācāra accepts 24 kinds of categories of this class: *prāpti*, *jivāndriya*, *nikāyasabhāgatā*, *prthagjāti (aprāpti)*, *asañjñi-samāpti*, *nirodha-samāpti*, *asañjñivipāka*, *nāmakāya*, *padakāya*, *vyañjanakāya*, *jāti*, *jarā*, *sthiti*, *anityatā*, *pravṛtti (srotāḥ santati)*, *evam bhāgiya (samādhyantara)*, *pratibandha*, *javanya*, *karma*, *deśa (dik)*, *kāla*, *saṅkyhā*, *sāmagri (samyog)* and lastly *bheda (viyoga)*.

### **2.9.2.6 The Asaṃskṛta Dharmas**

These are immutable *dharmas* which are not subject to conditions. They are not phenomenal and not governed by law of impermanence. They are six kinds-(a) *akāśa*, (b) *pratisaṃkhyānirodha*, (c) *apratisaṃkhyānirodha*, (d) *acalanirodha*, (e) *saṃjñā-vedayitṛ-nirodha*, and (F) *Tathatā*. Among them *Tathatā* is the only *asaṃskṛta*, the ultimate essence of everything, unconditional and the absolute. “*Tathatā* is also enumerated as

one of the *dharma* leaves no room for doubt that the *dharma*-phenomenology is entirely unaffected by any metaphysical consideration.”<sup>84</sup>

### 2.9.3 *Nirvāna* in *Yogācāra*

Cessation of suffering is *Nirvāna*. Pain or suffering is produced because of the attachment and aversion of object by mind. “Freedom from suffering is freedom from these two fetters of mind; it is balanced equanimity of mind, unruffled by any objective vicissitude.”<sup>85</sup> For *Yogācāra*, consciousness is the sole reality. Thus the bondage and freedom pertain only to consciousness. Like other schools of Buddhism, *Yogācāra* also considers ignorance as the cause of bondage. ‘In Idealism, ignorance consists in taking the apparently objective world as independently real’. The external world is the mode of consciousness, because of ignorance person thinks it to be real thereby produces attachment and aversion to objects, leading to bondage. So long as we think the content to be external, it makes limitation of ourselves and increases ego. Thus, objectivity is bondage, because of this false idea, consciousness becomes infected by the subject-object duality.

Only when one realizes that the content is a product of consciousness, there will be no desire for it. Pure will evolves into the three *viññānas*, the root of which is the *Ālaya*. *Ālaya* is the *Abhūtaparikalpa*, since it projects contents where they are not. *Ālaya* is *samsāra* and bondage (MSA XI-32).

For *Yogācāra* *Ālaya* is both bondage and *Nirvāna*. In *Ālaya*, two kinds of potential seeds are stored. First is *Sāsrava-bija*, which is full of defilement, and second is *Anāsrava-bija*, which is free from defilement. Because of *Sāsrava-bija* one moves in *Samsāra*, by

developing *Anāsrava-bija* attains *Nirvāna*. “Every kind of *dharmas* which lead us to enlightenment (*Nivṛitti dharma* and *Mārga-satya*) is kept on by the existence of the Eighth *Vijñāna* (the *Ālaya-Vijñāna*), and it is due to the existence of it that the practitioner (Yogi) realizes *Nirvāna* (*Nirodha-satya*).”<sup>86</sup>

Will is free by its nature and it becomes limited by the projection of content. “Liberation is the regaining of the sovereignty of will by negating the object breaking down its obstinate externally.” The consciousness negates the external object, hence it cannot be determined by object. Breaking the particularity consciousness becomes universal. “This universal will is absolute. *Nirvāna* is realization of this universality” (MSA IX-2). Here, the subject-object duality of consciousness is vanished. “It is the retracting of *Ālaya* for its forward movement (*āśrayaparāvṛtti*)” (MSA XI-44). *Āśrayaparāvṛtti* is the disappearance of the unreal object, and realization of *Tathatā*; and this is freedom (MSA XIX-44). The diversification of consciousness into moments of empirical form is stopped here, rests again in itself. “Realizing everything to be imaginary, the *Bodhisattva* ceases to imagine anything at all; this is *Bodhi* or enlightenment” (MSA IX, 8). This is the *Nirvāna*, which is supreme bliss (*sukha*) and identical with the *Tathāgata*.

In order to avoid the Mādhyamikas negative implication of *Nirvāna* as emptiness, Yogācāra expounded the doctrine of three natures (*trisvabhāva*), for positive explanation of *Nirvāna*. The three natures are: (a) the imagined (*parikalpita*), (b) the dependent (*paratantra*), and (c) the accomplished (*pariniṣpanna*). The first two natures are related to conventional experience that comes under the account of the subject-object duality. The third one represents the transcendental realm of experience, which is totally non-



dual; it is in no way related to conventional experience. “Since the accomplished nature is free from duality, so it is identified with *Nirvāna*, which would mean the *Nirvāna* is of the nature of the non-dual.”<sup>87</sup>

*Nirvāna* is not acquisition of something new it is only realization of sole reality of consciousness, the essence of everything (*Tathatā*). According to Yogācāra, the process of attaining *Nirvāna* from the subjective view point is real, though the cause of bondage is unreal. From the objective view point it is unreal, as object never exist; hence its sublation also is a part of illusion. But because of this illusion it produces suffering which is subjective and real. “It is consciousness which is defiled and consciousness which is purified (MSA XI 34).”<sup>88</sup> In this point Yogācāra is different from Mādhyamika and Vedānta.

Yogācāra maintains that freedom is attainment of the ideal of *Buddhahood*. Every person can attain it. Everybody is potentially a Buddha; i.e. contains the potentialities of complete *Buddhahood*. Everybody is *Tathāgatagarbha* (MSA IX-37). But people are not all same in having parallel spiritual development. It is because of the difference of spiritual attitude (*gotra*). The *gotra* has two aspects: fundamental (*prakṛtistha*) that exists in every living being from the very outset. And the second one is *Paripuṣṭa* which undergoes the process of development. The first one is essentially identical to all persons. But due to the difference of the second aspect, the laymen are different from the saints who have attained the maturity of spiritual or philosophic consciousness. “The *gotra* works as a kind of force that produces a metamorphosis (*parāvṛtti*) of the elements of personality into the elements of *Buddhahood*.”<sup>89</sup>

## 2.9.4 Spiritual Discipline

Self realization is very important to understand the Truth on the way to *Nirvāna*. Spiritual discipline enables person to understand the Truth. It has different subsequent stages.<sup>90</sup>

(1) *Sambhāramārga* (the path of accumulating merit): It is the preparatory stage to the higher level of disciplinary path. The real nature of consciousness is defiled by the two obstructions: *Kleśāvarana* and *Jñeyavarana*. The *kleśās* are pain and evil pertaining to the empirical level. When one imagines the existence of object wrongly, it repeals the will of consciousness. This is *jñeyāvarana*. It is the root of all pain. These two obstructions can be removed by merit and wisdom (*punya-jñāna-sambhār*). Since the root of all evil is intellectual, so only mere merit is not sufficient, right knowledge is necessary as well. The highest knowledge (*prajñāpāramitā*) only can remove the *jñeyāvarana*.

(2) *Prayogmārga* (the path of training): after having the knowledge that object is only subjective creation, the person realizes that the so called two objective natures of object, *svalakṣaṇa* and *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* are two subjective imaginations. This is the *Uṣmagatāvasthā* (MSA 93) of the discipline. “He obtains the first sparks of the spiritual enlightenment (*dharmāloka*), which he strive to make steady, and cultivates still more intense practices. This is the *Mūrdhāvasthā*. The bodhisattva, with deep insight, realizes the real nature of consciousness and understands that anything external to consciousness are only appearance of consciousness. It makes removal of diversification of consciousness. It is like *Ksyāntyavasthā*. Then the *Bodhisattva* enters into

*Ānantaryasamādhi*, which is called *Laukika gradharmāvasthā*. After this, the deeper diversification of consciousness as the knower vanishes and the awareness of the sole reality of consciousness also ceases (MSA XI 47).

(3) *Darśanamārga* (the Path of Vision): In this path, the sage makes himself free from false dualism of knower and known and acquires a non-dual, non-conceptual and pure intuition of the ultimate and unique substance of the universe. He withdraws the *Ālaya* (*āśrayaprāvṛtti*) and enters into first *bhūmi*. “He realizes the essential identity of every living beings and thinks of them in terms of himself” (MSA XIV, 30). By cultivating the excellence of character, he attains Enlightenment (*Bodhi*). He has no pain, but he grieves at the misery of the suffering mankind.

(4) *Bhāvanāmārga* (the Path of Concentration): It is the highest stage of the discipline and here, the *Bodhisattva* enters into the rest of the *Bhūmis*. He obtains a complete mystic intuition of the Absolute which is of two folds. First one is the *nirvikalpa* or the *Samāhita* (transic) *jñāna* (MSA-191). It is immediate and entirely personal and a direct supernatural intuition of the saint (*Ārya*). “The other is the *Prṣthalabdhajñāna*, the conceptual (*savikalpa*) empirical knowledge that arises in the wake of the first transcendental intuition.” Then the transic culmination is reached in the *Vajropamasamādhi*, in this stage there is no any penetrable of subjective construction (*vikalpa*) (MSA 96). The process of retracting of the *Ālaya* is completed. The intuition becomes absolutely pure and attains the universality of consciousness without limitation of particular objects.

“He rests in the absolute and ultimate reality (*anuttarapada*), and strives for the well-being of all humanity”.

## 2.10 Concept of Person in Mādhyamika School

Nāgārjuna (100 AD) is the founder of Mādhyamika or *Śūnyavāda* School and his famous work is *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*. Other Mādhyamika philosophers are Āryadeva, Kumārajīva, Buddhapālita and Chandrakīrti. Some other important works of Āryadeva are *Catuḥśatak*, *Hastabālaprakraṇavṛtti*, and *Cttaviśuddhiprakaraṇa*. Nāgārjuna’s *Kārikā* is commented upon by all of them. According to Mādhyamika, everything is *śunya* (unreal) from the phenomenological stand point, only Absolute is real. Things are dependent on each other, so they have no reality of their own. *Śunyata* is the *Paramārtha satya*, the Absolute. Main theories of Mādhyamika are the *Śūnyatā* theory and the dialectic theory. In the concept of person these two theories have prominent role. Thus, the researcher intends to give a brief sketch of these theories.

### 2.10.1 Mādhyamika Dialectic

Mādhyamika has no special doctrine of their own, their main philosophy is criticism. Nāgārjuna developed his dialectical philosophy to criticize the conflict that emerged in Indian Philosophy by the clash of *ātma* and *anātma* views. “Dialectic is the consciousness of this conflict in reason”. The Mādhyamika characterizes both the *ātma* and *anātma* views as dogmatic. Critically analyzed, each *dṛṣṭi* reveals its inner contradiction. *Prajñā* (intuitional insight) is the abandonment of all *dṛṣṭi*. “Dialectic is a self-conscious spiritual movement; it is necessarily a critique of Reason.”<sup>91</sup>

In order to reject any and all views Mādhyamika uses one weapon. By drawing out the implication of a view he shows its self contradictory character. The dialectic is a series of reduction-ad-absurdum argument (*prasangāpādanam*). “Everything is turned against itself. The Mādhyamika is a *prāsangika* or *vaitaṇḍika*, a dialectician or free lance debater. The Mādhyamika disproves the opponent’s thesis and does not prove any thesis of his own.”<sup>92</sup> Mādhyamika criticizes all of these. By rejecting a thesis he does not accept its counter thesis and does not set one opponent against another.

The principle of dialectic is that all is relative and so they are not real. “The cause and effect, substance and attribute, whole and part, subject and object etc. are mutually dependent, relative; hence they are not things-in-themselves.”<sup>93</sup> What is relative is subjective, unreal. In Nāgārjuna’s Dialectic three moments are present: dogmatism (*dṛṣṭi*), criticism (*śūnyatā* or *prāsanga*), and intuition (*prajñā*).

Mādhyamika dialectic is not only theoretic; it has also practical and religious consciousness. “The root cause of pain and imperfection is *avidhyā* or the tendency to conceptualize the real. Mistaking as this or that do we get attached to things and evince aversion towards them. Nāgārjuna says “Freedom is the cessation of acts (*karma*) and the roots of evil (*kleśa*); these are born of *vikalpa* and this is *prapaśñca* (the conceptual function of reason); *Prapaśñca* ceases with the knowledge of *Śūnyatā* (MK XVIII 5). The dialectic as non-conceptual intuitional knowledge takes us beyond the possibility of pain. “It is the summum bonum of our entire endeavour. It is freedom itself (*Nirvāna*).”<sup>94</sup>

### 2.10.2 Śūnyatā

Mādhyamikas develop their *śūnyatā* theory by new interpretation of *Pratītyasamutpāda*, the cardinal doctrine of Buddhism. According to Mādhyamika, it means the dependence of things on each other, their having no nature or reality of their own (*nissvabhāvatva* or *śūnya*) (MKV 504). *Śūnyatā* shows the very nature of things, the universal relativity or the non-existence of anything-in-itself. They said the *pratītyasamutpāda* doctrine is described as ‘this being that is’-what is really meant is that thing can only be indicated as mere appearance one after another, for they have no essence or true nature. “The true meaning of *pratītyasamutpāda* or *śūnyavāda* is that there is no truth, no essence in all phenomena that appear. As they have no essence, they are neither produced nor destroyed, neither come nor go. They are merely appearance of *māyā* or illusion.”<sup>94</sup> The void does not mean pure negation; it is relative to some kinds of position. It only denies the intrinsic nature or essence of object. Even heat cannot be said to be the essence of fire; for both heat and fire result of combination of many condition. “If a thing has no essence or existence of its own, we cannot affirm the essence of other thing to it (*parabhāva*).”<sup>95</sup>

Empirical knowledge works through and because of pre-supposition; it is *Samvṛti*, and is directed towards understanding and handling objects. Critical knowledge is just the awareness of these pre-suppositions. It is thus the disabusing of the mind of its pre-supposition. Its value is clarity and freedom, and not any secular utility. It is *Śūnyatā* or *Paramārthasaty*. “Mādhyamika distinguishes between *dr̥ṣṭijñāna* which is conditioned through concepts and word (*savikalpa prapañca*) and *Prajñā* or *śūnyatā* which is totally free of these (*nirvikalpa niṣprapañca*).”<sup>96</sup>

In Mādhyamika negation is the threshold of intellectual intuition. *Śūnyatā* is not only the negation of *dr̥ṣṭi* (view, judgment), but it is also the *prajñā*. *Śūnyatā* is negative only for thought; but in itself it is the non-relational knowledge of the Absolute. It may be taken as more universal and positive than affirmation. Both affirmation and negation are determinations, limitations or negations. The dialectic as *Śūnyatā* is the removal of the constructions which our concepts with their practical or sentimental bias, have put on reality. It is freeing of reality of the artificial and accidental restrictions, and not the denial of reality. “*Śūnyatā* is negation of negation; it is thus a re-affirmation of the infinite and inexpressible positive character of the Real.”<sup>97</sup>

### 2.10.3 Person in Mādhyamika School

*Śūnyavāda* maintains that person is combination of the four elements (earth, water, fire, and air), space (*ākāśa*) and consciousness (*viññāna*). “It is due to earth (*pr̥thivi*) that the body become solid, it is due to water that there is fat in the body, it is due to fire there is digestion, it is due to wind that there is respiration, it is due to *ākāśa* that there is porosity, and it is due to *viññāna* that there is mind or consciousness.”<sup>98</sup> Thus, person is mutual combination of these elements, but these elements are not real substance. “Through ignorance thus come the *saṃskāras*, consisting of attachment, antipathy and thoughtlessness (*rāga, dveśa, moha*); from these proceed *viññāna* and four *skandhas*, with the addition of *rūpa* makes five *skandhas*; from these proceed the senses (*ṣaḍāyatana*), from the coming together of these three comes contact (*sparśa*), from that arises feeling and desire (*tr̥ṣṇā*) and so on. This flow is like the stream of a river, there is no essence or truth behind them all or as the ground of them all” (MV pp209-211).<sup>99</sup> The phenomena cannot say either existence or non existence, no truth is eternal or void. Thus,

this doctrine is called the middle doctrine (Mādhyamika). Existence and non-existence have only relative truth, but there is no true reality (*paramārthasaty*) as the ground all of them.

#### **2.10.4 Non-Existence of *Ātman***

Nāgārjuna using his Dialectical method criticized different *Brāhmanical* schools regarding their belief in eternal existence of self, other Buddhist schools regard self as identical with *skandhas*, and another Buddhist conception of self is a conventional name (*prajñaptisat*) for a series of discrete momentary states (*skandhas*). After examining these views Nāgārjuna concludes “The self is not different from the states, nor identical with them; (there) is no self without the states, nor it is considered non-existence” (MK XXVII, 8). “It shows that Mādhyamika position regarding self is different from the teaching of Buddha; on several occasion he seems to have asserted the existence of the self.”<sup>100</sup> Nāgārjuna says The self does not exist the Buddha have declared; they have taught the ‘no-self’ too; they have (finally) taught that there is neither self nor non-self (MK XVII, 6).

Mādhyamika claims that Buddha corrected his doctrine of self by nihilistic tendency that is by affirming the self, as there is continuity of karma and its result. “To those addicted to the dogmatic belief in a changeless substantial *ātman* and who cling to it, he teaches the ‘no-self doctrine’ as an antidote; his ultimate teaching is that there is neither self nor not-self as these are subjective devices (MKV 356-60). The Real as the indeterminate (*śunya*) is free from conceptual construction.”<sup>101</sup>



### 2.10.5 *Prajñā* is Freedom

Mādhyamika like other schools of Buddhism has given importance to freedom from suffering. Suffering is because of illusory concept of ultimate reality. Illusion is the consciousness of the inapplicability of our subjective notion to the real. Pain is impeded willing, the inconsonance of our desire with objective circumstances. *Kleśas* impelled man towards attachment and bondage, so freedom from pain achieved by the elimination of *kleśas*. “*Prajñā* is the negation of all *vikalpa*, conceptual constructions; it is the reaching of non-dual knowledge, a state beyond the discursive level of Reason.”<sup>102</sup> The end of practical discipline is the spiritual good, beyond the duality of good and evil. By the spiritual discipline one can purifies or removal the hindrances and defilements that cover up the real. “Freedom is achieving the state of passionlessness. It is essentially negative process and not the acquisition of merit or other values.”<sup>103</sup>

### 2.10.6 *Pāramitā* Discipline

Buddhist three fold discipline *śīla*, *samādhi* and *prajñā* is modified and elaborated by Mādhyamika into six-fold *pāramitā* discipline of *dāna*, *śīla*, *kṣānti*, *virya*, *dhyāna* and *prajñā*. “They give importance to the preparatory stages and emphasize certain virtue charity and forbearance, and enjoins ceaseless and enthusiastic effort as essential for attaining *Buddhahood*.”<sup>104</sup> *Prajñā* is given utmost important which guides and controls other *pāramitās*. The other virtues *Dāna* (charity), *Śīla* (moral restraints and observance), *Kṣānti* (forbearance), *Dhyāna* (meditation) are meant to purify the mind and make it fit to receive the intuition of the Absolute (*prajñā*).

The spiritual disciplines are self-imposed disciplines, there is no external compulsion or pressure to cultivate or practice them. The essence of self-culture is the bringing about a change in oneself, not in the environment. “It is an intense and sustained self-reflection, self-criticism. It is a ceaseless watchfulness of one’s doings–speech, bodily and mental action.”<sup>105</sup>

The special characteristic of Mādhyamika spiritual discipline is *Śat-Pāramitā-Naya*, the six fold path of highest perfection. Along with this, other two important notions are the ideal of *Bodhisattva* and *Bhumis*. Broadly, the discipline can be divided into two stages- *Śamatha* (control of mind) and *Vipaśyanā* (insight). The five *Pāramitās* (*dāna*, *śila*, *kṣānti*, *virya* and *dhyāna*) are preparatory to the last *Prajñā* (intuition), which crowns them. *Prajñā* is the main element that informs and directs other practices and virtues for the whole process of the freedom.

#### 2.10.6.1 *Pāramitās*<sup>106</sup>

(1) ***Dāna***: *Dāna* is the act of giving and it is grounded on universal friendliness (*maitri*) and compassion (*karuṇā*). By this a Bodhisattva must be ready to give anything to the seeker (other). Apart from giving various material objects, a Bodhisattva is happily willing to grant even his merit of past, present and future (*tryadhvagatam śubham*) for sake of other.

(2) ***Śila***: *Śila* is good conduct and it has both negative and positive aspects. Main purpose of cultivating *śila* is self-preservation (*ātmabhāva-rakṣa*) with the aim of bringing benefits to other. Like early Buddhism’s ten precepts (*dasa śila*),

Mahāyāna also speaks of ten ‘ways of action’ (*karma-pathāḥ*) in negative and positive form.

(3) **Kṣānti:** *Kṣānti* stands for forbearance and opposed to hatred (*dveṣa*) and anger (*krodha*). It is exalted as the most excellent type of penance and it is three types-(a) forbearance of pain (*duḥkhādhivasna-kṣānti*), (b) forbearance of seeing the doctrine (*dharmanidhyāna-kṣānti*) and (c) forbearance of injuries and insults (*parāpakāra-marṣṇa-kṣānti*).

(4) **Virya:** The fourth *Pāramitā virya* is recognized as important object of aspiration. It’s literal meaning ‘prowess’, ‘energy’, ‘strength’, ‘heroism’, or ‘manliness’. Realization is not possible without exertion. *Virya* is base of *Bodhi*. “A *Bodhisattva* should cultivate enthusiasm for good actions (*kuśalatsāha*) and strenuously guard himself against all sins, small or great, realizing that sensual pleasures are like honey on the edge of a razor (*kṣuradhāramadhūpama*).

(5) **Dhyāna:** *Dhyāna* is concentration and fixity of mind. After acquiring *virya* a *Bodhisattva* puts his mind to trance from distracted mind (*vikṣipatacittva*). For it he has to develop the *kāya-viveka* and *citta-viveka*. Former is isolation of body from worldly people and later is isolation of mind from sensual and worldly desire. *Dhyāna* leads to wisdom on two Truths and Four *Brahma-vihāras*.

(6) **Prajñā:** It is the perfection of wisdom that incorporates the other five *Pāramitās*. It is the supreme and perfect knowledge in all its aspects-‘the unobscured knowledge of all that is knowable. It is the knowledge of the true nature of things which is the knowledge of void (*śūnyatā*).

### 2.10.6.2 *Bodhisattva* the Fundamental Ground of Mahāyāna Ethics

*Bodhisattva* is the aspirational ideal of the Mahāyāna ethico-spiritual seeking. *Bodhisattva* is a Perfect Being that aims at complete *Buddhahood*. “According to Mahāyāna *Bodhisattva* is one who has successfully practiced the various perfections such as *dāna* (charity), *śīla* (morality) etc. and is thus fit to be a Buddha.”<sup>107</sup> In this state he is fit to enter into the state of *Buddhahood* and enjoys the bliss, but he refrains it and works for the fellowmen to remove their suffering. Mahāyāna believes that in all beings or persons *Bodhi* (enlightenment) remains implicitly which can be realized by spiritual discipline. However, to achieve this state needs help of an enlightened being, *Bodhisattva* is the person who does the help for laymen.

*Prajñā* and *Karūna* are the two principle features of the *Bodhicitta*. “*Śūnyatā* is *prajñā*, intellectual intuition, and is identical with the Absolute. *Karūnā* is the active principle of compassion that gives concrete expression to *śūnyatā* in phenomena.”<sup>108</sup> First is the *prajñā* of non-duality of good and evil, love and hatred, virtue and vice; the second is goodness, love and pure act. As D. T. Suzuki quotes Nāgārjuna’s work on *Bodhisattva* “The essential nature of all *Bodhisattva* is a great loving heart (*Mahākaruṇā*), and all sentient beings constitute the object of his love.”<sup>109</sup>

For enlightenment this perfection and compassion are very important. The emphasis on compassion introduces a new ethical framework that the aspirant should not be satisfied with his personal spiritual gain; he should have to work for welfare of others. “A feeling of complete identity with others is evoked so that one’s individual liberation is tendered incomplete and meaningless if all others are not liberated.”<sup>110</sup>

Bodhisattva is the complete self-effacement and for its cultivation of *Prajñāpāramitā* is necessary. It is the climax of spiritual attachment, which is same with *Tathatā*, that is realizing the fact that things of the world have no essence and they exist in emptiness (*śūnyatā*). It eradicates the dualistic thinking, conflict and hostility between oneself and others and emphasizes on unity of all life. Hence, the *Bodhisattva* cultivates *anuttrāsamyaka sambodhi*, the unsuppressable, perfect wisdom.

In the spiritual journey to freedom (*Nirvāna*), the Bodhisattva must practice and cultivate the six *Pāramitās*, the essence of practical ethics of Mahāyāna. The *Mahāyānasūtralāṅkāra* defines the six Pāramitās as fulfilling certain specific spiritual and moral virtues and says that they bring welfare, happy rebirths and lead to serenity, great spiritual attainment, good concentration and supreme knowledge (MSL 13 p 99).<sup>111</sup> Each *Pāramitā* is divisible into three categories- (1) the worldly one which the ordinary people of the world practice in order to attain happiness in this life and the life hereafter, (2) the supreme worldly one, a category superior to the former one-which the Hinayānists practice with the aim of attaining personal *Nirvāna*, and (3) the highest supreme worldly categories which the *Bodhisattva* practices with the aim of good of all beings.<sup>112</sup>

The *Bodhicitta* is developed in two stages. First is preparatory stage which is called *bodhi pranidhi citta*. Here the devotee makes the Great Resolves (*Mahā pranidhāna*), usually before a spiritual Guide (*kalyāṇa-mitra*), about his intention and endeavor. “Mādhyamika treatise gives ten or twelve number of this; the chief one is helping all being in their spiritual endeavor.”<sup>113</sup> The next stage is called *Bodhi Prasthanacitta*. Here

the Bodhisattva practices the *pāramitās* and this is the actual starting of the journey towards the goal, *Nirvāna*.

### **2.10.6.3 *Bhumis***

After completing the training and accumulation of merit (*punya-sambhāra-mārga*), the Bodhisattva enters into path of illumination (*darśana mārga*) and of concentrated contemplation (*bhāvana-mārga*). “Great clarity is attained till the mind becomes transparent, free from all impediments, obscurations, passion and sloth, and he acquires great yogic power.”<sup>114</sup> Ten *Bhumis* are accepted by Mādhyamikas- *Pramudita*, *Vimalā*, *Prabhākari*, *Arciṣmati*, *Sudurjayā*, *Abhimukhi*, *Dūraṅgama*, *Acalā*, *Sādhumati* and *Dhramamegha*. In the Mādhyamika list of six *Pāramitās* later another four *Upāya-Kauśalya*, *Pranidhāna*, *Bala* and *Jñāna* are added, thus making them ten in number. “In his Madhyamakāvātāra, Candrakīrti connects the ten *Pāramitās* with ten *bhūmis* (stage of spiritual growth) in the same order.”<sup>115</sup>

### **2.10.7 Mahāyāna Nirvāna**

Hinayāna Buddhism explains two kinds of *Nirvānas*: *Upādhiśeṣa* and *Nirupādhiśeṣa*. In *upādhiśeṣa* the ascetic gets rid of all ignorance and passion, but still body and mind continues to function without passion. *Nirupādhiśeṣa nirvāna* is the final release, even from the *skandhas* that constitute the empirical existence of a person. “The Mahāyāna added one more variety, the *Aprtiṣṭhita Nirvāna*, the state of Bodhisattva, who shuns retiring into Final Release, although fully entitled to it, and who by his free choice devotes himself to the service of all beings.”<sup>116</sup>

According to Nāgārjuna, *Nirvāna* is not *bhāva* and *asamṣkṛta* (*anutpāda*). *Nirvāna* is “what is not abandoned nor acquired; what is not destroyed nor created” (MK p.521). In *Nirvāna* no change occurs, what changes is only our attitude, not reality. “The function of *prajñā* is not to transform the real, but only to create a change in our attitude towards it. The change is epistemic (subjective) not ontological (objective).”<sup>117</sup>

For Mādhyamika *Nirvāna* and *Samsāra* have no difference; Noumena and phenomena are not two separate sets of entities nor are they two states of the same thing (MK XXV-10). The Absolute is the only reality. The empirical world is the false construction (*kalpanā*) of the thought. It is not *bhāva* or *abhāva*. This *Nirvāna* can be attained only by making one free from thought-determination; it is one with the Absolute.

*Nirvāna*, for Nāgārjuna is the calming of all representations, the calming of all verbal differentiation, peace (MK 25.24). It is knowledge about the true nature of things (*dharmatā*, i.e. emptiness), which is not produced and not destroyed; it is cessation of the realm of verbal utterance and the dualistic mind (MK 18.7). “It is the result of seeing things the way they are, a seeing which occurs through going beyond the conceptualizing activity of our everyday minds and language, which conditions us to think in terms of inherent existence.”<sup>118</sup>

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