

Chapter I
Introduction

In the present humanistic world, philosophy has shifted its interest to 'man' than abstract things. Man is the highest being of the world, having the capacity to develop and destroy. The world is a circle of interdependence, where everything is dependent on each other. Man's value and dignity is not fully respected by society in recent times, and innumerable inhumanistic events have taken place. So, humanism becomes very important issue for the society. "There is the dire necessity of reconstructing ourselves. We have to understand our self and understand man behind all his activities, scientific, ethical and spiritual."¹ Philosophy in its true sense is a philosophy of life; this life is the life of man. Philosophy basically interested in the thinking process of man, Existentialism, Phenomenolism etc. are modern branches of philosophy, which have shifted their whole interest to man, his existent and their role in society.

Person is a very ambiguous concept, varied descriptions are found in different philosophies. Are all men being conceived as person? What constitutes the person? Is person only a psycho-physical organism? Is self person? Without self can there be a person? Regarding these questions answers are given differently by different philosophers. Both in Indian and Western philosophy, person occupies the important notion which is different from the 'subject'. Subject is epistemological concept while person is a practical concept. Subject is "who of knowledge" and "person is who of action." In Indian thought, both knowledge and action are subordinate to the concept of subject and in Western they subordinate to person. Action cannot be separated from life; simultaneously to perform action knowledge is essential. For knowledge universality is important, for that person requires transcending personal interest and prejudices.

1.1 Indian Views on Concept of Person

Indian attempt to comprehend person is a compound of two heterogenous principles, *cit* and *acit*, consciousness and body. The major systems have fully objective concept of body, body is acit, jada. It is distinct from the self which is most important truth to know and experience. Self is of the essence of consciousness. “And remove body from the world of things and assigns to it a decisive and positive role in the cultivation of subjective attitude and knowledge.”² “The material or physical side of person consists of elements, acts, and dispositions that either belongs to man’s physical body or originate straightaway from it in the mind. And spiritual side consists of elements, act and dispositions that do not owe their origin to the physical body in any such way.” Person is a unity of these two sides. These two entities cannot remain side by side; somehow remain in closest union as unitary whole. “It consists of unique I-feeling that characterizes one’s body and mind and whatever changes occur in them. The unreflecting I-feeling shows his sense of possessing extra bodily thing.”³ However, spirit is regarded as higher stage than matter, which by nature existed alone. “Spirit progressively tries to dissociate from the close entanglement of matter, and only in the highest stage, the spirit can be discovered as truly itself- in its full freedom.”⁴ The exact nature of this co-operation of these two entities is serious problem for Philosophy and Science.

Cognition is an important phenomenon of a person, as it is the individual state of consciousness. Consciousness is produced by the contact of sense organs with the respective objects. By the connection of senses and outer objects the external consciousness is aroused and by the connection of mind and the respective object

internal cognitions are produced. The knowledge is located in particular cognitions and cognition is simply individual state of consciousness. “Thus, there is a close connection between the nature of knowledge and nature of consciousness in Indian thought; and understanding the nature of consciousness is important for understanding knowledge and its soteriological consequence.”⁵

The existence of person is not against the world, but with the other, not solitary from the society and other persons. He has to act in the world and has to enjoy all suffering and pleasure. So in Indian philosophy person is characterized by *karṭṛtva* (agency) and *bhokṛtva* (enjoyment), concerned, caring, willing and acting with the world. The knowledge of the person enters in the structure through the participation which is determined by the life of interest. As an individual being the desires, action, success-failure, and pleasure-pain are centered on the concept of person. And as the social being a complex nexus of duties and obligations are taken to bind the individual person to other persons, to God and the nature.

In Indian philosophy no agreement is found regarding the status of individual, several views are upheld by the Indian thinkers. According to Kalidas Bhattacharya, some common points about individual in Indian Philosophy are -“(1) that every individual has a spiritual side; (2) that his spiritual side is, from the valuation point of view, more essential than his material side; (3) that its autonomy has to be fully realized; and (4) that this realization is possible through progressive detachment (*vairagya*) from the less essential sides of his being.”⁶ Thus the physical side is not given proper interest in Indian Philosophy in comparison to the spiritual (self) side. The psychic analysis is basically done on the basis of this spiritual side. But for knowledge the body has very important

role as without it sensation is not possible. Person has the autonomy to realize the nature of self which is possible by the detachment of material things. Due to these sort of explanations of person, most of the time it is criticized that there is no concept of person in Indian Philosophy, in its strict sense.

Individual is a human being who is not entirely a product of nature, accepting unquestioningly what nature offers and submitting blindly to its forces, but one who often resists it and initiates new action. “This over natural status of man is called ‘freedom’. In Indian philosophy the movements made by individual have been classified into three groups-*Tāmasika*, *Rājasika* and *Sattvika*.” Kalidas Bhattacharyya explains these three movements as it is explicitly given by Sāṅkhya, but according to him, except Cārvāka and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika all other Indian systems accept it.⁷ In *tāmasika* movement the individual has no control over nature and remains in a state of stupor. This is a blind biological movement and the individual is absolutely unfree. In *rājasika* movement the individual is conscious, but unreflective. He is prepared to take full responsibility for his actions, which are still not free; they are processed through and determined by emotions and sentiments. It is a state of positive attachment (*rāga*) or repulsion (*devśa*). This is also unfree movement like *tāmasika*, but here the individual performs action with *rāga* and *devśa*, which animal and man in stupor cannot.

Individual requires a good amount of effort to keep his actions confine within his mind, preventing them from maturing into physical action, or to channelize them into moral contexts, maintaining all through an overall control over them. This is the *sattvika* movement, and the guiding principle of this movement is detachment (*vairagya*). The absolute detachment leads to actions which are socio-moral (*dharma*) at a lower level

and spiritual (*adhyātmika*) at a higher. Practice again and again, channelizing ordinary actions and preventing from maturing into physical movement leads to accumulation of corresponding dispositions, make the individual stronger and sap. This entire course of progressive sapping constitutes the spiritual life of the individual and finally he reaches liberation (*mukti*). For liberation one has to make actual control of his activities, which is *sattvika* movement and after liberation one finds oneself in a new dimension altogether, beyond all *tamas*, *rajas* and *sattva*. The *sattvika* action is free as it does not individual with nature. A brief analysis is given, regarding the concept of person in different schools of Indian Philosophy in my Second chapter.

In contemporary Indian Philosophy we have seen the discussion of concept of person more widely and with a new outlook. In the philosophy of Tagore, K. C. Bhattacharya, Radhakrishnan and Gandhi 'person' (usually called by them as 'Man') is the centre of their thought. All of them conceive person is a combination of matter and spirit, where spirit is given most important. In contemporary Indian Philosophy, though, spirit is given more interest, yet their real interest in person. "They talk about suffering and mukti from suffering. It is not the spirit who is suffering. They talk about the state of existence and the final goal. This shows that in spite of their talks about the 'spirit', they are really interested in man, whom they want to place at a happier position."⁸

However, apart from the spirit, they admit existence of individual. For this Tagore refers to the finite aspects of man's nature, K. C. Bhattacharya refers the state of bodily subjectivity, the psychic life, towards feeling and introspection. Radhakrishnan denotes man as an organization of feeling and desire-man as 'body and mind'.

Person acts according to its situation, but person is not fully determined by situation. He has freedom to act. Freedom means in his situation man is free to take decision. All contemporary thinkers admit freedom in person. Freedom leads person to responsibility. Person is responsible for his deeds and other social relations.

Subjectivity is given prior importance by the contemporary thinkers. "Subjectivity is not mysterious capacity of man. It just means inwardness that implies man is lonely, free and has an awareness of his responsibility which creates in him an anxiety."⁹ Tagore says that all spirituality impose to man is only meaningful if human subjectivity is accepted. K. C. Bhattacharya elaborately discusses this subjectivity and he shows that the entire process of negation and assertion of different stages of subjectivity is nothing else but a process in the inner life of the individual. Radhakrishnan also said about subjectivity and mentions two types of subjectivity: inward subjectivity and spiritual subjectivity.

Another two important qualities of person mentioned by them are infinite potentialities and uniqueness. Person has immense potentiality in him to perform different actions. And being an individuals person is always unique and different from other individual and other creatures.

J. N. Mohanty tries to distinguish subject and person from Indian perspective. For him 'subject' is spirit understood as consciousness, for which the world is an object. Knowledge of the object is possible by subject. Object cannot be revealed by itself, it needs to be made an object for a subject. The word 'subjectivity' in general signifies what is relative to a subject, and so lacks universality. "To be the subject of knowledge requires transcending one's personal interests and prejudices and to attain universality,

such that knowledge is, in principle, valid for everyone.”¹⁰ Hence to know, person has to raise himself above his life of interest, and go beyond to the relative view of a person himself. “In other words, in order to be able to know, he must be a subject, over and above being a person.”¹¹

Person is a bodily-psychic unity which is unitarily self-conscious. About the nature of person, Mohanty says “The person on the other hand, is a concrete, corporal entity which calls itself I, a bodily-psychic unity that is appropriated into the structure of a unitary self consciousness. It is in the world, with others. Its mode of being in the world is not an epistemological subject’s having a world stand over against it, but a concernful, caring, willing and acting-temporally structured by systems of recalling, anticipating and lack of fulfillment. In the language of Indian Philosophers, the person is characterized by agency (*kartr̥tva*) and being an enjoyer (*bhoktr̥tva*); he is an agent and an enjoyer; his being an agent and being an enjoyer together form one total structure of mundanity.”¹² Thus, for person object is not only the object of knowledge, it has also affective and volitional concern. Knowledge gives rise desire (*icchā*) to acquire that leads to appropriate action (*pravṛtti*), which ends either in success or in failure, giving rise to pleasure or pain.

According to Mohanty, Indian Philosophers look at knowledge in two radically different manners:-“(1) From the point of view of subject, knowledge is manifestation of object; its entire purpose, and (2) From the point of view of the person, knowledge is an event which impinges into the affective-volitional structure, giving rise to desire, appropriate action, success and failure, pleasure and pain.”¹³

Mohanty says that it is wrong to think that Indian Philosophy does not have concept of person, but for him in Indian Philosophy still the concept of subject is dominating concept, under it the concept of person is underdeveloped. He refers to three important points.¹⁴

- (a) Almost all Indian theories of knowledge conceive of knowing as manifesting, revealing, illuminating, and unconcealing the object of knowledge. Although Indian epistemologist recognized the role of body and mental faculties in the acquisition of knowledge, its sole function is to manifest its object.
- (b) In the autonomous concept of person, namely in the theory of action, we also find shadows of the dominance of the concept of subject. In the mundane structure of desire, action, success or failure, pleasure or pain which centers around the concept of person. Person performs action out of desire and intended to bring about a consequence that leads to pleasure and pain. But for freedom person has to perform act with non-attachment. “But how can the person who, by definition, leads a life of interest act without attachment? As *Bhagavadgītā* recommends that action should be performed with complete non-attachment, of renouncing the sense of being the doer. “We have here an ethics of action in which the agent cease to be the person that he is, but reduces himself to a pure subject.”
- (c) In Indian philosophy concept of person is a ‘weak’ concept as it formulates a unity that is analyzable into component parts. A concept of person is strong if it formulates an irreducible and unanalyzable unity. Person is consisted of the empirical self split into the pure consciousness (*purusa*) and nature (*prakṛti*).

The former is conceived as individual (Sāṃkhya) and universal (Vedānta), by different systems, is still a witness self, an uninvolved observer, disinterested, neutral, the pure of knowledge but not an agent or enjoyer. The psycho-physical body, inner sense, ego-intellect complex is not conceived as itself a person, for it is not self conscious. Hence “the person is a derivative unity of two heterogeneous elements; a pure witness self, i.e. pure subject, and a psycho-physical complex. The later provides the causal conditions as knowing, the former the final epistemic condition of manifestation.

But in Buddhism concept of person is not a weak concept, as they developed it without accepting a permanent substance. There is no witness self, observer, or pure consciousness. For them consciousness is not special quality of permanent, eternal substance, it is produced by the combination of physical elements (*rūpa*) and mental states (*nāma*). According to Buddhism person is a psycho-physical organism that constituted by five aggregates (*skandhas*), twelve *āyatanas* (bases) and eighteen *dhātus*. In these three broad kinds of elements (*dharma*) no permanent substance is admitted for the basis for consciousness. Consciousness is produced by interconnection of external object and senses, which is regulated by the different stages of mind. Mohanty rightly observes that “Buddhism alone had the concept of knowledge as construction, but even there the constructing, synthesizing agent is not a subjective unity, an ego or a person; infact there is no agent other than the series of instantaneous cognitions with their inherited, but beginningless, tendency to conceptualize and objectify.”¹⁵ And other objections made by Mohanty are would be answered in my concluding chapter.

1.2 Western Views on Concept of Person

Commonly the 'person' means the experiencing and behaving self. Individual is a human being considered a single member of human kind. All individuals cannot be said as persons as they are unable to acquire the standing of full person as agents-in-society. When an individual, developing his manner through experience, behaving normally in the society following social principles, he is called person. "These are seen as making possible the performance of meaning laden conduct, that is, conduct construable or interpretable as action, according to system of principles."¹⁶ For the western psychologists important in the second order monitoring "self awareness" which is embedded in and shaped by linguistic usages, enables humans to respond to their own conduct as well as to that of others.

Person is conceived as a human being publicly considered an agent. To be a person, means to have a certain standing in a social order, as agent-in-society and who conduct construed as action. "The person is universally assigned some measure of freedom to choose among possible lines of action."¹⁷ As a social being person must acquire responsibility, accountability and liability. Other two important feature of person are his moral career and situationally contextualized.

G. G. Harris mentions three capacities (Harris pp.605-06) that should be possessed in a person-(a) judgmental capacity, (b) capacities of social entitlement and (c) mystical capacity. Someone suppose have judgmental capacity is considered capable of submitting his or her conduct as well as that of others to shared standards and values, and is capable of making appropriate decision and morally high choices. By social

entitlement capacity means the capacity to embody in one's conduct the rights, duties, freedoms, and constraints of specific social rules. By mystical capacity mean alleged capacities that are ordinarily hidden from day to day processes of construal, capacities recognized and properly assessed by special means such as divination, I. Q. testing and so on.

1.2.1 Strawson's Concept of Person

Strawson holds that person is living human being consisting of two fundamental elements-the M-predicates and P-predicates. The first one is those properties which can also ascribe to material objects, such as high, colouring, physical location etc. The second kind is that we ascribe to ourselves as wide range of features, state of consciousness, thoughts, perceptions, sensation etc. Thus, for Strawson the person is a combination of body and mental states, where the second one plays a very important role in human construction.

“A person is a type of entity to which both M-predicates and P-predicates are applicable, it is not an entity to reducible to a conjunction of two distinct entity to one of which M-predicates are ascribable and to the other of which P-predicates are ascribable.”¹⁸ There is no Cartesian duality in the Strawson's concept of person.

Person is not merely the subject of M and P-predicates, but they are language users, who apply P-predicates both to others and to themselves. They have the capacity to give linguistic expression to their knowledge believer and desires. Thus they act for reason, and use it for pursuing their goals and to justify or explain what they do by reference to such reason. The concept of person is not separable from that of an at least partly rational

creature. And persons being partly rational are also partly moral. Being animal they can feel pleasure and pain, flourish or suffer and so have a welfare and illfare. Being partly rational, they not only fare well or ill, they also do good and evil- knowingly contribute to the welfare and illfare of other. The concept of person is a subject of moral category, for a person is a subject of moral right and duties, subject to moral virtues and vices.¹⁹

A person is not merely a locus of perceptual receptivity dependent for its possibilities on such bodily facts, as described, but also a source and origin of action. Indeed, perception is not only co-ordinate with action, but also often the intend consequence of intentional action.

“My body is the vehicle of my expressive behavior, by means of which my inner life, my suffering and joys, emotions and desires are exhibited; it is the body by the use of the sense organs of which I perceive, and it is the movable part of which I move when I act.”²⁰

Every person has some special qualities, uniqueness that is not in others. One pain is not same with other pain. Frege put it “Nobody else has my pain. Someone may have sympathy with me, but still my pain belongs to me and his sympathy to him. He has not got my pain, and I have not got his feeling of sympathy.”²¹

1.3 Concept of Person in Buddhist Philosophy

In Buddhist philosophy concept of person is described from metaphysical view point, without accepting Self or *Ātman* as essence of person. Buddhism rejects the existence of self and states that human life is composite of five aggregates. The psycho-physical personality consists of five aggregates or *Skandhas*: *Rūpaskandha* or the aggregates of

the matter, *Vedanāskandha* or the aggregates of feeling and sensations, *Samjñāskandha*, or the aggregate of ideas, *Samskāraskandha*, or the aggregate of instincts, propensities, impressions etc. and *Vijñānaskandha*, or the aggregate of consciousness.

According to Buddhism, consciousness is either object of sense or of thought. Consciousness first comes into touch with object and then perception, feeling and volition arise. When the sense organ and object come into contact sensation arises. The object of senses is of five classes- sight, sound, smell, taste and touch. But Buddhism has not given definite account of the way in which sense experience is transformed into knowledge of memory and ideas.

Buddhism argues that person is a composite of body and mind, so the body of human being can not survived without the support of the mind. The five aggregates are equal to the body and mind, both make the person and they are interdependent. Unlike Hinduism and Descartes concept of dualism regarding self and body, Buddhism argued that mind and body are not completely independent.

Person in Buddhist context contains moral properties that must be respected by others. The five precepts of Buddhism: killing, stealing, sexual misconduct, lying and taking intoxicant are related with person. The first four statements are involved with other person, while the last one involved with oneself. For achieve the highest realization, requires leading a strict ethical life, and for it Buddhism points out the Eight Fold Noble path.

The life ideal, according to Buddhism, is the realization of the essential reality within man and becoming one with it. Buddhism emphasized on monk life than individual life

and insists on the separation of spiritual life from the social and political life. Man is a product of ignorance and karma and so, we must try to get over them. He wrongly thinks that he is the same as the psycho-physical personality (*pudgala*) formed out of five aggregates. He can know the essential nature by analyzing the aggregates away.

The goal of a person is the complete cessation of suffering, and it is the *Nirvāna*. The path of *Nirvāna* is highly ethical for which self control, control of mind, body and speech is necessary. But only this self control is not enough, the highest kind of concentration and self analysis are needed for the final result.

1.3.1 Concept of Person in Vaibhāṣika

Vaibhāṣika developed the concept of person as a combination aggregates (*skandhas*) and rejects any permanent entity (self), in a person. Person is a combination of 75 *dharma*s, which can be analyzed in three headings: *āyatana*, *dhātu*, and *skandha*. They admit the existence of external world, which is open to perception. According to Vaibhāṣika School, human bodies and the objects of sense are the combination of atoms. The atoms are immediately separated and their aggregation is but instantaneous. Things exist for four moments, those of production, existence, decay and death. Material things which offer resistance to sense organs are the collection of the four fold substance of colour, smell, taste and touch. Objects have independent existence apart from our perception.

The Vaibhāṣikas are natural dualists who maintain the independent existence of mind and nature. The mind is conscious of objects. Our knowledge or awareness of things is not mental creation, but discovery of mind. They hold that as per the substratum of consciousness the “*citta*” or mind is permanent. Memory is considered as *citta dharma*.

The sense objects are colour, taste, smell, touch and sound. The mind is aroused by the five sense organs that grasp the objects and the inner consciousness or *vijñāna* is raised to an excited status. “According to Vasubandhu, *citta* is one with mind, *vijñāna* or discrimination.”²² Both Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika advocate the threefold discipline *śīla*, *samādhi* and *prajñā* to lead ethical life of a person. Vaibhāṣika maintains that *Nirvāna* is real, good and eternal. As it is an *Asaṃskṛta dharma*, it has real existence and it can be achieved by following certain disciplines (*śīla*, *samādhi* and *prajñā*) and meditation (*samādhi*).

1.3.2 Concept of Person in Sautrāntika

Sautrāntika, like Vaibhāṣika, develops the selfless person, that constituted by the five aggregates, twelve *āyatans* and eighteen *dhātus*. But Sautrāntika does not believe in the real existence of person and also reduces the number of *dharma*s after critical examination.

The Sautrāntika admits the extra mental existence in the phenomenal world, but we do not have a direct perception. The real object is not object of perception, *pratyakṣya* that is only a representation, receives its form which is apprehended in consciousness. And based on that idea or representation the outer object is inferred. They must exist because there cannot be perception without an object of perception. Unlike the Sarvāstivādin, Sautrāntika does not maintain that the elements of experience have real existence.

As Sarvāstivādins, Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika admit similar views albeit in different contexts, and with some differences. About Sautrāntika Motilal Pandit writes “The Sautrāntika, while being an offshoot of the Sarvāstivada School, began its career by

examining critically the realism as propounded by Sarvāstivādins. The Sautāntikas attempted to rectify such shortcoming in the realism of the Sarvāstivāda that they found to be too glaring and self-evident. It is their critical approach that paved the way for the emergence of Mahāyāna idealism and accordingly came to be considered as forming a kind of bridge between the realism of early Buddhism and subjectivism of Mahāyāna.”²³ Critically examining the view of Sarvāstivāda, Sautrāntika reduced the number of elements (*dharmas*) to forty three from the seventy five of Sarvāstivāda. They also applied their critical approach in the theory of epistemology and presented the representationalism in contrast to the Vaibhāsika theory of presentationalism. Moral philosophy of Sautrāntika is almost same with Vaibhāsika and same process of cultivating morality is admitted to attain *Nirvāna*. *Nirvāna* for Sautrāntika is only the cessation of suffering, hence it is *abāva* (absence of passion etc), and a result produced by the *mārga*. *Nirvāna* is not real or eternal.

1.4 The Problematic

In this present research work I highlighted how Sautrāntika and Vaibhāsika as independent schools of thought find their place in the Buddhist theoretic concept of personhood. It is a critical investigation of the Buddhist theoretic concept of person with reference to the problematic that has been raised pertaining to the formation of a person as a psycho-physical, ethical and social being in both Sautrāntika and Vaibhāsika schools of thought. The distinct contribution of Buddhist study, their conceptualization of person without bringing a permanent self is the question to be answered in this research. The orthodox schools of Indian philosophy have, by default, accepted presence of a permanent substance

in a human being. This research aims at studying the notion Vijñāna (consciousness) as propounded by the Sautrāntika in a way distinct from other schools of Buddhism.

1.5 Objectives of the Research

The main objectives of the research are:

1. Critical investigation into the nature and content of person in Sautrāntika and Vaibhāṣika schools of Buddhism.
2. To explore the differences between concept of person in major schools of Hindu philosophy and Sautrāntika and Vaibhāṣika schools.
3. To understand the nature of person as a psycho-physical, moral and social being.

1.6 Methodology

The Nyāya philosophical investigation method consisting of seven steps would be considerably used in this research work. The richness and content of Indian philosophy uses combination of methods and is much more than that. This methodology contains critical and analytic models as well, but is not limited to these two.

1.7 An Overview of the Chapters

This research work is completed under consecutive six chapters including Introduction and Conclusion.

The second Chapter, **Concept of Person in Different Schools of Indian Philosophy** is divided in two parts. In the first part I have investigated the concept of person in Vedas and *Upaniṣads* and other schools of Indian Philosophy: Cārvāka, Jaina, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Sāṅkhya-Yoga, Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta. In this chapter my sift intention is to

critically analyze the concept person as a psycho-physical organism, mechanism of knowledge and his value from the stand point of different Indian Philosophical traditions.

Except Cārvāka, all other schools of Indian Philosophy regard that person is a combination of self and body where body is unconscious and self is conscious. Cārvāka does not admit any conscious thing (Self) other than physical object. For them consciousness is the byproduct of physical matter. Except Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika other schools admit consciousness is essential character of self. But for Nyāya consciousness is not an essential quality of self, it is an adventitious quality of *Ātman*. And all schools admit that in the process of knowledge, self plays a very important role.

In the second part of the chapter concept of person is analyzed from the Yogācāra and Mādhyamika view point. Here, I try to give a general understanding of a person as a psycho-physical organism and a moral and social being as developed by the two Mahāyāna schools. Yogācāra School conceives person as a combination of *Vijñāna* (consciousness), the only real existence and *dharmas*, which are not real; they have existence as pertaining to consciousness. In the discussion of *vijñāna* a detailed analysis of three kinds of *Vijñāna*: *Ālayavijñāna*, *Manovijñāna* and *Pravṛttivijñāna* are given from the Yogācāra standpoint. According to Yogācāra, *dharmas* are not real they have existence as pertaining to consciousness. Yogācāra accepts one hundred *dharmas* and I have given a detail description of these *dharmas* into five headings: (1) the *citta-dharmas*, (2) the *caittas*, (3) *rūpa dharmas*, (4) *citta-viprayuktasaṃskāradharmas* and (5) *asṃskṛa dharmas*. I also investigated the spiritual discipline and attainment of *Nirvāna* in Yogācāra philosophy.

Mādhyamika School developed their concept of person on the basis of their *Śūnyatā* theory. So, in the discussion of concept of person in Mādhyamika, first I try to give analysis of their dialectic method and *śūnyatā* theory. Mādhyamika has given a new outlook in the *anātmavāda* theory of Buddhism. I investigate *anātmavāda* theory, *pāramita* discipline and *Nirvāna* in Mādhyamika School to analysis the concept of person.

In the third chapter '**Person**' in **Vaibhāṣika School of Buddhist Philosophy**, I try to give a detailed description of the concept of person in Vaibhāṣika School. I start the chapter with historical development of Vaibhāṣika and explain the nature of person as developed by Vasubandhu in his '*Refutation of the Theory of a Self*'. According to Vaibhāṣika, person is conventional and substantially established reality which is an aggregate of *skandhas*. Then I present the Vaibhāṣika refutation of self theory presented by Tirthikas and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. Discussing the constituents of a person a detail analysis of dharma theory presented by Vaibhāṣika and along with three concepts *āyatana*, *dhātu* and *skandhas* are given.

Regarding ethical life almost same theories are advocated by Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika. So, in third chapter I intend to give an over view on Hinayāna morality which is based on three disciplines (*śila*, *samādhi* and *prajñā*). And in the fourth chapter I try to analyse the nature of morality, different kinds of disciplines, purifications, actions and practices as discussed in *Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam* by Vasubandhu from the Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika standpoint.

Vaibhāṣika maintains that *Nirvāna* is real, good and eternal. As it is an *Asaṃskṛta dharma*, it has real existence and it can be achieved by following certain disciplines (*śīla*, *samādhi* and *prajñā*). *Nirvāna* is not mere negation; it is a *dharma* in which there is the absence of *Samskāras*; in itself it is a positive entity. It is destruction of *kleśa* by *prajñā* and freedom from suffering.

In the fourth chapter **‘Person’ in Sautrāntika School of Buddhist Philosophy**, I elaborately discussed the concept of person in Sautrāntika School. First I sketch briefly the historical background of Sautrāntika School and then present Sautrāntika refutation of *Vātsīputriyas Pudgala* Theory and Saṃkhya-Vaiśeṣika’s theory of self. By analysis the constituent of person I try to give a detail description of *dharma* theory as presented by Sautrāntika. Sautrāntika reduces the number of *dharmas* to 43 from the Vaibhāṣika 75. All 43 *dharmas* are discussed clearly. Among the *dharmas* the *Āyatanas*, *Dhātus* and *Skandhas* are discussed in detail. In the discussion of *Vijñāna skandha* Sautrāntika theory of *Sākārajñānavāda* and Dīnāga theory are discussed.

Nirvāna for Sautrāntika is only cessation from suffering, hence it is *abhāva* (absence of passion etc), and it is a result produced by the *mārga*. *Nirvāna* is not real or eternal. The process for *Nirvāna* is explained almost same way by both Hinayāna schools.

In fifth chapter **A Study of Differences between Sautrāntika and Vaibhāṣika Schools of Buddhism on the Notion of Person**, I made a comparative study of Sautrāntika and Vaibhāṣika on the notion of the concept of person and other two Mahāyāna schools are also discussed. In this chapter my intention is to critically examine the concept of person as developed in four schools of Buddhism pertaining to the notions of *dharma*, morality

and *Nirvāna*. The analysis of the four schools of Buddhism reveals that ‘Person’ for all schools is a conventional reality under the universal change. It is because all schools believe in momentariness (*pratityasamutpāda*) theory. Suffering comes from the ignorance about the real nature of *dharmas* and worldly objects. And it is the *prajñā* that makes enlightenment, unveils the real nature of the things and ceases the suffering and one can attain *Nirvāna*.

The sixth chapter summarizes the major findings and discussions of the research work. Buddhism developed the concept of selfless person properly and strongly. The person in Buddhism is not a weak concept. Buddhism is a philosophy of man, here the person is given so much important that most of the time they remain silent about the metaphysical discussions. The whole discussion of my concluding chapter is done in five headings: concept of person in Buddhism, concept of person in Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika, momentariness and concept of person, *dharma* theory and concept of person, and *anātmavāda* and concept of person.

Notes and References

¹ Raju, P. T. and Radhakrishnan, S. (1995), ed., *The Concept of Man A study in Comparative philosophy*, New Delhi: Indus Publication, p.17

² Mohanty, J. N. (1993), *Essays on Indian Philosophy*, Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica p.84

³ Bhattacharyya, Kalidas, (1982), *The Indian Concept of Man*, Calcutta: Hirendranath Dutta Foundation, p.1

⁴ Ibid., p.3

⁵ Bhattacharyya, Kalidas, The Status of the Individual in Indian Philosophy, *Philosophy East and West*, Vol. 14, No. 2 (Jul., 1964), pp.131

⁶ Ibid., p.132

⁷ For more details see Ibid., pp.132-134

⁸ Lal, Basant Kumar, (1982), *Man: A Study in Contemporary Indian Philosophy from Existentialist Stand Point*, Patna: Bharati Bhawan., p.197

⁹ Ibid., p.205

¹⁰ Mohanty, J. N. (1992), *Reason and Tradition in Indian Thought*, New York: Clarendon Press. Oxford, p.195

¹¹ Ibid., p.196

¹² Ibid., p.196

¹³ Ibid., p.197

¹⁴ For more details see Ibid., pp. 197-198

¹⁵ Ibid., p.197

¹⁶ Harris, G. G. Concepts of Individual, Self, and Person in Description and Analysis, *American Anthropologist*, New Series. Vol. 91. No. 3 (Sep., 1989), p.600

¹⁷ Ibid., p.603

¹⁸ Hacker, Peter, Strawson's Concept of A Person, *Proceeding of the Aristotelian Society*, New Series, Vol. 102 (2002), pp. 21-40

¹⁹ For more details see Ibid., pp.28-29

²⁰ Ibid., p.31

²¹ Ibid., p.32

²² Radhakrishnan, S. (2013), *Indian philosophy*, Vol. I, Oxford: Oxford University Press., p.619

²³ Pandit, Motilal, (2008), *The Buddhist View of Knowledge and Reality*, Delhi: Manshiram Manoharlal Publishing Pvt. Ltd. p.221