Chapter V

Towards an Ethics of Responsibility

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5.1. Introduction

This chapter brings to the fore the major concern of the study that how the underlying principle that ultimately leads the chain of justificatory arguments which takes off from human cloning, the moral and ethical challenges against cloning in the modern philosophy, ethics and science, which shares the same platform of a metaphysically induced concept of human nature, doesn't satisfactorily validate itself. Therefore, the study resorts to the Postmetaphysical arguments to argue along with them more contextual reframing of autonomy and related justificatory grounds.

5.2. Ethical Problems of Human Cloning in a Nutshell

The dispute of human cloning has reached a peak point in present day context among all stages of community. The discussion involves the scientists, legislators, religious leaders, philosophers and different international organizations of the society. Most of the scientific, governmental and religious organizations of that time opposed reproductive cloning. However, a serious ethical concern has been developed because of the future possibility of clones. But, unfortunately of these diverse groups of people none of them thought harmoniously and worked together for a common goal. Over all, there was a general agreement comes out from this problem that human 'reproductive cloning' for the purpose of producing a genetically identical baby of human being is totally unethical. Leon R. Kass, in his book advocated that "the programmed reproduction of man will, in fact, dehumanize him".[1] Kass also believes that we should declare human cloning unethical in itself and unsafe in its possible consequences. According to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, Cloning

involves a violation of an ethical principle, namely the individual's right to integrity and this is why the European Parliament deems it unethical. According to the opinion of the Group of Advisors on the Ethical Implications of Biotechnology to the European Commission (No 9), human cloning is ethically unacceptable for reasons relating to instrumentalization and eugenics.[2] This procedure is not free from high risk as the failure rate of this process is too high. The failure rate of this process is more than 90 percent and this high rate morbidity of animal cloning strongly rejects its applicability in the case of human beings. Here after, animals which have is cloned also have to suffer high rate of deformity and disability. Therefore, the ethical understanding of cloning, especially with regard to human beings which honestly challenges its easy limitations.

Now, from the theoretical point of view the problems of cloning techniques are resolved so far. However, there are so many questions which are remains unsolved even today. These fundamental questions are namely, on what ground should the reproduction of human children by cloning procedure to be allowed or prohibited? Whether the procedure of cloning only be applied particularly for those barren couples or for those homosexual couples and who would become a biological offspring? Now, how would a child feel or experience his or her life after birth as an asexual reproduction? Is the human clone a 'unique individual' or a genetic 'prisoner'? Is a cloned child simply a twin of its genetic donor? Should the parents choose the inherited characteristics of a cloned baby? The scientists and the bioethicists possess their mind including these important issues. The scientists also support that the reproductive cloning technique is potential to endanger human identity. Of course, many of them argue that cloning procedure violates ethical principles; therefore it has to be prohibited. As for example, John Harris has stressed,

to deny humans the possible benefits of cloning and to deny them the freedom to choose how to reproduce is a violation of fundamental human rights and ethical principles, such as respect for human dignity, equality, and autonomy.[3]

From the discussions in different level, it is found that cloning, particularly human cloning is a complex and highly uncertain procedure. Therefore, there should be definitely some major ethical issues in terms of human cloning. Here we can discuss some of the major ethical considerations of human cloning, which can be grounded on the basis of following important points.

Never Harm Others:

It is obviously seen that all kinds of research related to cloning violates a fundamental principle namely, doing no harm to other creatures. Rather, animal cloning experiments, during which a large percentage of the clones die prematurely or have serious birth defects, obviously violate this principle. Therefore, in the context of human cloning, many experts express their comments that human cloning like animal cloning would also involve the same failure rate. As a result, most people refuse all kinds of human cloning, including animal cloning.

The principle of not to do any harm to others or never harm others may have some relevance to cloning at its early stages. As human being, we all are morally obligated not to impose any harm on a child which is born through human cloning technique. However, the cloning procedure is found very much dangerous for the child who is come out as a result after a long waiting procedure. Today, the present information of scientific development also indicates that this cloning technique is not fully safe and sound to use in the context of human beings.

Importance of Human Dignity:

It is quite natural that in our society we strongly belief in individual human dignity. Each and every individual have the moral right and responsibility to deal with for themselves and the most fundamental questions about the meaning and value of their own lives. In this sense, the existence of human cloning or genetic identical copy is interpreted not only as an assault on individuality but also an attempt to destroy the very fundamental nature of human dignity. Because, being a form of artificial asexual reproduction, human cloning represents an excellent manipulation of the essential relationship and interdependency which are at the origin of human having offspring as a biological act and an exercise of human desire. Therefore, treating a human being for the only purpose of producing therapeutic material, would not respect the dignity of the created human being.

Again, human cloning procedure objectifies human sexuality and modifies the bodies of women. While doing so, women are underprivileged from their inherent dignity. They remain only as the suppliers of eggs and wombs. In other words, the dignity of a person who is cloned similarly in danger because other persons and the technological powers which are exercised indisputably control over the duration of the life of the person as well as his or her unique identity. In this way, reproductive cloning threatens biological individuality and imposes the genetic composition of an already-existing person on the cloned person.

Again, the cloning technique in general would violate the human dignity and individual rights. It is observed that human cloning in any form and for any purpose should not be ethical because it violates human rights and certain basic ethical norms. Human cloning also violates the theory of equality and dignity. The instrumentation of human beings through the deliberate creation of genetically identical human beings

is always contrary to human dignity. It is a parallel misuse of both biology and medicine. The UNESCO stated that practices which are contrary to human dignity, such as reproductive cloning of human beings, shall not be permitted.[4]

Uniqueness and Individuality of Human Being:

There is one more important ethical concern in case of human cloning. Human cloning creates persons by depriving them from their uniqueness. The born 'twin' from cloning technique, which will usually lack individuality or the freedom to create his or her own identity because of uncertainty about or expections aroused by having the same DNA as another person. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, a 'person' is "a self-conscious or rational being."This is similar to the definition given by Derek Parfit, who claims that "to be a person, a being must be self-conscious, aware of its identity and continued existence over time."[5] But, it evidently contradicts the concept of respect for the individual person which undermines our moral system of the society. Once human beings are deprived of their uniqueness, then naturally, they will be devalued. So, producing human being by cloning procedure also poses a serious risk to our humanity. Such a view was certainly shared by the National Bioethics Advisory Commission, which cited it as "unknown risk" in its assessment of safety issues, as part of the justification of recommending a ban on human cloning.[6]

Respect for Human Persons and its Identity:

It is factually found that our media always gives particular attention to the supposed danger to individuality and uniqueness. It is also concern about our losing uniqueness and even our individual identities are derives from our apprehension over the clones as mere copies. Daniel Challahan, one of the founding father of American bioethics, mentioned cloning as "a profound threat to what might be called the right to

our own identity".[7] There is a conviction that human value or human dignity is a fixed agreement which is attached to our genetic sketch. This attitude derives from the common belief in genetic determinism, that is to say our personalities and our behaviors are genetically determined, whether this is toward violence, a tendency to adultery or happiness etc. Many of the arguments against cloning have focused on the idea that clones would be harmed because they would lack of unique identity possessed by naturally begotten human beings.[8]

The Importance of Family and its Moral Significance:

Again, the practice of human cloning also creates a threat in expressions of the moral significance of the family. It creates problem in finding out the meaning of parenthood and the role of the family in the life of the entire society. In this circumstances people also starts fearing that the parents who like to choose their child's genome through somatic cell nuclear cloning will expose the child just as a 'commodity' or an object which serve their own ends.

Perhaps cloned children would suffer through confusion over family relationships.[9] Any individual who is created by cloning procedure would be treading new ground in terms of family relationships. What would be the status of the original cell donor? Are they the real father or mother of the child? Will we call more correctly as its sibling? What would be the consequence to say the father-daughter relationship, if the daughter and wife were genetically identical? Would a woman have a normal mother-daughter relationship with her clone? A cloned child might feel totally alone in the world as because clone is a product of science and machinery rather than the offshoot of a family tree.[10]

Again, there are some critiques who have expressed their view that nuclear transfer process of cloning using adult donor nuclei to generate a complete human being would have some negative impacts on our family relationships. In our society, from the time immemorial, sex, reproduction, and family configuration have been connected in a dependable manner. However, concept of human cloning will absolutely alter these connections. For example, the mother of a clone could actually be considered as the child's sister. Again, a social father, for example, is not likely to suddenly rescind his responsibilities toward his daughter because the child is, genetically, his wife's twin sister.[11] In addition to this, the significance of sexual intimacy in terms of having offspring may become very poor. Of course many others have rejected this view. Some of them also commented that these new prospects of cloning human beings from the genetic material of an adult cell challenge some of the most fundamental concepts which we respect ourselves as social and spiritual beings.

Again, there may be some extraordinary relational circumstances which arise if we accept the concept of human cloning. For instance, birth of distant relative may be genetic brother or sisters. There might be a question of marital prohibitions among them. An imaginary destruction of the family unit is another additional argument against human reproductive cloning. Wide-spread cloning would exacerbate the problem by distorting generational boundaries, which would add a layer of confusion to society's conception of the nature of the family, and the roles of its individual members.[12] There may be huge possibility of negative impact on the concept of family because of these arguments against human cloning.

Lack of Respect for Nature:

Again, the rapid swiftness of scientific advances in cloning procedure has overpowered the public discussion regarding the control of the society and the

environmental impact of human cloning. The earth is on the boundary of experiencing a new kind of pollution. This kind of new pollution is known as biological pollution. The procedure of cloning animal as well as cloning human   disrespects the species as well as the individual. There are some scientists who openly talk about redesigning, or improving, human beings and animals. But, before imposing such type of risks on individuals or society, the scientists must have a firm opportunity of what they propose. The history of the introduction of alien species into native ecosystems as well as the use of toxic chemicals in the environment is examples of impulsive actions that have caused significant damage.[13] Today, humanity stands on the brink of a totally new and alarming change in our earth, as well a change which could carry us into an entirely new realm of artificial existence and a new type of pollution biological pollution more ominous possibly than chemical or nuclear pollution.[14]

Artificiality Concerns:

There is a consideration that children arise from natural reproduction has a deference with the children who arise from an artificial conception. Again, there is some character trait which is inherent in artificial conception which is not followed from a sexual relation, obliges parents regarding their children as mere objects. This character trait is not found in 'natural' conception. More importantly, given Meilaender's concern that the quality of parenting is compromised in tandem with the artificiality of conception, the study found that "the quality of parenting in families with a child conceived by assisted conception is superior to that shown by families with a naturally conceived child, even when gamete donation is used in the child's conception."[15]

However, some thinkers have argued that a cloned child would feel even closer to the parent from whom she was cloned, given that they would share all their genetic

information, rather than just half part of it. Moreover, the findings of the study supported the thesis that "genetic ties are less important for family functioning than a strong desire for parenthood,"[16] which suggests that the parents of cloned children would not be as caught up with the genetic origins of their offspring, and so their parenting would not be as affected by it, as Meilaender contends. According to the some study, the quality of parenting improved one behind the other with the quantity of effort that took to achieve parenthood. Here, it can be pointed out that the quality of parenting for cloned children would be just as good, if not superior, than any naturally conceived children.

Lack of creativity, concerns:

There are some Critics who also often claims that cloned children will be deprived of loving parents because their origins will be out of science, rather than natural love bindings. A study was conducted by Golombok positively seems to provide evidence to the contrary. In this context, deliberately taking steps towards creating a child via cloning procedure or any other kind of reproductive technology could be seen, instead, as a mutual affirmation of love on behalf of the potential parents and clear evidence that they really desired resulting a child. Whereas in sexual reproduction the child may be a product of chance, a cloned child would be a product of deliberate choice, which, according to some philosophers, could be a superior method of creation in some respects.[17] Creating a child via cloning does not entail that there is a lack of mutual love between the parents, or that the resulting child would be any less loved.[18]

It is true that human reproductive cloning is a much disputed ethical issue. The technique used in cloning human embryos is very similar to the technique used in cloning animal embryos. It is just because of the high rates of deformity, disability

and death, resulting from animal cloning, people also raised question whether resulting humans would be healthy and treated like normal individual. For example, clone Dolly was the only survivor out of 277 embryos which were cloned in the experiment conducted by Wilmut at the Roslyn Institute in Scotland. Unfortunately, Dolly was euthanized in 2003 at the age of 6 years as she developed a virus-induced lung tumor. It is not clear how long Dolly might have been expected to live because the natural life spans of sheep have not been well studied. "Nine months and then we eat them," Dr. Wilmut said. He added that while it is possible for pastured sheep to live for 11 or 12 years, those who live indoors, as Dolly had, are prone to develop lung infections. Dolly was kept inside for security reasons.[19] This is itself might seem to argue for caution where cloning human beings is considered. John Harris has said that the safety consideration is the one decent argument against cloning.[20] This new technologies of reproduction have created both new risks and new rights. At this stage, the risk of congenital anomalies constitutes a strong argument against creation of humans by human reproductive cloning. The Holy See firmly supports a worldwide and comprehensive ban on human cloning, no matter what techniques are used and what aims are pursued. Its position is based on (1) biological analysis of the cloning process and (2) anthropological, social, ethical and legal reflection on the negative implications that human cloning has on the life, the dignity, and the rights of the human being.[21] It is argued that human reproductive cloning should not be carried out because human clones are also likely to exhibit abnormalities like other experiments due to inappropriate epigenetic reprogramming.

Again, therapeutic cloning is the procedure in which human stem cells are used in order to study human development and treat disease. It has been identified as one of the most divisive subjects in modern biology (*Nature* 2004). However,

therapeutic cloning is closely related to reproductive cloning, in which a copy of an organism is produced. Of course, both these two procedures have very different goals. The therapeutic cloning is completely different from reproductive cloning technique and it does not involve the creation of a perfectly copied human being. No sperm fertilization is involved in therapeutic cloning, nor is there implantation into the uterus to create a child.

The goal of therapeutic cloning is to produce a healthy copy of a sick person's tissue or organ for its transplant. It would be more trustworthy to rely on organ transplantation from other people. The main business of reproductive cloning is to create a human being. On the other hand, the main business of therapeutic cloning is to generate and direct the differentiation of patient-specific cell lines that is isolated from an embryo which is also not intended for transfer in uterus. Although, these two kinds of cloning were related by technique but both are distinguished by their intended result. It is observed that, the therapeutic use of SCNT can be distinguished from reproductive use of SCNT for policy purposes. This distinction most likely showed an option of allowing the former while banning the latter.

But, it is unethical to perform any procedure that might be regarded as an experiment on a human subject or what will eventually become a human being? Therapeutic cloning is the ultimate misnomer, for it actually means killing.[22] Leon Kass cites this as a conclusive reason not to clone human claiming that in the absence of any consent-obtaining mechanism, such experimental procedures are intrinsically unethical.[23] So, before using therapeutic cloning procedure to treat human heart disease, diabetes, paralysis, etc., a number of ethical questions also have to be considered very seriously. Some of the important ethical questions are mentioned as follows-

Increasing Cures: It is found that research using therapeutic cloning technique is a very new field. Since the therapeutic cloning technique is new, the use of it is to be reconsidered more seriously. Because, it has already proved that developing stem cells from embryos have much better flexibility than adult stem cells.

Embryo is Treated as Human Person: The Pro-life supporters generally have a believe that human being comes into existence at the time of its conception. It is also understood that the technique of somatic cell nuclear transfer (SCNT) is sufficiently similar to normal conception with an egg and spermatozoa that a human person also comes into existence during therapeutic cloning. In this sense, the process of extracting stem cells or choosing to cultivate stem cells from that egg would be a questionable ethical decision. Because it indirectly involves the question of killing the embryo. Therefore, according to the pro-lifers, this process of therapeutic cloning is again like a way of killing.

Unsteadiness of Stem Cells: Again, there are numbers of shortcomings found in the field of therapeutic cloning procedure because the therapeutic cloning procedure is still in its early stages of its development. In this sense, it is obvious that feasibility of therapeutic cloning will not be satisfactory until and unless these shortcomings have been overcome.

Waste of Human Eggs: Again, Thomas Okarma, the chief executive of Geron Corporation, a leading stem-cell research establishment, expresses his opinion that if the diseases like diabetes is to be cured through therapeutic cloning; it will have to take 1.5 billion eggs for experiment to cure at least 15 million diabetic patient. But, extracting eggs from women in this way is highly painful, costly and unreliable, which is also full of risk.

However, in the contemporary world, the issue of cloning human beings is a very controversial one. It has received little serious and careful ethical attention until now. It was typically dismissed as science fiction, and it moves far from edge, but difficult to articulate, discomfort and even disgust in many people. Any kind of ethical assessment of human cloning at this level must be tentative and not final. But, luckily the science and technology of human cloning are not yet in hand, and lots of public and professional debate is still possible.

In this way, the ethical considerations of this new technological advance are well established in the potential risk to human beings and to the potential human beings. Many people thought of the possibility of making less important of the sense of human identity and their individuality. Some of them are also seriously concerns about the destruction of the quality of family life of human being. These questions arise only when human dignity is in danger.

Therefore, from the above discussion it is clearly observed how the scientific, philosophical and ethical justificaticatory arguments are established for and against Human cloning, as it has been shown in previous chapters. It also further studies how the concept of human cloning are grounded to large extent on the concept of autonomy.

5.3. Autonomy Question and Justifying Human Cloning, Concerns

Autonomy means one who gives oneself their own law. It is a concept found in moral, political and bioethical philosophy. In moral philosophy, autonomy is used as the basis for determining moral responsibility for one's actions. It is the ability to impose objective moral law on oneself. Therefore, Kant has rightly argued that autonomy is demonstrated by a person who decides on a course of action out of

respect for moral duty. It indicates that an autonomous person acts morally, exclusively for the sake of doing 'good'. According to Kant, although in theory I should respect the autonomy of others as I live out my own autonomy, in practice an autonomous mindset predisposes me to be unconcerned about how my actions will affect others.

There are different justifications found on different ground for human cloning. The justification appeals to the idea of autonomy is an increasingly popular appeal in this postmodern age, in which personal experiences of the people and their values play the most important role in determining what is right and true for them. According to this justification, we ought to respect people's autonomy as a matter of principle.

In the history of ethics as well as Bioethics, Autonomy is found as an important justification with reference to human cloning. As long as the people making autonomous choices to have good moral character which predisposes them to be concerned about the well-being of everyone else, there will not be any serious problems. The scientists, family members, and others are predisposed to act on the basis of their own autonomous perspectives when they are ruled by autonomy. Again, there are different forms of the autonomy justifications. However, three major forms stand out as particularly influential in the ethical consideration of human cloning. These three major forms are as follows-

a. **Individual Freedom:**

According to this form of autonomy, it is observed that there is a strong commitment in many countries, particularly in the United States to respecting people's freedom. This commitment is basically rooted in a variety of religious and secular background. In this background, respect for people entails allowing them to

make important life decisions which moves freely from their own personal values, beliefs, and goals, rather than forcing them to live by a difficult collection of social requirements.

b. Reproductive Choice:

Secondly, all kinds of reproductive decisions are exceptionally private and personal matters. Therefore, they have massive implications for one's future responsibilities and his or her well being. In this area of interest, social intrusion is particularly disgusting.

c. Scientific Inquiry:

Finally, it is seen that an important value has long been placed for protecting the freedom of scientific inquiry. It is also obvious that more knowledge and better understanding increases our capacity to make good decisions and achieves great things in the world.

From the above discussion, it becomes clear that autonomy is an important ethical justification. However, these forms of justification do not provide a sufficient ethical ground for human cloning. We need to examine them more carefully. While the concern for freedom and responsibility for one's own life, autonomy justifications are also as intensely rejected as utility justifications.

The word autonomy comes from two Greek words namely, '*auto*' meaning 'self' and '*nomos*' meaning 'law'. In the context of ethics, the word 'autonomy' literally signifies that the self has its own ethical law, which generates its own standards of right and wrong. There is no support that inspires confidence in this way of looking at the world to consider the well-being of others. Although in theory, I should respect the autonomy of others as I live out my own autonomy; in practice an

autonomous mindset predisposes me to be uninterrupted about how my actions will affect others.

As long as the individual making autonomous choices they should have good moral character which predisposes them to be concerned about the well-being of everyone else. There will not be any serious problems in this regard. For example, in the United States, the significant influence of Christianity with its authoritative command to love others sacrificially has encouraged people to use their autonomous choices further to the interests of others in conjunction with their own. In this sense, consciously or unconsciously, selfish and other base motives arise within us continually, and without countervailing influences, there is nothing in an autonomy outlook to ensure that the well-being of others will be protected.

Again, protecting people's own choices is good as long as they are in a comparable position to make their own choices. But, if some people are economically or socially or physically very weak then they may not be able to avail themselves the same opportunities. They would surely want to do so even if under more equitable circumstances. So, in an autonomy-based approach, there is no commitment to justice, caring, or any other ethical standards that would safeguard those people who normally able to stand up for themselves.

Again, an autonomy justification is simply an insufficient ground for justifying a practice like human cloning. It indicates that curtailing people's freedom would otherwise not a sufficient argument to justify an individual action. We have learned this lesson the hard way, by allowing scientific inquiry to proceed without any restriction. The Nuremberg Code resulted from research atrocities that were allowed to occur because it was not recognized that there are other ethical considerations that can be more important than scientific and personal freedom (autonomy).[24]

On the other hand, the autonomy justification itself is flawed and there is many more to say about it as a ground for defending human cloning. It is found that even if autonomy was an adequate type of ethical justification, it is far from clear that whether it would actually justify the practice of human cloning. An honest, complete autonomy based evaluation of human cloning would have to consider the autonomy of all persons involved, including the people produced through cloning, and not just the autonomy of researchers and people desiring to have clones.

It is also observed that human cloning procedure involves a high risk to the clone's life. There is no authentic way to undertake human cloning at this juncture without a major loss of human life. Even, in the process of cloning the sheep Dolly, there were 276 failed attempts failed, including the death of several so-called 'defective' clones. Afterward mammal cloning has developed fatalities and deformities which were unavoidably accompany cloning research. Now, when these experimental technologies to be applied to human beings, then it will show that many human embryos, fetuses, and infants would be lost and many others deformed whatever the process is used. There will be a great tragedy in this sense. This tragedy would be multiplied unlikely in terms of human cloning research. Loss of human life would be occurred almost simultaneously at various private and public research of human cloning if it is allowed.

Again, experimentation on human beings is allowed only with their explicit consent. But, in the case of a child an exception is sometimes granted and also including one still in the womb, who has a verifiable medical problem. In this situation, an experimental treatment may be able to cure or help the child. However, human cloning procedure is not covered by this exception for two separate reasons. (1) There is no existing human being with a medical problem in the situation in which

a human cloning experimentation would be attempted. (2) Even if that were no hindrance, there is typically no significant therapeutic benefit also to the clone in the many case for which cloning human has been proposed. Therefore, to proceed with human cloning at this level, would involve a massive assault on the autonomy of all clones produced, whether they alive or died.

Again, there is also some other ways where human cloning would conflict with the autonomy of the people. It is occurred most intimately in the case of practice, that is, the clones themselves. The practice of human cloning would radically weaken the family structure and relationships of the clone. Therefore, it would be fundamentally unusual with their most primary interests. Confusion arises even the most basic relationships involved in human life. For example, the children who results from cloning procedure really the siblings or the children of their 'parents' or of anybody else. So, in spite of any future legal resolutions of such matters, child clones will almost certainly experience lots of difficulty and confusion. Such confusion will weaken their psychological and social well being and also their very sense of identity.

Again, creation of human cloning is problematic enough, where a matter of clearly identified family is involved. Particularly, during the experimental phase identifying the parents of clones produced in a laboratory may be more problematic. Whether the donor of the genetic material automatically is the actual parent of the clone child! Think about the egg donor into which the genetic material is inserted! If the genetic material and egg are simply donated anonymously for experimental purposes, does the scientist who manipulates them and produces a child from them become the parent? In this particular context, a question of providing necessary love and care for the damaged embryo, fetus, or child again becomes very important.

According to the U. S. National Bioethics Advisory Commission's report, human cloning "invokes images of manufacturing children according to specification. The lack of acceptance this implies for children who fail to develop according to expectations, and the dominance it introduces into the parent-child relationship, is viewed by many as fundamentally at odds with the acceptance, unconditional love, and openness characteristic of good parenting."[25] "It just doesn't make sense," to quote Ian Wilmut, who objected strenuously to the notion of cloning humans after he succeeded in producing the sheep clone Dolly.[26] He was joined by U.S. President Clinton, who quickly banned the use of federal funds for human cloning research, and by the World Health Organization, who summarily labeled human cloning ethically unacceptable.[27] It is observed that reaction of the people, who typically might want to 'have' a clone, but he or she would not want to 'become' a clone. There is an important difference between these two ideas, namely having a clone and to becoming a clone. Therefore, it is the intuitive recognition that the option of cloning may expand the autonomy of the person producing the clone; it only undermines the autonomy of the clone.

In this sense, the autonomy justification is much more challenging than it might at first appear to be. We would not to attempt to justify human cloning by autonomy justification because of its inherent deficient performances. But we must have to be honest and pay special attention to the autonomy of the person most intimately involved in the cloning procedure, if we are to create it. A special kind of appeals to 'freedom' or 'choice' may able to persuade it. But if the autonomy of people is limited only to a clone's autonomy, then that kind of appeals must be rejected. In this connection, it is also observed that in an autonomy based justification

of human cloning, there is no such commitment to justice, caring, or any other ethical standards which would safeguard those least able to stand up for themselves.

However, the tricky ground here is that an honest, complete autonomy-based evaluation of human cloning would have to consider the autonomy of all persons involved, including the people produced through cloning, and not just the autonomy of researchers and people desiring to have clones. This challenges autonomy claim as guiding ethical principle. Though it routes the contemporary discourses on cloning including science, fall back on a concept of human nature, integrated by an invariable metaphysical principles, the present study aims to argue that the 'metaphysical frameworks', as mentioned in the beginning, seeks a stance beyond static or objectivist metaphysics. Therefore, the study takes a decisive turn here to extend its investigation on the basis of a Postmetaphysical idea of ethics.

5.4. Metaphysics: At a Glance

Metaphysics is that kind of "science" which studies "being as such" or "the first causes of things" or "things that do not change". Of course, it is not possible to define metaphysics for two reasons. First of all, a philosopher who denied the existence of those things that had once been seen as constituting the subject matter of metaphysics first causes or unchanging things would now be considered to be making thereby a metaphysical assertion. Again, secondly, there are many other philosophical problems which are now considered to be metaphysical problems which are not related to first causes or unchanging things, for example, the problem of free will or the problem of the mental and the physical.[28]

In the period of eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the term Metaphysics was used mostly to include questions about the reality of the external world, the possibility

of a priori knowledge, the existence of other minds and the nature of sensation, memory abstraction etc.

5.5. Postmetaphysical Arguments of Habermas

Jurgen Habermas (1929) is a prominent German sociologist and philosopher in the tradition of critical theory and pragmatism. He is perhaps most preeminently known for his theories on communicative rationality and the public sphere. Habermas presently stands as one of the most important and influential philosophers in the world. He has tried to make a bridge between the continental and Anglo-American traditions of thought. He has seriously engaged in debates with some prominent thinkers very different from Gadamer and Putnam, Foucault and Rawls, Derrida and Brandom. Habermas has considered his major contributions to be the development of the concept and theory of communicative reason or communicative rationality, which distinguishes itself from the rationalist tradition, by locating rationality in structures of interpersonal linguistic communication rather than in the structure of the cosmos.

According to Habermas, the term "postmetaphysical" refers, in part, to this more reflective form of reasoning, which can be seen as emerging in academic circles but also characterizes an emerging sophistication in informal reasoning in post-modern society (Habermas, 1992). Its focus is only on his understanding of metaphysics and of his own thinking as postmetaphysical, in his sense. Habermas often comes close to identifying metaphysics with the modern philosophy of subjectivity or consciousness.

The very beginning of Habermas' concept of postmetaphysical thinking is his argument that currently justifiable philosophical thinking must break radically free from the philosophical tradition. While explaining this concept, Habermas identifies

four aspects of the thinking which follows this split, namely, (1) It must be postmetaphysical, (2) It must take the linguistic turn, (3) It must exclusively situate reason and (4) It must include reason among the practices of the life world, thereby historicizing it. In this way, it must overcome logocentrism, in significant part by subordinating theory to practice. Taking the linguistic turn and subordinating theory to practice are the central positive aspects of postmetaphysical thinking of Habermas.

Again, Habermas uses the term 'postmetaphysical,' is to signify only, 'beyond' what he calls 'metaphysics'. Most significantly, it is beyond Kantian and post-Kantian philosophies of subjectivity. It cannot mean, 'beyond' all that, in the history of philosophy, has been called 'metaphysics'. Two very important paths, even if they are not wholly independent, lead Habermas to his post-metaphysical position. One of them is historico-philosophical path and the other is, thematic path. Subsequently, to understand what Habermas signifies postmetaphysical thinking of crucial importance to clarify how he understands metaphysics. In the various writings of Habermas, there is no clear-cut characterization of metaphysics. Rather, there are only these frequent descriptive and critical references to metaphysics. The best of these kinds are available in Habermas book *Postmetaphysical Thinking*. According to Habermas, he has restricted his consideration almost exclusively to metaphysics after Kant. He refers to metaphysics before Kant only incidentally, generally when he provides a very general division of epochs of philosophical thinking in terms of being, consciousness, and language, distinguishing the corresponding modes of thought as, respectively, ontology, philosophy of consciousness or subjectivity, and philosophy of language[29] about being and ontology, he has almost nothing to say.

Again, Habermas' post-metaphysical stance[30] makes a critique of the western metaphysical tradition and its glorified conception of reason by de-mystifying the

metaphysical traps which shapes its concepts of reason. Habarmas, in his great work *Postmetaphysical Thinking,* presents a kind of concise characterization of his understanding of metaphysics, which showing differences among four aspects of metaphysical thinking. Amongst these aspects, the first aspect is the identity thinking, by which Habermas means a mode of thinking that aims at articulating a view of the whole, of the unity of the one and the many. The second aspect, Habermas introduces with uncertainty, the term idealism, which he explains with reference to Plato's concepts of Ideas, and not to any philosophical schools which known as idealistic. At this particular stage, Habermas introduces the third aspect of his metaphysical thinking. In the third aspect, he asserts that idealistic philosophy tried to renew the identity theory of Platonic idealism by accomplishing a paradigm shift from ontology to mentalism. By doing this he is also laying the foundations for subjectivity and consciousness. Lastly, the fourth aspect of metaphysical thinking according to Habermas is the strong concept of theory. The first version of this concept of theory is originated in ancient Greece.

As Pius V Thomas rightly pointed out "The postmetaphysical stance in Habermas has two wings (implications): One, Habermas calls the post-metaphysical ethical implication 'the concept of being able to be oneself'- autonomy and the right to be postmetaphysically self-organized; the other, is the inter-subjective framework to associate self with critique. They orient the engagement with the other at the ethico-political plane primarily, as 'concretizable' self critique through the right discourse of deliberative process/procedure of positive law. In the context of cultural critique the post-metaphysical intent claims the inter-subjective unity of reason that sets an 'ideal critique situation' beyond the scattered local commitments of the various universes of discourse".[31]

It is found that Habermas normally proceeds on the assumption that Post-Hegelian philosophy, or at least any such philosophy which is worth considering, is postmetaphysical. According to him, metaphysics as a central philosophical concern from the time of ancient Greece to that of Hegel. Indeed, he often comes closer to identifying metaphysics with the philosophy of subjectivity or consciousness. While, Habermas' considerations of pre-Kantian metaphysics are only global and marginal. Of course, there are many aspects of metaphysics in which Habermas fails to consider in anything approaching adequate detail. Out of that, the most significant aspect is the grand tradition of philosophy of being.

However, Habermas remarks that the reorientation of knowledge from material to procedural rationality need not by any means completely surrender the relationship to the whole that had distinguished metaphysics.[32] According to Habermas, this lack of surrender does not engage the reintroduction of any modified version of metaphysics. For him, the whole is not the whole of any historical version of metaphysics. Rather, it is simply identified with the human lifeworld. Here, the concept of lifeworld has been treated as a central concept to Habermas' philosophy throughout his long development. The lifeworld is already intuitively present to all of us as a totality which is unproblematized, non-objectified, and pre-theoretical as the sphere of that which is daily taken for granted in the area of common sense.

According to Habermas, Philosophy liberates itself from logocentrism when it is not completely engaged by the self-reflection of the sciences. Its look is not absorbed on the scientific system, when it reverses this standpoint and looks back upon the undergrowth of the lifeworld. As an analyst, in which it mediates between expert knowledge and everyday practices in need of orientation, philosophy can make use of that knowledge and contribute to making us alert of the deformations of the

lifeworld. According to Habermas, it can do so only as a critical agency, for it is no longer in possession of a positive theory of the good life. So, after metaphysics, the nonobjective whole of a concrete lifeworld is now present only as perspective and background, cleverly escapes the grip of theoretical objectification. Marx's saying about the realization of philosophy can also be understood in this way: what has, following the disintegration of metaphysical and religious worldviews, been divided up on the level of cultural systems under various aspects of validity, can now be put together and also put right only in the experiential context of lifeworld practices.[33]

There are two ways of arriving at and characterizing and explaining Habermas' postmetaphysical position. Even though these two paths are not wholly independent, it leads him to his own position. They are historic-philosophical path and thematic path. The conclusion to which Habermas' historico-philosophical path leads him is that history has shown that metaphysical thinking is obsolete today. Rather, it belongs to the past. At present, it can no longer claim validity. In this context, Habermas makes two primary and influential assumptions, one which is methodological assumption and another one is contextual or thematic assumption.

According to Habermas, the only real subject matter for philosophy is the dimension of social interaction and communicative practices. It has the task of analyzing and articulating the rationality, which is inherent in the validity, based on day by day speech. It also indicates that reason and rationality both are restricted to day by day practices of modern individuals and philosophy to the clarification of procedures and norms upon which our public reflection depends. This must be understood in a restricted sense are the modes of explanation that we use in our moral and political deliberations, and the ways we determine which claims of others are also valid. In this way, Habermas attributes to communicative reason when he formulates

methods, which are suitable for conducting our political and ethical discourse. This influential thematic restriction of philosophy has a significance that philosophy must be conceived as nonmetaphysical or, more accurately, post metaphysical thinking. The shortest and most sufficient characterization of this status of Habermas' postmetaphysical thinking can be observed in the programmatic expression mentioned above.

5.5.1. Habermas' Theory of Truth as Knowledge

Habermas explicitly treats knowledge in several writings, and most extensively in his influential Book *Knowledge and Human Interests.*[34] Of course, he has never presented any significant analysis of his concept of theory. In his various essays on empirical truth, Habermas usually regards propositions as the truth-bearer: in making an assertion, "I am claiming that the proposition that I am asserting is true".[35] In his early treatment, Habermas immediately equated empirical truth with perfect justifiability, the consensus theory of truth. According to that theory, the "truth condition of propositions is the potential assent of all others"; thus "the universal-pragmatic meaning of truth…is determined by the demand of reaching a rational consensus"[36] Such formulations suggest that Habermas equated the meaning of truth with the outcome of a universal, rational consensus, which he understood in reference to the ideal speech situation.[37] However, Habermas has found out the difficulties with consensus theory. He never allowed "Wahrheitstheorien", one of his prominent essays on the consensus theory of truth, to come into view in English. Like the 'epistemic' theories of truth that link truth with ideal warranted assertibility, consensus theory downplays the justification-transcendent character of truth.[38]

Habermas now proposes instead a "pragmatic epistemological realism"[39] In this context, Habermas holds a realist theory of truth in caring the objective world,

rather than ideal consensus, is the truth-maker. For example, if a statement for which we claim truth is indicating true, because the statement correctly refers to the existing objects. It can accurately represents the actual states of affairs even though objects and states of affairs about which we can state the facts only under descriptions which is depend on our linguistic resources. Here, the inescapability of language controlled over the pragmatic epistemological character of Habermas' idea of realism. Specifically, Habermas abstained from the attempt to develop the relationship between proposition and world metaphysically. He developed the meaning of accurate representation pragmatically, in terms of its implications for everyday practice and discourse together.

According to Habermas, to that extent as we take propositional contents as unproblematically true in our daily practical engagement with reality, we act confidently on the basis of well-confirmed beliefs about the objects around the world. This is what Habermas calls "theoretico-empirical" or "theoretical" discourse which becomes necessary when belief loses their unproblematic status as the result of practical difficulties, or when the new circumstances ask questions about the natural world. This kind of cases known as an empirical inquiry in which truth claims about the world are submitted to a critical testing. Even if Habermas likely to sharply separate action and discourse, it looks more reasonable to regard such critical testing as combining discourse with experimental actions. It is seen in scientific inquiry that combines empirical arguments with practical actions, that is, field studies and laboratory testing.

Habermas has not drawn out the implications of his discourse theory for a comprehensive account of truth-oriented discourses, which we find most extremely developed in the sciences. As an argumentation theory, such an explanation would

possibly have to take the following broad outline. According to Habermas, at this logical level, the discursive justification of challenging truth claims a lot that relies on empirical reasons of assessment reports is the results of experimental tests, and the like. Similarly for the dialectical level, the chief challenges take place from the theories and observations that apparently conflict with the claim at issue or with its supporting reasons. At the metaphorical level, one seeks the agreement of a potentially universal spectator, given that truth claims are about an objective world that is the same for all human beings.

5.5.2. Habermas' Discourse Theory of Ethics

The moral theory of Habermas is called discourse ethics. It is considered for contemporary societies, where moral agents come across the pluralistic notions of the good and try to act on the basis of publicly justifiable principles. This theory first received explicit and independent articulation in *Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action*[40] and *Justification and Application,*[41] but it was projected by and depends on ideas in *Theory of Communicative Action*. According to Habermas, Discourse is conceived in such a way that it is to be realized during the "cooperative readiness to come to an understanding" on the strength of reason alone and is rationally different from everyday context of communicative achievement. So, discourse ethics come into views at the end of Habermas' reflective reconstructive engagement, as the highest point of the exceeding programme to overcome hermeneutics.

Habermas' idea of discourse ethics applies the framework of a pragmatic theory of meaning and communicative rationality to the moral sphere in order to show how moral norms are justified in contemporary societies. It could be seen as a theory that exposes what we pragmatically *do,* when we formulate and protect the moral

273

validity that claims fundamental and manifested in our norms. However, we have to be careful with this characterization. Since its cognitive commitments to *moral education* and *knowledge,* discourse ethics cannot simply be a reconstructive description of how do we virtually avoid conflicts and stabilize expectations in post-conventional social contexts. This is also an attempt to present a formal practice for determining which norms are *indeed* morally right, wrong, and permissible.

Again, discourse ethics is exactly situated in the practice of Neo-Kantian deontology in which it takes the rightness and wrongness of obligations and actions to be universal and unconditional. In this situation, the same moral norms are applied to all agents in the same way. Here, they strictly bind one to perform certain actions, prohibit others and identify the boundaries of acceptability. There is no 'relative' strength of genuine *moral* norms even though, we perceive that they can be rooted in social contexts, which have consequences for their submission. As long as these caveats are kept in mind we can understand discourse ethics by analyzing the practice of making and protecting validity claims and how there are certain conditions of possibility tacitly groundwork and enabling this practice.

Again, Habermas' idea of discourse ethics engages the sense of dialogue with an idea, which goes deep and necessitates a 'rational framework' to talk about the moral circumstances and norms and to allow dialogue on behalf of oneself and taking the risk to be responsible to listen to the other. Discourse ethics accepts this challenge from the communicative point of view which connects the ultimate speech situation and the communicating the public as the counter factual principles. In this sense, discourse ethics possibly is one more step nearer to the idea of true dialogue which means the assumption of a position to know and acknowledge the self and other jointly at inter-subjective, inter-personal, inter-social and intercultural stage.

Therefore, enlightening the main agenda of discourse ethics, mainly, to reveal the unseen connection between justice and common good, which has been usually detached to give birth to isolate ethics of duty and the good, Habermas discusses the intersubjective approach which shapes discourse ethics to its logical conclusion.

Again, there are two continuous interests of Habermas in political theory and rationality which have come together in his discourse theory of deliberative democracy. Here, we see Habermas is struggling to show how his highly idealized, multi-dimensional discourse theory has real institutional achievement in complex, modern societies. In this context, argumentation appears in the form of public discussion and debate over practical questions that confront political bodies. Now the challenge is to explain how an idealized model of practical discourse connects with real institutional contexts of decision-making.

In the "discourse principle", Habermas summarized his idealized conception of practical discourse. This can be stated as follows- A rule of action or choice is justified, and thus valid, only if all those affected by the rule or choice could accept it in a reasonable discourse. Although he first understood discourse principle as a principle of moral discourse, he now positions it as an overarching principle of impartial justification that holds for all types of practical discourse.[42] As such, it simply summarizes his argumentation theory for any question involving the various "employments of practical reason".[43] Here, discourse principle accordingly applies not only to moral rightness and ethical authenticity, but also to the justification of technical as well as pragmatic claims about the choice of effective means for achieving a given conclusion. In this context, each type of practical discourse involves a further specification of discourse principle for the content at issue. While developing his democratic theory, Habermas has been particularly concerned with

two such specifications, namely, moral discourse and legal-political discourse. While distinguishing these two types of discourse, Habermas has tackled the traditional problem of the relationship between laws and morality. He also points out how to bring ethereal discursive idealizations behind the institutional earth.

Of course, Habermas' discourse theory of morality generally goes by the name "discourse ethics," is to some extent misleading brand name given that "ethics" has a distinct non-moral sense for him, as noted above. The idea of a discourse ethics was anticipated by G. H. Mead and has been pursued by a number of philosophers.[44] Habermas' accounts of discourse is heavily obligated to the Kantian tradition. Like Kant, he also considers morality as a matter of unconditional moral obligations. It is the prohibitions, positive obligations, and permissions which regulate interaction among persons. According to Habermas, the job of moral theory is to reconstruct the unconditional force of such obligations as impartial dictates of practical reason which hold for any correspondingly located agent. Habermas, like Kant also connects morality with respect for autonomous agency. While following the dictates of impartial reason, one follows his or her own conscience and shows respect for other such agents. But, unlike Kant, Habermas takes a dialogical approach to practical reason, as his discourse theory requires. Kant supposed that in principle each mature, reflective individual is guided by the Categorical Imperative, which could reach the same conclusions about what duty requires. This supposition has long been recognized as problematic, but in pluralistic and multicultural settings it becomes entirely untenable. In this situation, one may reasonably claim to take an impartial moral point of view only by engaging in real discourse with all those which are affected by the issue in question.

Again, Habermas' principle of discourse articulates this dialogical requirement. Here, if someone assumes this dialogical requirement, then one can arrive at Habermas' specific conception of reasonable moral discourse. The moral discourse is arrived by working out the implications of Habermas' argumentation theory for the discursive testing of unconditional moral obligations. What one gets is a dialogical principle of universalization, "A moral norm is valid just in case the foreseeable consequences and side effects of its general observance for the interests and value orientations of each individual could be jointly accepted by all concerned without coercion" (i.e., in a sufficiently reasonable discourse).[45] Habermas maintains that universalization can be deduced from statements articulating the pragmatic implications of argumentative discourse over moral norms[46] More precisely, a successful deduction probably depends on three assumptions. These three assumptions are discourse principle, a statement of the semantics of unconditional norms, and an articulation of the pragmatics of discourse. If we accept discourse principle and also accept Habermas' explanation of the metaphorical presuppositions of the discursive justification, which is required by discourse principle, then universalization would have to follow as an implication of what is required for discursively justifying norms with the specific content of moral norms. These moral norms are namely obligations which connect persons in general and whose acceptance thus affects each person's pursuit of interests and the good life. From the argumentation theory point of view, this universalization seems to state the burden of proof, which structures an adequate process and procedure of justification.

The Principle of universalization assumes that valid moral rules or norms allow for an egalitarian community of autonomous agents governed by "common laws". Kant put it, a "systematic union of different rational beings." However, the

universalization principle has been a site of controversy among discourse theorists. All of them do not consider it necessary for a discourse ethics. There are some feminist advocator of an "ethics of care", who have bothered that neo-Kantian model of universalization of Habermas screens out morally relevant individualities of concrete situations and persons.

Again, the discourse ethics of Habermas also depends on some of the very strong assumptions about the capacity of persons for moral dialogue, whether or not the argument for universalization goes through. His discourse theory in general, and model of universalization in particular, rests on counterfactual idealizations. In this connection, one might be tempted to regard universalization as a hypothetical thought which experiment, corresponding to that we find in other neo-Kantian or contractualist theories like John Rawls and T. M. Scanlon. To some extent, this is correct that to regard a moral norm as valid, one must have to suppose it which would hold up in a fully inclusive and reasonable discourse. But Habermas, a step ahead persistently declared that universalization is a principle of real discourse. An individual's moral judgment counts as fully reasonable only if, it issues from participation in actual discourse with all those who are affected. Moreover, universalization requires not simply that one seek the input of others in forming one's conscience, but that one gains their reasonable formal contract.

According to Habermas, to bring some strong idealizations which are down to earth, one must have to connect them with conscientious judgment in their daily moral practice. But, one way to do this is through an account of the appropriate application of moral rules in concrete circumstances. In response to ethics-of-care objections, Habermas has acknowledged the need for such an account.[47] He has pointed out that, in moral discourses of application, one must test alternative normative interpretations

of the particular situation for their acceptability before the limited audience of those immediately involved, assuming that one is applying certain valid general principles. But, even at the level of application, discourse cannot always include all the affected parties. Habermas' discourse ethics thus implies that for many, if not most, of our moral rules and choices, the best we can achieve are partial justifications: arguments, which are not conclusively convincing for all, but also are not conclusively defeated, in limited discourses with interlocutors we regard as reasonable[48] Moreover, Habermas has also attempted to give discourse ethics some empirical foothold by looking to moral psychology and social anthropology.[49] Here, the psychological line of argument draws on the theory of communicative action to reconstruct Lawrence Kohlberg's theories of moral development. according to Habermas, the moral maturation involves the growing ability to integrate the interpersonal perspectives which is given with the system of personal pronouns. The finishing point of that process coincides with the capacity to engage in the mutual perspective.

On the other hand, the anthropological line of argument focuses on identity formation, drawing on the social psychology of G. H. Mead. Mead, in a wide agreement with the Hegelian models of mutual recognition, understands the individual's development of a stable personal identity as extremely complex that is bound up with processes of socialization which is depend on participation in relationships of mutual recognition. Habermas extends this analysis to respond to feminist and communitarian criticisms of impartialist, justice-based moralities.[50] These moralities, as critics claim, imagine an unbelievably atomistic view of the self. In this way, they fail to appreciate the moral import of particularity and cultural substance. The critics have appreciated particular relationships between unique

individuals, on the one hand, and membership in particular cultural communities or traditions, on the other. Here, Habermas claims of discourse ethics, meets two-fold demand in virtue of the kind of mutual perspective. If we observe universalization, we notice that it requires participants to attend to the values and interests of each person as a unique individual. Conversely, each individual condition, his or her judgment about the moral import of his or her values and interests on what all participants can liberally accept. Consequently, moral discourse is structured in a way which links moral validity with a solidaristic apprehension for both the concrete individual and the morally formative communities on which his or her identity may vary according to circumstance.

However, these opinions are certainly motivated, and they only raise as many questions as they answer. It is only just unexpected, that many commentators have not been convinced discourse ethics as a normative ethics. They consider it as believable only in the context of democratic politics, or as a model for the critical evaluation of formal dialogues. For example, environmental conflict resolution, medical ethics committees, etc. Other critics have targeted discourse ethics at a meta-ethical level. In fact, Habermas first unveiled his moral theory in answer to moral non-cognitivism and skepticism.[51] In this context, universalization explains a moral epistemology. It means for moral statements to count as justified. So, if moral statements are justifiable, then they have a cognitive character. It means that they are correct or not depends on how they fare in reasonable discourse.

However, Habermas proposes universalization not only as communicating a consensus model of moral justification, but also as an explanation of the meaning of rightness itself. Unlike truth, the rightness of a moral norm does not consist in reference to an independently existing realm of objects, but rather in the worthiness of

the norm for inter-subjective recognition. Thus rightness, unlike truth, means ideal warranted assertibility.[52] However, this antirealist interpretation of discourse ethics has been severely challenged with a few critics advocating a realist understanding of rightness, others an approach that reduces self respect.

From the above discussion, it is found that Habermas takes a dialogical approach to practical reason, as his discourse theory requires. Habermas' discourse principle articulates this dialogical requirement. If one assumes this requirement, then one can arrive at Habermas' specific conception of reasonable moral discourse by working out the implications of his argumentation theory for the discursive testing of unconditional moral obligations. Habermas' discourse ethics depends on some very strong assumptions about the capacity of persons for moral dialogue.

5.5.3. Habermas' Idea of Human Nature and Autonomy

Habermas points out that language is the most significant criterion for any demarcation between humans and other animals. Therefore, he understands the concept of "eccentric possibility" as an expression of linguistic structures and not vice versa. Again, genetic modification in an individual's natural properties changes the self-understanding of that particular human being as well as his or her relation to the societal environment. Haberman refers to this as "a specific type of paternalism"[53] and thus implicitly emphasizes that genetic engineering fundamentally differs from any other form of determination by others, as it alters the individual's natural disposition. This kind of non-metaphysical approach is especially since in Hbermas' postmetaphysical understanding. According to Habermas, genetic engineering therefore represents a reification of human beings which has strict ethical consequences. In this context, he proposes a virtual discourse in which the physician or doctor records him or herself as a rival of the future human being.

Therefore, according to Habermas, the action-theoretical understanding of the term "human nature", not only depends on the truth that no interference takes place in principle, but, the important question is whether the geneticist or doctor involves in a virtual discourse with the embryo and thus precludes any reifying attitude. Thus, Habermasian concept of action-theoretical version of human nature can be defined in this way, namely, the term 'human nature' relates to those features of a person, which has developed exclusively on their own. Again, that has only been intervened upon under the circumstance of predictable consent. Habermas, in his famous work, *The Future of Human Nature*, argued that genetic engineering as an unknown determination of another person who also undermines the main condition of every moral agent, specifically the consciousness of autonomy.

Again, Habermas explicitly talks about 'discourse' not the conversation as Gadamer has pointed out. For him, discourse is supposed to be a rational, problem-solving mode of communication, which may be used to find non-violent solutions across behavioral and cultural boundaries. Therefore, without going into farther details on this complex concept, it is enough to state that the normative presuppositions of linguistic interaction are particularly important for a discourse-ethical reconstruction of morality. Merely in communicative interaction is essentially feasible to establish moral claims and hence, moral validity. In such presuppositions, the question mainly, how the modification of our genetic code could have strict ethical consequences transforms into the question? Whether there are several connections between our nature and the essential presuppositions of communication.

Habermas' analysis can be summed up in three kinds of hypothesis. These three hypothesis are (1). 'Human nature' provides a species-specific context of human morality which Habermas calls the 'ethics of the species', (2). Genetic manipulation

of this nature embodies a specific form of reification and has to therefore be avoided "if morality itself is not to start slipping";[54] (3). Finaly, the demand for 'moralizing human nature' is justified by the second hypothesis. In discourse ethics, Habermas held a quasi-transcendental status of autonomy and denied the necessity for any 'meta-commitment for morality'.[55]

5.5.4. Habermas' Postmetaphysical Consideration of Human Cloning

Jurgen Habermas has recently confirmed his status as Germany's preeminent public philosopher by entering the debate over human cloning;[56] his passionate opposition to this practice is structured around replies to three other German intellectuals who either condone cloning or do not oppose it on moral grounds.

In this connection, Habermas offers three different but overlapping arguments against cloning. Amongst these three arguments, first one is from a constructivist perspective on human rights. The second one is from the moral stance based on mutual perspective-taking, and the third one is the possibility of moral reciprocity between the cloned and those who clone, or in fact, any human conceived in the traditional way. Here, the latter two of these arguments are related in important ways, and both are depends on a view of human rights, which Habermas has recently explained in his work *Between Facts and Norms*. It is latter found that there are serious problems with each of his three arguments, because all these three arguments fail to take into account the consequences of the probable event of the birth of an actual cloned human. Finally, it can be concluded that although Habermas is perfectly correct in insisting a Kantian kind of "important normative argument" against cloning has a place at the public consideration about this issue, we should not choice to potentially questionable appeals to new applications of human rights which stanch

from an exclusively deontological moral framework in order to reasonably defer the existing search of cloning technology.

A cloned human's "encounter [with] a foreign intention is the mirror image of her own predispositions",[57] says Habermas. It produces a double effect: it permanently disrupts the ability of the clone to see herself as autonomously shaping her own self-understanding as well as putting the clone's creator in a position of power over the clone. Normally, contingencies in the life of a non-genetically or reproductively-engineered human can be taken as either the "givens of birth," the inherent uncertainty of living in the world, or the interaction of both. With the intentions of a creator standing in the place of the first of these kinds of contingencies, a typical "zone of inaccessibility" has been accessed, and this constitutes the "morally and legally relevant difference" in the two births.[58]

"Habermas used the 'inaccessibility' as a reference to the areas of our historical life which could not be explained by reference to the intentions of others having permanent causal impact on us. Another way of putting this is that part of our autonomy, as human, is that significant portions of our life history are "removed from the grasp of another person with whom we are, normatively regarded, on an equal footing."[59] Following this train of thought to argue that the moral and legal relationship of reciprocity between creator and clone cannot come into being, Habermas makes an analogy between the cloner and the clone and the master-slave relationship.[60] Clearly, if cloning, like "slavery is a legal relationship signifying that one person disposes over another as property," then, "it therefore cannot be harmonized with the currently valid concepts of constitutional law: human rights and human dignity."[61] If this analogy holds true for creator and clone, there is a fundamental disproportion in their significant relationships which deny the basic

inter-subjective premise of a universal morality; for Kant, this premise is the possibility of reciprocal recognition.[62] According to Habermas, reciprocity is unrestricted by definite historical communities, whose logic certainly leads us to positing an "unlimited communication community" to which our claims for appreciation are addressed. It demands recognition from us, if in no other way that the joint acknowledgment of definite unanimously binding norms. "Because of [the] inter-subjective relations inscribed in moral norms," Habermas tells us, "no norm, regardless of whether it involves negative or positive rights and duties, can be justified or applied privately in the solitary monologue of the soul with itself."[63] In case of cloning, this observation explains that the mutually supporting necessities of ethical self understanding and being part of a moral community are offended as the accurate degree of responsibility for one's own actions imputable to the clone, which is again uncertain. The rule, "No person may so dispose over another person, may so control his possibilities for acting, in such a way that the dependent person is deprived of an essential part of his freedom,"[64] becomes the central pillar of Habermas' argument. It also allows him to charge the intentions of scientists and cloning technology in the same way that preceding generations have indicted slave owners and traders, paternalistic and misogynistic husbands and fathers, and the corporate marketing establishments who, displeased with meeting customers demand, influence public judgment to fabricate new demands.

On the other hand, Habermas has also drawn our attention to the situation of the cloned human and its self-understanding. It helps the clone to find himself or herself in a unique and unwanted situation regarding two most important sources of individual autonomy, the probability of reciprocity and the ability to take the viewpoint of others and recognize that others have taken his viewpoint. Habermas

asks, "Whether the autonomy of the clone essentially undermined by these considerations?" Despite Habermas' acknowledgment that our self-understandings are dependent on many things including one's genome but also "on interpretive patterns that predominate within a culture,"[65]

In conclusion, one thing can be noticed that Habermas and the pragmatist will agree upon in our postmetaphysical discussion of the implications of new genetic technologies as Sidney Hook observes that "What gives life value is not its mere existence but its quality."[66] According to Habermas, a potential clone has the human right not to be bring into existence, but the application of this "quality of life" principle to the issue of human cloning, which seems to be located in future agreements to a debate, whether the autonomy of a cloned human is fundamentally injured by its creation, or possibly more broadly, whether a clone has the possibility of a high quality of life regardless of his or her origin.

5.6. Concluding Observation

This chapter being the one that offers the argumentative central scenario, at the beginning of the chapter, an attempt has been made to sum up the debate related to human cloning in the field of ethics and bioethics. It has also shown that the biggest concern in connection with human cloning is that the cloned human is "morally despicable", "repugnant", "totally inappropriate", as well as "ethically wrong, socially misguided and biologically mistaken". The following are the major ethical concerns related with cloning in general and human cloning in particular. Cloning technique in general would violate the human dignity and individual rights. It is observed that human cloning in any form and for any purpose should not be ethical because it violates human rights and certain basic ethical norms. Human cloning also violates the theory of equality and dignity. The instrumentation of human beings through the

286

deliberate creation of genetically identical human beings is always contrary to human dignity. It is a parallel to misuse of both biology and medicine. Moreover, it has been pointed out that human or even cloning of any life form challenges the creative spontaneity of evolving life or the creative evolution. It has further discussed how the scientific, philosophical and ethical justificatory arguments for and against cloning, as it has been thoroughly discussed in previous chapters, are grounded to large extent on the concept of autonomy.

Farther the study also included different justifications found on different ground for human cloning. Though, the justification for cloning appeals to the idea of autonomy in this postmodern age, in which people's personal experiences and values play the most important role in determining what is right and true for them. However, it is observed that the tricky ground here is that an honest, complete autonomy-based evaluation of human cloning would have to consider the autonomy of all persons involved, including the people produced through cloning, and not just the autonomy of researchers and people desiring to have clones. So, to proceed with human cloning at this level, would involve a massive assault on the autonomy of all clones produced, whether they lived or died. This challenges autonomy claim as guiding ethical principle. Though it routes the contemporary discourses on cloning including science, fall back on a concept of human nature, integrated by an invariable metaphysical principles. In this connection, the present study has aimed to argue that the 'metaphysical frameworks', as mentioned in the beginning, seeks a stance beyond static or objectivist metaphysics.

Therefore, the study has taken a decisive turn here to extend its investigation on the basis of a Postmetaphysical idea of ethics. As noted above that the postmetaphysical stance in Habermas has two major implications. One, Habermas

calls the post-metaphysical ethical implication 'the concept of being able to be oneself'- autonomy and the right to be postmetaphysically self-organized. The other is the intersubjective framework to associate self with critique, which also familiarized the engagement with the other at the ethico-political plane primarily, as 'concretizable' self critique through the right discourse of deliberative procedure of positive law. Habermas, in this context of cultural critique, the post-metaphysical intent claims the inter-subjective unity of reason that sets an 'ideal critique situation' beyond the scattered local commitments of the various universes of discourse.[67]

The study further moved across Habermas' effort to link morality with respect for autonomous agency, in following the dictates of impartial reason, and simultaneously following the dialogical willingness to listen, talk and respect other such agents. Finally, Habermas has taken a dialogical approach to practical reason, as his discourse theory requires. His discourse principle also articulated this dialogical requirement. It is observed that if one assumes this requirement, then one can arrive at Habermas' specific conception of reasonable moral discourse by working out the implications of his argumentation theory for the discursive testing of unconditional moral obligations. In this sense, Habermas' discourse ethics depends on some very strong assumptions about the capacity of persons for moral dialogue.

It is also found that discourse is conceived in such a way that it is to be realized through the 'cooperative readiness to come to an understanding' on the strength of reason alone and is rationally distinct from everyday context of communicative action. Therefore, the participants of discourse raise arguments for the justification of problematized validity claims. In this context, the process of justification additionally requires a progressive radicalization in the levels of argumentation, which leads one from the context of action to the context of self-

reflection. This kind of self-reflective action is attained through progressive radicalization in the levels of argumentation of both theoretical as well as practical correctness.

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